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Abstract
Cooperative networks rely on user cooperation at the network layer to provide ser-
vices, such as packet forwarding or shared access to other network resources like stor-
age or Internet access. Examples of cooperative networks that build upon user con-
tribution are ad-hoc networks, decentralized wireless mesh networks, micro-operator
networks, wireless Internet access sharing networks or hybrids between these network
types. However, while it enables new types of networks and services, the concept of
cooperative network service provisioning also creates new attack possibilities for ma-
licious and selfish users. For example, wireless multi-hop networks are particularly
susceptible to attacks based on flooding and the interception of, tampering with, and
forging of packets. Thus, reliable communication in such networks quintessentially
depends on mechanisms to allow on-path devices, such as middleboxes, to verify the
authenticity of network traffic and the identity of the communicating peers.
Efficient standard authentication techniques for end-to-middle authentication typ-
ically assume the presence of shared keys within the network or rely on trusted
third parties, such as on-line authentication servers. However, in cooperative sce-
narios, these approaches suffer from significant drawbacks in respect to functionality
and efficiency. Moreover, the tight resource constraints of wireless routers and ac-
cess points in cooperative scenarios make the use of more flexible but less efficient
authentication techniques challenging. Hence, a careful selection of cryptographic
components and the creation of new and flexible and efficient mechanisms is required
to enable end-to-middle authentication in cooperative multi-hop networks.
In this thesis, we address the problem of end-to-middle authentication on different
levels of granularity, ranging from infrequent signaling events to rapid verification
of high-bandwidth payload streams. The different security and performance re-
quirements of signaling and payload traffic prevent the creation of a one-size-fits-all
solution but requires the use of specialized approaches. We designed and analyzed
three solutions that cover low-frequency signaling events as well as high-frequency
payload protection.
We first analyze and extend the Host Identity Protocol to enable secure public-
key based end-to-middle authentication for signaling traffic. However, the use of
CPU-intensive public-key verification prevents the use of this solution for verifying
high-bandwidth payload streams. Consequently, our second solution focuses on more
lightweight cryptographic components to provide end-to-middle authentication for
payload. The Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for Hop-By-hop Authentication,
ALPHA, uses efficient hash functions and hash chains to enable rapid verification
of the source and integrity of a payload packet. Finally, our third solution sacrifices
end-to-middle integrity protection of the packet to further improve the verification
performance. The family of Stream-based Per-packet One-time Token Schemes,
SPOTS enables middleboxes to rapidly authenticate the source of a packet when
the middlebox is agnostic to the contents of the forwarded packet. In combination,
the three solution provide a flexible set of mechanisms that enables efficient end-to-
middle authentication for a wide range of scenarios within and beyond the setting
of cooperative multi-hop networks.

Kurzfassung
Kooperative Netze beruhen auf dem Prinzip der Zusammenarbeit von Benutzern
auf Netzwerkebene, um Dienste wie z.B. das Weiterleiten von Paketen oder den
gemeinsamen Zugriff auf andere Netzwerkressourcen wie Speicherplatz und Inter-
netzugang gemeinschaftlich zu erbringen. Beispiele fu¨r kooperative Netzwerke sind
Ad-Hoc-Netze, dezentrale drahtlose Mesh-Netzwerke, Micro-Operator-Netzwerke,
WLAN-Communities oder hybride Formen dieser Netzwerk-Typen. Jedoch schafft
das Konzept der gemeinschaftlichen Schaffung eines Netzes auch neue Angriffs-
mo¨glichkeiten fu¨r egoistische und bo¨sartige Benutzer. Zum Beispiel sind drahtlose
Multi-Hop-Netzwerke besonders anfa¨llig gegenu¨ber Angriffen, die auf dem Fluten
des Netzwerks mit Schadpaketen oder der Manipulation und Fa¨lschung von Paketen
beruhen. Um eine zuverla¨ssige Kommunikation in solchen Netzwerken zu erreichen
sind daher Mechanismen notwendig, welche es weiterleitenden Gera¨ten, sogenannten
Middleboxen, erlauben, die Herkunft und Authentizita¨t von Paketen vor der Weiter-
leitung zu u¨berpru¨fen.
Effiziente Standardlo¨sungen, um eine solche Ende-zu-Mitte-Authentifizierung zu er-
reichen, setzen typischerweise geteilte symmetrische Schlu¨ssel zwischen Endgera¨ten
und Middleboxen voraus oder beruhen auf einer stets verfu¨gbaren Verbindung zu
einem Authentifizierungsserver. Diese Einschra¨nkungen fu¨hren jedoch in kooper-
ativen Netzen zu deutlichen Nachteilen bezu¨glich der Flexibilita¨t und Effizienz.
Daru¨ber hinaus erschweren die knappen Ressourcen von drahtlosen Gera¨ten wie
WLAN-Routern und Access Points den Einsatz flexiblerer aber weniger effizienter
kryptographischer Methoden.
Diese Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem Problem der effizienten Ende-zu-Mitte Authen-
tifizierung in verschiedenen Granularita¨ten, beginnend mit der Authentifizierung
sporadischer Signalisierungsnachrichten bis hin zur rapiden Bearbeitung von hoch-
frequenten Authentifikationsereignissen, wie sie fu¨r breitbandige Nutzdatenstro¨me
no¨tig sind. Dabei verhindern die verschiedenen Sicherheits- und Performanzan-
forderungen von Signalisierungsnachrichten und Nutzdatenstro¨men die Schaffung
einer allumfassenden Lo¨sung. Daher stellt diese Arbeit drei sich erga¨nzende Lo¨sun-
gen vor, deren Kombination ein breites Spektrum an Authentifikationsgranularita¨ten
abdecken.
Diese Arbeit widmet sich zuerst der Public-Key-basierten Ende-zu-Mitte-Authent-
ifizierung. Dabei wird das Host Identity Protocol (HIP) analysiert und erweitert,
um den Schutz von sporadischem Signalisierungsverkehr zu erreichen. Jedoch ver-
hindert die Nutzung von rechenintensiven Public-Key-Verifikationen in HIP den
Einsatz dieser Lo¨sung fu¨r die Authentisierung von breitbandigen Nutzdatenstro¨-
men. Daher verwendet die zweite vorgestellte Lo¨sung ausschließlich leichtgewichtige
kryptographische Komponenten, um die effiziente Ende-zu-Mitte-Authentifizierung
von Nutzdatenstro¨men zu ermo¨glichen. Das “Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for
Hop-by-Hop Authentication”, ALPHA, verwendet effiziente Hash-Funktionen und
Hash-Ketten, um eine schnelle U¨berpru¨fung der Quelle und Integrita¨t eines Netz-
werkpakets zu erreichen. Die dritte vorgestellte Lo¨sung, SPOTS, verzichtet auf
Ende-zu-Mitte Integrita¨tsschutz um die kryptographische Komplexita¨t der Authen-
tifizierung weiter zu senken. SPOTS basiert ausschließlich auf effizienten Einweg-
funktionen und ermo¨glicht es Middleboxen ausschließlich die Quellinformation eines
Paketes zu u¨berpru¨fen. Diese alleinige Quellpru¨fung eignet sich besonders fu¨r die
Anwendung in Fa¨llen, in denen eine U¨berpru¨fung des Paketinhalts durch die Middle-
boxen nicht notwendig oder nicht mo¨glich ist, zum Beispiel bei Ende-zu-Ende ver-
schlu¨sselten Daten. In Kombination bieten die drei Lo¨sungen einen flexiblen Satz
von Mechanismen, welcher effiziente Ende-zu-Mitte-Authentifizierung fu¨r ein brei-
tes Spektrum von Szenarien innerhalb und außerhalb von kooperativen Multi-Hop-
Netzen ermo¨glicht.
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1
Introduction
Over the last decades, computer networks have become more and more dynamic,
distributed, and cooperative. Beginning with the Internet as the most prominent
example of a cooperative and distributed network, a development towards even more
open and dynamic network concepts in the wired and wireless domain is evident.
This development is driven by the need to reduce the deployment and operation costs
and to increase the functionality and availability of networks. For example, peer-
to-peer networks promote network concepts where end-hosts supplement or even
substitute core functions of the network (e.g., routing and addressing). Involving
user devices enables these systems to cheaply and reliably serve use cases for which
expensive server infrastructure would otherwise be required. At the same time, the
rapid development and proliferation of wireless communication technology, especially
Wi-Fi, has led to an almost ubiquitous presence of affordable and available wireless
client devices and infrastructure.
This availability of cheap wireless stations and access points in combination with
an open frequency band has fostered research and development in new wireless net-
works with small-scale operator structures, in which, similar to the peer-to-peer
concept, users create wireless networks based on individual contribution. Like for
peer-to-peer-networks, user contribution can enable a larger wireless coverage and
can reduce the deployment and operation costs because the effort for creating and
running the cooperative network is shared among all users. A second reason for the
success of such user-operated networks is the high flexibility regarding the provision-
ing of the network, its services, and its business models. Such flexibility is highly
valued in a domain mostly dominated by large mobile communication companies.
However, with the advent of such cooperatively operated networks, new security
threats, such as selfish misuse of shared network resources, arise because central
control and authentication infrastructures are often missing.
Examples of networks that embrace user contribution are ad-hoc networks, decen-
tralized wireless mesh networks, micro-operator networks, wireless Internet access
sharing networks or hybrids between these network types [BH08]. A common trait
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of these networks is the contribution of users to the network infrastructure by pro-
viding services like network access control and routing, that, in other networks, are
exclusively provided by a dedicated network operator. The absence of such trusted
network structures requires new decentralized solutions for essential security ser-
vices, such as authentication, authorization, and accounting. Furthermore, since
core network services are provided by untrusted users, the distinction between trust
worthy managed network infrastructure and untrusted user devices is fading. Most
notably, a simple distinction between benign insiders (the provider) and potentially
malicious outsiders (the user) is not possible anymore. As a result, in addition to
general security threats of wireless networks, cooperative networks are highly vul-
nerable to selfish misuse of the network, as well as to resource-targeted Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks.
In recent years, two complementary developments have gained importance in the
area of network security to counter the threats in distributed networks. For one,
end-systems implement an increasing number of security features because networks
– especially in the wireless domain – have become inherently insecure. For another,
middleboxes realize more and more security-related services within the network to
prevent intrusion, DoS attacks, and misuse of resources. However, the disconnect
between these two developments created end-to-end protocols that are primarily
concerned with the end-to-end security properties and middleboxes that are left to
scavenge the sparse and mostly non-verifiable information from forwarded packets.
With an increasing trend for general traffic encryption [KKG+10, AN04], middle-
boxes are often left with no other option but to merely observe the information in
few unencrypted packet headers, further impairing the ability of these devices to
detect malicious attacks and selfish behavior.
The need to close the gap between end-to-end security solutions and security ser-
vices provided within the network has sparked interest in middlebox-aware security
solutions in which end-to-end security protocols are designed to aid middleboxes in
their security related tasks. Examples of such end-to-middle solutions are the Host
Identity Protocol (HIP) [MNJH08, MHJH11] and the Packet-Level Authentication
(PLA) [CLK05] protocol. These protocols support middleboxes explicitly in their
authentication-related tasks, allowing them to better protect the network against
unauthorized access and resource misuse.
Technically, these protocols rely on CPU-intensive public-key signatures, which ei-
ther results in serious performance limitations or the need for specialized crypto-
graphic hardware acceleration, which, due to its complexity and price, is not available
in commodity hardware devices today. The mismatch between the computational
resources of middleboxes and the computational demands of the employed crypto-
graphic primitives renders these protocols vulnerable to DoS attacks and limits their
applicability to processing of low volumes of traffic.
1.1 Contributions
One of the main causes for concern in cooperative networks is the general lack
of trust that stems from the missing distinction between a trusted insider and a
potentially malicious outsider. Without sensible classification of trustworthy and
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non-trustworthy groups of devices, the identity of a device becomes a key concept
for detecting and preventing malicious actions. However, pure end-to-end authenti-
cation techniques are insufficient if malicious or selfish actions threaten the network
itself rather than another end-host. Hence, our main focus is on end-to-middle au-
thentication as a key building block for achieving a range of security goals, such
as access control, availability, and non-repudiation. In particular, this thesis shows
how end-to-end protocols can be extended with end-to-middle authentication fea-
tures to counter authentication-related threats. Such end-to-middle authentication
allows entities on the communication path to verify the origin and integrity of the
data they process.
In this thesis we analyze, design, and evaluate end-to-middle authentication proto-
cols for multi-hop networks. Thereby, we address the fundamental tension between
security and lack of central control in cooperative networks. To support the dis-
tributed and decentralized character of emerging cooperative networks, we discuss
three novel approaches that enable direct end-to-middle authentication without re-
liance on trusted on-line third-party authentication servers. With such a capability,
middleboxes can shelter against resource misuse and protect end-hosts against DoS
attacks that leverage the middleboxes as a weak spot.
Additional security measures typically come at a price because increased security
often results in reduced performance or increased protocol or system complexity.
Thus, we specifically consider these metrics in our work and provide a range of
options that provide tradeoffs between security, performance, and protocol complex-
ity. Apart from simple but heavy-weight public-key based authentication methods,
we explore more lightweight alternatives based on cryptographic hashes and hash
chains to provide adaptable end-to-middle authentication protocols to meet the per-
formance and security needs of many application scenarios.
As main contribution of this work, we design and analyze three protocols:
1. The HIP Middlebox Authentication extension (HIP-MA) for public-key
based end-to-middle signaling.
2. The Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for Hop-by-hop Authentica-
tion (ALPHA), a protocol that relies on a lightweight hash-chain authentica-
tion mechanism for higher traffic volumes.
3. Stream-based Per-packet One-time Token Schemes (SPOTS), a family
of token schemes for lightweight token-based source authentication without
integrity protection for payload.
1.2 Scope and Genesis of this Thesis
The creation of the three proposed end-to-middle authentication protocols (HIP-MA,
ALPHA, and SPOTS tokens) was an iterative process consisting of the analysis and
subsequent improvement of our previous work. The order and structure of this work
reflects the chronological order of these iterations. Thus, the shortcomings of each
discussed protocol define the design goals for the next protocol. However, in order
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to achieve these goals, tradeoffs between performance, simplicity, and security are
necessary. In the following, we briefly summarize the relations and the rationale for
creating each of the three protocols:
HIP-MA – End-to-middle Authentication for HIP Signaling Traffic: The first
protocol presented in this work focuses on the protection of end-to-middle
signaling traffic with low traffic volume. To this end, we analyzed the Host
Identity Protocol (HIP), a security and key exchange protocol that acknowl-
edged the presence of middleboxes in its design phase. During our analysis
of the interaction between HIP end-hosts and middleboxes we discovered that
HIP does not provide a proof of freshness to middleboxes, rendering on-path
devices vulnerable to replay attacks performed by colluding attackers. We de-
signed HIP-MA, which mitigates such attacks and allows on-path middleboxes
to securely authenticate end-hosts. The performance of HIP-MA is limited
by the computational cost of the public key signature algorithms employed
by HIP, and hence, limits the use of HIP to the protection of low-frequency
signaling events (i.e., low traffic volumes).
ALPHA – End-to-middle Authentication for High-Volume Traffic: Driven by
the performance limitations of HIP-MA, we analyzed alternative and less re-
source demanding signature schemes with the goal of securing high-volume
payload traffic. Hash chains, as inexpensive cryptographic components can be
used to provide efficient end-to-end source authentication and integrity pro-
tection for unicast and multicast traffic. In our work on the Adaptive and
Lightweight Protocol for Hop-by-hop Authentication, ALPHA, we design a
hash-chain based approach to match the requirements of end-to-middle source
authentication and integrity protection for signaling and payload traffic. How-
ever, ALPHA shows channel properties, such as delay and burstiness, that
deviate from the behavior of an unprotected IP communication. This makes
ALPHA applicable for network applications with high throughput require-
ments but limited end-to-end delay constraints.
SPOTS – Lightweight End-to-middle Source Authentication: The third pro-
posed mechanism uses cryptographic tokens based on computationally in-
expensive hash chains and hash graphs: Stream-based Per-packet One-time
Token Schemes (SPOTS). SPOTS tokens are replay-proof tokens for source
authentication without additional delays or the use of computationally ex-
pensive asymmetric cryptography. In scenarios where middleboxes only need
to attribute packets to a sender (e.g., for per-sender resources allocation or
per-sender access control), SPOTS can provide a simple and highly efficient
defense mechanism against a malicious or selfish sender. In contrast to AL-
PHA, SPOTS tokens are suited for delay-sensitive applications and achieve an
even higher throughput.
The common focus of HIP-MA, ALPHA, and SPOTS on end-to-middle authentica-
tion leads to a number of common properties. First, all of these protocols focus on IP
networks and are conceptually located at or above the network layer and below the
transport layer in the communication stack. This layering is in accordance with the
function of the network and transport layer, with the network layer being the layer
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that enables routing across several hops and the transport layer enabling end-to-end
communication associations. Second, none of the protocols requires the exchange
of pair-wise shared secrets between the middleboxes and the end-hosts. This is an
important property because it drastically simplifies, and in some cases obviates, the
complex trust bootstrapping otherwise needed for the key distribution in cooperative
and distributed networks. Moreover, it allows middleboxes to dynamically interact
with hosts without pre-established security contexts. Third, all protocols are exe-
cuted and driven by end-hosts. This means, that end-hosts actively participate in
the authentication process. This property sets apart our work from pure in-network
security solutions (e.g., packet passports [LYWA06] and hop integrity [GEHM02]).
1.2.1 Scope of our Solutions
A coarse-grained classification of our solutions into architectures, protocols, and
mechanisms can help to show the intention and scope of the different solutions:
i) Cryptographic mechanisms (e.g., cryptographic primitives and their application)
provide the building blocks for creating ii) protocols that achieve different security
goals. These protocols can then be combined into iii) architectures that mold a set
of protocols into one system. The three main contributions of this work, HIP-MA,
ALPHA, and SPOTS tokens, occupy different areas of the above classification. In
the following, we briefly discuss how our solutions fit into the three classes. Ta-
ble 1.1 provides a summary of the classification. For the sake of conciseness, we
merely state the different technical mechanisms here and defer a detailed discussion
to the respective chapters.
HIP-MA, as a protocol extension to HIP, defines a protocol that employs the mech-
anisms of nonces, public-key signatures, and cryptographic puzzles. It is part
of a larger architecture, PiSA, that defines the use of the protocol to achieve a
certain goal in an existing system. For HIP-MA, our main achievement is the
analysis of HIP, the discovery of an attack, and the resulting protocol design
and protocol analysis. The actual mechanisms that HIP-MA employs are well
known, however, their combination into a coherent protocol in the context of
end-to-middle authentication for HIP is novel.
ALPHA defines a protocol based on delayed secret disclosure schemes. We did not
define a specific architecture that ALPHA is part of but designed the protocol
as general security building block. As in HIP-MA, the basic mechanisms in
HIP-MA ALPHA SPOTS tokens
Architectures PiSA − −
Protocols HIP-MA ALPHA, ALPHA for
IP
token IPsec extension
Mechanisms nonces, cryptographic
puzzles, public-key
signatures
delayed secret
disclosure,
amortization schemes
lightweight and
loss-tolerant hash
chain tokens
Table 1.1 The contributions of the different chapters of this work grouped into architectures,
protocols, and mechanisms. Our main contributions are printed in bold.
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ALPHA are well known but their application in end-to-middle authentication
is novel. Hence, the main contribution is the ALPHA protocol design.
The SPOTS token schemes provide a loss-tolerant and lightweight source authen-
tication mechanism that can be used in different protocols. Here, the contri-
bution is the design and evaluation of the basic mechanisms. We provide an
example protocol implementation of the token scheme for IPsec, however, it
only serves to illustrate the use of the tokens and to evaluate their efficiency
in practice. Similar to ALPHA, the SPOTS tokens are not employed in a
concrete architecture yet.
For all three solutions, the focus of this work is on mechanisms and their combination
into protocols. We use the setting of cooperative networks as defining factor of our
security and systems requirements. However, since our solutions are not restricted
to cooperative scenarios, we present and evaluate them independent of their use in
a concrete cooperative system.
1.3 Outline
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes and describes the basic
problems and challenges for end-to-middle authentication in cooperative scenarios.
Chapter 3 introduces background material on authentication and network security.
It discusses threats in networking and briefly introduces defense mechanisms. Chap-
ters 4 through 6 present the three protocols, HIP-MA, ALPHA and SPOTS. For
each protocol we provide an individual analysis of the problem space, protocol de-
scription, related work, and evaluation. Chapter 7 revisits the challenges described
in the problem statement and sets into context the different parts of this thesis. In
addition, the appendix provides additional figures and measurements for alternative
scenarios and hardware platforms.
2
Scenario and Problem Statement
With the advent of cooperative networking, a range of new security threats have
surfaced. Especially the lack of trusted provider structures for authentication, au-
thorization, and accounting allows malicious users of the network to manipulate
cooperatively provided network services. Consequently, these networks are often
susceptible to threats that center on the illegitimate use of the network and its re-
sources. Providing a degree of end-to-middle authentication for users and devices can
help the network to mitigate these threats by identifying and preventing illegitimate
and selfish behavior.
The three approaches presented in this thesis revolve around the theme of end-to-
middle authentication in the absence of centralized authentication services. Due to
the need to directly authenticate towards middleboxes without the use of an addi-
tional online third-party authentication server, we refer to the approaches as direct
end-to-middle authentication. This chapter provides an overview of the different as-
pects of our work. The chapter first introduces cooperative networks and highlights
their security challenges. These security challenges and the assumed absence of a
centralized trusted entity for solving these challenges defines the problem space of
this work. Secondly, we discuss the origin and the role of middleboxes for security
in today’s networks and motivate that middleboxes and end-to-middle authentica-
tion can enhance security in cooperative networks. In this regard, the capabilities
of these middleboxes in combination with the capabilities of the end-hosts define
the solution space of this work. The chapter concludes with a problem statement
that states seven challenges for direct end-to-middle authentication in cooperative
networks. Based on these challenges, we assess the results of our work in Chapter 7.
2.1 Cooperative Networks
Cooperative networks are networks in which the users of the network cooperate to
create the network itself or the services offered by the network. These networks
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often exhibit an ad-hoc character in which user devices join and leave a network
or take over certain network functions (e.g., packet forwarding) on demand without
the need to set up a pre-defined network topology. Wireless technology has fostered
such dynamic networks by making connectivity available by sheer proximity of the
communicating peers without the need to provide cabling or other intermediary in-
frastructure. As a result, cooperation between users and devices can be spontaneous
and can even be extended to the cooperation between unknown entities without
prior contact or a-priori trust relationships.
The availability of cheap wireless router hardware and a free wireless frequency
band has created numerous user-driven initiatives to create cooperative provider-
less networks. These initiatives started as grass-roots movements between neighbors
and friends but soon created networks of hundreds of devices. Examples for such
networks are the Freifunk [Fre11] and Funkfeuer [Fun11a] initiatives in Berlin and
Vienna as well as the roofnet project in Cambridge [MIT11, BABM05] and its spinoff
Meraki [Mer11]. These networks embrace openness and have long passed the point at
which trust relations between every pair of users exist. The ongoing interest in these
cooperative networks and their continued growth has led to the definition of a pico
peering agreement [Fun11b] to provide a legal basis for each micro operator. This
agreement states that users provide free data transit and open access. Moreover, it
contains a liability exclusion for the pico operator. However, while the legal aspects
of service provisioning are defined by this agreement, providing security measures
to enforce proper user behavior or to detect misbehavior in such open networks still
remains challenging.
One of the fundamental principles of cooperative networks is resource sharing. Sim-
ilar to peer-to-peer networking concepts, users contribute their own resources to the
network and can use other users’ resources in return. Adopting this concept, wireless
networks can grow in coverage and function by harnessing the resources contributed
by each individual user. Examples of cooperative and collaborative networks that
rely on resource sharing are Wi-Fi Internet sharing communities, ad-hoc networks,
distributed mesh networks, and hybrid forms of these network types. In all of these
examples, the very existence of the network and its services are only possible through
user contribution and user interaction.
Cooperative networks can be classified by the resources that are shared in a coop-
erative manner. Focusing on network resources, such resources can be a) Internet
access or b) packet forwarding. This work focuses on the security aspects of two
examples that each share one of these resources: a) community Internet sharing
networks that use layer-3 Internet uplinks as the shared resource and b) cooperative
wireless multi-hop networks that use layer-two and layer-three forwarding capabili-
ties as the shared resource. However, we strongly believe that our results are also
applicable to other types of cooperative networks, such as networks of smart objects,
wireless sensor networks, and hybrid forms of these networks for which, as we have
shown in [HGMH+11], the application of standard Internet solutions is challenging.
Moreover, while all presented networks are wireless networks, our focus is on their
principal security problems rather than on the effects of the wireless medium. Hence,
none of our solutions is limited to the wireless domain but can also be applied in
wired broadcast and unicast domains. In the following, we briefly describe the two
network types that are most relevant for this thesis.
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2.1.1 Community Internet Sharing Networks
With the proliferation of IEEE 802.11, wireless infrastructure has become available
at prices that are affordable for very small operators and even individuals [BH08] and
has led to a dense coverage of urban areas with private wireless Internet gateways.
At the same time, Internet access technologies like DSL and cable modems have
gradually replaced ISDN and V.92, making broadband access available virtually
anywhere in urban areas. Despite these facts, broadband Internet is rarely available
to nomadic users because few access point owners are willing to altruistically open
their gateways to others and to accept the ensuing security and liability risks. Thus,
mobile users need to rely on expensive commercial wireless services typically only
available at particular points of interests such as airports and hotels.
These shortcomings have motivated Wi-Fi sharing communities in which a mobile
member may access other members’ residential broadband connection via their wire-
less access point. Originating in purely user-driven neighborhood networks such as
PTP [Per11] in Portland, companies like fon [LIM11] and Wippies [Sau11] commer-
cialized this concept. These companies offer customized IEEE 802.11 access points
that exclusively grant Internet access to members of the community. Owners of an
access point become micro-operators and offer Internet access to other community
members.
However, including the user in the provisioning of wireless Internet access creates
new threats. On the one hand, mobile users that use the Internet connection of
an unknown micro-provider may become victims of eavesdropping and man-in-the-
middle attacks. On the other hand, micro-operators may be held responsible for
the actions of a mobile user. In many cases, the lack of a professional provider that
offers essential security services, such as strong access control and logging, leaves a
micro-operator with his word against the mobile member’s.
The lack of security and trust in Wi-Fi sharing networks has motivated our work
on the Peer-to-peer Internet Sharing Architecture (PiSA) [HGWW08, HJH+10,
HHV+10]. Figure 2.1 provides an overview of the components of PiSA. PiSA uses
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Figure 2.1 The Peer-to-peer Internet Sharing Architecture uses a secured tunnel between the
mobile device and its access point at home to solve legal and security issues. Certificates prove
the community membership of a user.
10 2. Scenario and Problem Statement
a tunnel between the mobile device and its own access point at home to create a
trusted point of indirection between the mobile user and the Internet. This point of
indirection prevents that access point owners who provide service to other unknown
community members are held responsible for their actions because the mobile node’s
(potentially illegitimate) traffic is tunneled to their own router at home before it is
sent to the Internet. At the same time, the tunnel to their trusted indirection
point protects the mobile user from eavesdropping by malicious access point own-
ers. In PiSA, the trusted indirection point and the mobile device associated with it
use cryptographic identities based on public keys for mutual authentication and for
authentication to the host access point. The community membership of a user is
expressed by a certificate that a community operator creates for users that operate
their own access point to serve other community members. The trusted indirec-
tion point presents this certificate to the host access point when the mobile device
establishes the tunnel.
For this thesis, the role of the host access point is most important. The host access
point is a user device that authenticates unknown mobile devices and the trusted in-
direction points to which it has no prior trust relationship. Hence, it cannot assume
any of the two to be trustworthy or well behaving. Still, it serves as the primary
point of access control for the system. It can perform this action by first asserting the
cryptographic identity of the trusted indirection point and then evaluating the com-
munity certificate for this digital identity. Thus, the host access point is a middlebox
that operates as certificate-based firewall. As such, it must perform end-to-middle
authentication (asserting the identity of the trusted indirection point) and access
control based on the information in the certificate. We discuss this end-to-middle
authentication capability in the context of HIP-MA in Chapter 4. In addition,
the host access point must perform per-packet end-to-middle authentication to pre-
vent resource misuse by malicious or selfish mobile devices. We present a family of
one-time token schemes for achieving efficient per-packet source authentication in
Chapter 6.
2.1.2 Cooperative Wireless Multi-hop Networks
Wireless mesh networks utilize the relatively short-ranged wireless links of IEEE
802.11 radios to establish a meshed network topology for routing packets towards
user stations and Internet gateways in a multi-hop fashion [WMB06]. Initiatives,
such as Freifunk [Fre11] in Germany and Funkfeuer [Fun11a] in Austria, have man-
aged to cover large urban areas with such mesh networks. These networks have an
open access concept in which every interested user may contribute to and use the
network.
Figure 2.2 illustrates an example topology in which a source sends data to a des-
tination node via multiple relays. The network topology of such networks is of-
ten complex and interdependencies between links exist because of mutual interfer-
ence [WMB06]. Even the links of one single path may interfere with each other.
For example in Figure 2.2, the adjacent wireless links between the relays r1, r2, and
r3 interfere for packets from the source s to the destination d if the links use the
same frequency (i.e., the same channel). For multi-hop transmissions, inter-link and
intra-link interference leads to a high communication cost in terms of increased delay
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Figure 2.2 In a wireless mesh network, nodes may act as a source, destination, or relays.
Wireless mesh networks use costly multi-hop forwarding for delivering packets to distant des-
tinations.
and packet loss and reduced throughput [WMB06]. Therefore, multi-hop wireless
forwarding must be used carefully to avoid performance degradation within the net-
work. Consequently, malicious flooding within the network presents a formidable
Denial of Service attack.
The fact that each node may be the origin or merely the forwarder of traffic from
other nodes makes identifying the source of a transmission difficult. Hence, selfish
nodes may disguise their massive channel use as transmissions of other nodes to gain
higher throughput at the cost of other network members.
Because of the communication cost of multi-hop transmissions and the missing trust
relations between the nodes, establishing a consistent global view of the relevant
security events within the network is also challenging. The lack of an efficiently
reachable central network management forces each router to perform essential tasks,
such as topology detection and topology control, load balancing, and security, on its
own without global knowledge.
In short, serious conceptual and technical performance limitations exist for these
scenarios and render these scenarios susceptible to resource misuse and resource-
targeted Denial of Service attacks. Hence, the secure use and fair allocation of
network resources plays an important role in these scenarios. Especially the costly
multi-hop routing in combination with the limited local view of each node can be
exploited to misuse or deplete network resources. Thus, stopping malicious or selfish
traffic early in the network is important to preserve the function of the network in
presence of malicious users.
Hop-by-hop end-to-middle authentication can contribute to the fair resource allo-
cation in these networks. It allows to discard forged traffic before it is routed over
multiple hops and mitigates threats that arise from the anonymous use of the net-
work. However, providing resource-efficient hop-by-hop authentication is challenging
because of the resource limitations of the devices and the resource requirements of
the cryptographic operations. These limitations motivated our research on hop-by
hop authentication with ALPHA and per-packet origin authentication with the one-
time tokens of SPOTS to protect the scarce resources of these networks against
selfish and malicious misuse (c.f. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).
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2.2 Middleboxes
The end-to-end argument is one of the fundamental corner stones of the design and
evolution of the Internet architecture [Car96]. It mandates to design systems such
that as much complexity as possible is implemented in the end-systems instead of in
the network. Thus, functions should only be performed within the network if end-
hosts cannot perform them efficiently or securely. However, in the last two decades,
a plethora of network elements, such as Network Address Translators (NATs), fire-
walls, and proxies, that perform complex functions within the network have surfaced.
Following the end-to-end argument, these complex functions are ideally tasks that
end-hosts cannot perform. Obvious examples for such tasks are network access con-
trol and firewalling where the end-systems are not assumed to be benign, honest,
and altruistic in their actions and cannot be trusted to perform these tasks properly.
Another example is the creation of network address translators, which implement
in-network address rewriting that cannot be performed by end-hosts.
User-provided network elements in cooperative networks often partake in the for-
warding of packets and other essential tasks. Hence, these user devices often assume
the role of middleboxes in cooperative networks. This section gives an overview of
the origin and role of middleboxes in the Internet, summarizes design options for
protocols and highlights challenges for end-to-middle authentication.
2.2.1 History and Terminology
In 1999, the emergence of entities on the communication path, that were not part
of the original Internet design, led to the creation of the term “middlebox” by Lixia
Zhang. This term emphasizes the topological location of these on-path devices:
a box that sits at the middle of a communication path. According to Carpenter
and Brim, a middlebox is “performing functions other than the normal, standard
functions of an IP router on the datagram path between a source host and destina-
tion host” [CB02]. Examples of such devices are network and protocol translators,
firewalls, authenticators, on-path transcoders, tunnel end-points, and proxies. The
emergence of these devices has positive and negative aspects: on the one hand, these
devices enable a plethora of new functions and use-cases that have not been possible
with pure end-to-end protocols. Amongst these functions are address and protocol
translation that have dramatically extended the lifetime of the aging IPv4 Internet
and will enable a smooth transition path towards an IPv6 Internet. On the other
hand, these devices pose new challenges for old protocols, turning these protocols
into legacy protocols that cannot operate in the presence of the almost ubiquitous
middleboxes any more. The classic example for such a legacy protocol is active FTP.
Since NATs only permit outgoing connections, active FTP, which requires support
for incoming connections, fails. Similarly, many Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocols, are
also challenged by the presence of middleboxes such as network and port address
translators as well as firewalls for the same reason.
It is interesting to see that the distinction between an end-host and a middlebox is
not a distinction of different devices or network entities but a distinction between
different roles. For example, a firewall device may act as a middlebox for traffic that
passes through it. The same firewall device may act as an end-host when another
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host connects to it for configuring its firewall rules via an SSH terminal or web-
application. Likewise, the same firewall device can act as an end-host when it queries
the DNS system to resolve a host name, that it encountered in the forwarded traffic.
Hence, the term middlebox refers to a dynamic role in a communication process but
not to a network entity or a physical device.
Implicit and explicit middlebox design
Carpenter and Brim argue that middleboxes can be distinguished by the question
whether the function of the middlebox is an explicit design feature of an end-to-end
protocol or if the function of the middlebox was not foreseen when the respective
end-to-end protocol was designed. They use the terms explicit and implicit for
distinguishing these types of middleboxes. As an example for an explicit middle-
box design, they name SMTP and as an example for an implicit middlebox, they
name network address translators [CB02]. As a consequence of the inclusion of mid-
dleboxes in the design process, implicit middleboxes often try to be invisible and
non-obtrusive to avoid negative effects on the respective end-to-end protocols. Fol-
lowing this distinction, our work focuses on explicit middleboxes that are taken into
account at design time. This means, all of the presented protocols define how the
protocol behaves in the presence of middleboxes as well as how middleboxes process
the traffic flowing between the end-hosts.
2.2.2 Middleboxes in Cooperative Networks
In cooperative networks, user-provided devices extend or even substitute trusted
provider-based infrastructure. In the scenarios discussed above, these devices per-
form security-related operations typical for middleboxes, such as firewalls and au-
thenticators. Examples for such user-provided middleboxes are the access points in
Wi-Fi Internet sharing or the mesh routers in cooperative mesh networks. They play
an important role for the security and availability of the network since they perform
essential security and non-security related services, such as user authentication, ac-
cess control, and packet forwarding. Hence, they must be protected from attackers
that either aim at undermining their authentication functions or try to interfere with
their other functions in a selfish or malicious way.
The middleboxes in these scenarios represent valuable resources because they may
be shared by many end-hosts. For example, routers in a cooperative Wi-Fi network
forward data for a multitude of potentially distant end-hosts. Also, a Wi-Fi access
point in the Wi-Fi sharing scenario may serve numerous clients simultaneously. In a
more adverse setting, users do not share the resources of a middlebox benignly but
compete for these resources. Therefore, the common use and the scarcity of the re-
sources may motivate malicious users to target these middleboxes to disrupt existing
communication or to prevent further communication of other users. For example,
an attacker could either impair the function of the middlebox by flooding it with
attack packets at a high rate to consume its resources needed for packet forward-
ing. Alternatively, the attacker could try to invoke CPU-intensive operations (e.g.,
authentication procedures) to keep the middlebox from processing the requests of
14 2. Scenario and Problem Statement
legitimate hosts. Thus, defenses against such resource targeted attacks are essential
for the availability of the network.
Cooperative network deployments often utilize non-specialized hardware such as
commodity wireless routers and mobile devices for fostering their growth and for
simplifying the deployment of new services. Recent developments regarding open-
source operating systems for routers, such as the family of Linux-based OpenWRT1
routers has further fostered this practice. However, using such existing hardware for
new purposes introduces tight performance constraints because the hardware is not
tailored to achieving a certain throughput, latency, and availability in cooperative
scenarios. These additional restrictions must be considered in respect to the ex-
pected throughput in cooperative wireless networks. This possible throughput in a
wireless cooperative network strongly depends on the environment, the communica-
tion distance, and the employed hardware. We analyzed the throughput for different
802.11g and 802.11n devices and routers in [WHBW11] for different situations with-
out additional security measures. In our test scenarios, typical TCP throughputs for
a one-hop wireless transmission range between 10 Mbit/s and 40 Mbit/s, depending
on the employed devices. The maximum throughput rates degrade to 20 Mbit/s
for two hops and quickly approach values of less than 10 Mbit/s for three and four
hops. Hence, new security functions must be implemented in a way that preserves
the throughput of the cooperative wireless network. Furthermore, the performance
impact of new security functions on commodity hardware must be well understood to
avoid unforeseen DoS vulnerabilities.
The middleboxes in cooperative networks may be user-operated. Thus, in con-
trast to provider-operated middleboxes, the assumption that these devices are well-
configured and benign cannot be made. Therefore, middleboxes cannot purely rely
on other middleboxes for protecting against threats in the network but must assume
that these devices may be malicious. As a consequence, any interaction between
middleboxes must be performed with caution.
Finally, establishing trust and security is challenging in a cooperative scenario be-
cause neither the identity of the end-hosts nor the identity of all other middleboxes
is known to a middlebox or end host. The set of middleboxes is defined by the
topological location of the source and the sender as well as of the topological loca-
tion of the middleboxes. Therefore, for different pairs of communicating end-hosts,
different sets of middleboxes may be present on the communication path. Hence,
the set of middleboxes is not determined at design time but must be determined at
protocol run-time. This uncertainty regarding the existence and identity of middle-
boxes, complicate the trust bootstrapping between end-systems and middleboxes.
While centralized trust centers can simplify device and user authentication, such
facilities may not always exist in cooperative and distributed scenarios. Moreover,
the dependency on a trust center as an always-reachable online entity can intro-
duce new DoS vulnerabilities in cooperative networks because blocking access to the
trust center can impair vital authentication-related network functions. Therefore,
we focus on trust bootstrapping without guaranteed reachability of a common trust
1The development of OpenWRT [Ope11] has led to a plethora of projects that use commodity
hardware and the Linux-based operating system for advanced purposes. Examples of such projects are
Freifunk, Funkfeuer and fon.
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center. Hence, our protocols require other means of trust bootstrapping that can be
performed directly between end-systems and middleboxes.
2.3 Problem Statement
Summarizing the discussion of the scenario descriptions and the challenges for the
design of end-to-middle protocols in cooperative networks, we formulate the following
problem statement.
The main problem, this work focuses on, is the lack of authentication in cooperative
networks, which can be exploited to misuse the network in a malicious or selfish
way. The origin of this problem is the fading distinction between benign insiders
and malicious outsiders in such a network. As a result, protecting the resources of
the network from malicious and selfish users becomes increasingly difficult. More-
over, a lack of authentication can also result in identity spoofing, which can lead to
more severe security violations, such as unauthorized access to services or informa-
tion. A lack of such protection affects the performance and function of individual
middleboxes but may also reduce the performance of larger parts of the network if
forged or flooded packets propagate through the network. For end hosts, the effects
of such selfish and malicious actions are evident in a reduced quality of service and
availability of the network and its services.
We argue that introducing direct end-to-middle authentication capabilities is an im-
portant step to increase the security in networks that are challenged by the lack of
trustworthy infrastructure. Furthermore, authentication is a basic security building
block that serves as a basis for other security services, such as authorization, non-
repudiation, accountability, and availability. We choose to focus on end-to-middle
authentication at a shim layer between the network layer and the transport layer, be-
cause middleboxes and end-hosts directly interact at the network layer. In particular,
this thesis enables three different granularities for end-to-middle authentication:
a) End-to-middle authentication on an per-host basis to identify and exclude
malicious or unauthorized hosts from the network.
b) End-to-middle authentication on a per-association or per-connection basis
to prevent or terminate communication processes that make excessive and
unauthorized use of resources.
c) End-to-middle authentication on a per-packet basis to drop unauthorized or
forged packets to avoid costly processing or forwarding of these packets.
These three granularities are important to support essential signaling tasks as well
as payload authentication.
2.3.1 Challenges
From the descriptions above, we derive seven general challenges, common for our
an end-to-middle authentication solutions for cooperative networks. However, for
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each of the proposed protocols, additional challenges and requirements may exist,
depending on the specific goal and scenario.
(C1) Decentralized security bootstrapping: In cooperative networks it may not
be possible to establish all security relations between the end-hosts and the
middleboxes beforehand. Moreover, always assuming reachability of a com-
mon trust center is not feasible as well. Hence, end-hosts and middleboxes
should be able to establish the required security context, and in particular to
perform authentication, directly and on demand without the help of on-line
trust centers.
(C2) Cascaded middleboxes: As the exact network topology may not be known
to end-hosts, and multiple middleboxes may be situated on a communication
path, the end-to-middle authentication techniques should be able to efficiently
cope with cascades of middleboxes.
(C3) Heterogeneous and resource constrained hardware: Many cooperative and
community networks employ readily available commodity devices like desktop
PCs, notebooks, smartphones, and wireless routers without specialized cryp-
tographic hardware. Thus, the authentication procedures should cope with
a heterogeneous set of hardware capabilities and should provide acceptable
performance for resource-constraint devices.
(C4) Resilience to DoS attacks: Middleboxes must implement adequate measures
to reduce excessive load and to defend agains DoS attacks. Hence, if the
added security mechanisms create an asymmetric situation to the advantage
of an attacker, this asymmetry has to be alleviated. While flooding attacks
that oversaturate the medium are always possible regardless of the employed
security solution, special precautions have to be taken that the end-to-middle
security protocol does not create new possibilities for Denial of Service attacks.
(C5) No trust between middleboxes: In cooperative scenarios, there is only lim-
ited trust between individual middleboxes. Especially, middleboxes that are
contributed by different individuals and groups cannot assume that the other
middleboxes act without malicious or selfish intentions. Therefore, security
solutions should not rely on the fact that a set of individual network entities
is well-behaved.
(C6) Incremental deployability: Networks may consist of different software and
hardware components. Assuming that all middleboxes in the network can
perform the end-to-middle authentication steps may seriously hinder the de-
ployment of a particular solution. Therefore, devices that implement the end-
to-middle solution should be able to perform it independently of other middle-
boxes.
(C7) Sufficient performance under non-attack conditions: Security presents a
tradeoff between an abstract threat and a concrete cost for mitigating this
threat. Hence, additional security measures should not by themselves intro-
duce performance penalties that impair the function of a network. Since we
target cooperative networks, we aim at achieving TCP throughput rates of
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Figure 2.3 Problem areas that the presented challenges relate to.
up to 40 Mbit/s for a single wireless hop and up to 25 Mbit/s for multi-hop
wireless networks on wireless router hardware [WHBW11].
These seven challenges relate to three problem areas: security, performance, and
deployability. Figure 2.3 clusters the challenges into the different problem areas.
However, some challenges are in the intersections between different problem areas
and relate to two or three areas. Security related challenges relate to the security
concept and the prevention of attacks. Performance-related issues center on the
resource constraints of middleboxes and the provisioning of their services under
normal and attack conditions. Finally, deployment-related challenges are related to
the applicability of the protocols in cooperative networks.
While these challenges for end-to-middle authentication are motivated by the use
case of cooperative networks, many of these challenges also exist in non-cooperative
environments. In particular, any multi-hop network for which an eavesdropper or
an on-path attacker must be expected can benefit from direct end-to-middle authen-
tication. Since our approaches do not depend of special characteristics of wireless
scenarios, an application in wired scenarios is possible as well. However, fewer ad-
verse wired scenarios exist because of the physical protection of the network.
2.4 Three End-to-middle Authentication Solutions
Our work in the context of end-to-middle authentication has led to three solutions
that target different areas of the problem space. 1) HIP-MA focuses on end-to-
middle authentication on a per-host or per-association granularity. Authentication
is only performed for a small number of important events, for example during the
establishment of a communication or if the set of middleboxes changes. HIP-MA does
not affect payload processing. Hence, the security of the authentication is the main
focus of HIP-MA while performance considerations are a lesser concern. 2) ALPHA
provides end-to-middle authentication on a per-association and per-packet basis.
Therefore, performance and security are equally important because authentication
events occur at very high frequency. 3) Tokens of the SPOTS family allow for
inexpensive per-packet source authentication and can supplement HIP-MA or AL-
PHA in cases where integrity protection is not required.
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All three solutions take into account the challenges (C1) through (C7). However,
the emphasis on tackling the specific challenges differs. In Chapter 7, we revisit all
challenges after the presentation of our end-to-middle protocols and compare the
protocols with regard to these challenges.
3
Authentication and Network Security
This chapter introduces background material, terms, and definitions required in the
following chapters. However, it is not limited to merely stating background material
but analyses the relevance of this material in the context of end-to-middle authen-
tication and collaborative networking. Firstly, it presents and discusses definitions
of authentication and the concepts related to it. Secondly, in order to explain the
rationale and design decisions of our end-to-middle protocols, it introduces the at-
tacker model that we use throughout this thesis and discusses threats and attack
techniques. Thirdly, as countermeasures to these threats, this chapter introduces
general security mechanisms that form the basis of many security protocols. A brief
introduction of a range of security protocols that are conceptually or technically
related to our own solutions concludes the chapter.
3.1 Authentication
Authentication is one of the most fundamental building blocks of network security.
Due to this importance, literature provides a range of definitions for the term au-
thentication, each with minute differences in meaning, scopes, and granularity. To
create a consistent understanding of authentication as it is used in this work, we first
introduce the most relevant definitions of authentication and its related concept of
integrity protection in this section. Second, we discuss the concept of identity and
its connection to authentication. Third, we show how other security services depend
on authentication and how they are related to end-to-middle security.
3.1.1 Authentication and Integrity
According to the popular Oxford dictionary1, authentication is to “prove or show
(something) to be true, genuine, or valid”. Albeit being very coarse-granular, this
1Oxford Dictionaries, http://oxforddictionaries.com/
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simple definition already comprises the core components of authentication in digital
networks: An entity (e.g., the sender of a message) that intends to prove the validity
of a statement (e.g., the message) to someone. The definition approaches the concept
of authentication from the perspective of the sender but is very vague on the verifi-
cation of the authenticity by the receiver or verifier. Hence, technical authors, such
as Bruce Schneier, chose to emphasize the process of verification: “Authentication:
It should be possible to for the receiver of a message to ascertain its origin.” [Sch95].
By closely comparing both definition, it becomes clear that Schneier’s definition is
also useful in case of an attack, in which neither the original sender, nor a real proof
of validity is present. In such attack case, the sender-focused definitions fail because
the core of the definition (the sender and its proof) are absent. Other receiver-centric
definitions are given in [Shi07, Nik99].
The term authentication is used in many different contexts, and therefore, carries
different meanings. Authentication can refer to the identity of a host, the origin of
a message or the contents of a message. As first step to resolve such ambiguities it
is essential to distinguish authentication and integrity protection. Schneier clearly
makes this distinction: “Integrity: It should be possible for the receiver of a message
to verify that it has not been modified in transit.” [Sch95]. This means, that the
verifier can detect unauthorized manipulation. However, integrity protection stays
closely related to authentication because detecting unauthorized changes requires
a distinction between authorized and unauthorized hosts, which, in turn, requires
authentication. This interplay of both concepts, authentication and integrity pro-
tection makes individual consideration of each of the both concepts impossible.
The simple example in Figure 3.1 illustrates this interdependency between authenti-
cation and integrity protection. Assume that a verifier intends to verify the source of
a message based on some information in the message. Manipulations to this informa-
tion can obviously be detected because manipulated information will invalidate the
source information. Hence, the source information is also integrity protected. On
the other hand, assume that a verifier intends to verify the integrity of the contents
of a message. Without any authentication of the source, any source of information
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Figure 3.1 Relation between source authentication and integrity protection.
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would be valid. Therefore, any attacker could produce integrity-protected and valid
information. The key to separating authentication and integrity protection is to con-
sider the subject of the integrity protection. Hence, we refer to integrity protection
if its primary function is to detect the manipulation of additional data besides the
authentication information itself.
3.1.2 Granularity of Authentication
In his definition, Schneier chose to use the message as a granularity for defining au-
thentication and integrity protection. However, the actual granularity of “message”
is unclear. What is the unit of a message in network communication? In differ-
ent communication protocols, message could be interpreted as a packet, parts of a
packet, or a sequence of several packets.
Nikander discusses the need for a more fine grained description of the authenticated
information [Nik99]. If a message is considered to be a packet in a communication,
a receiver may only be able to detect manipulation in parts of the packet. Moreover,
when considering systems like HIP-MA and ALPHA, in which forwarding nodes
are allowed to manipulate or extend the contents of a packet, different parts of the
packet may originate from different network entities. Again, using message as a
granularity for authentication and proof of a single origin is misleading. Hence,
we follow Nikander’s definition and use authentication for an authentic piece of
information that may be delivered in an arbitrary message, for which parts of the
message may or may not be authentic.
3.1.3 Authentication Goals
To further disambiguate the overlap between different kinds of authentication and
integrity protection, standardization bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) have
defined a set of subclasses of authentication, distinguished by the goal of the au-
thentication. The following authentication goals are at the core of this thesis:
a) authenticating the identity of a peer in the communication,
b) authenticating the origin of a message in the communication,
c) authenticating that the content of a message was not altered by an unau-
thorized party.
For deriving appropriate security terms for these goals, we refer to the IETF Internet
Security Glossary (RFC 4949) [Shi07]. In regard to authentication, this glossary uses
and extends the definitions by the ISO Open Systems Interconnection Reference
Model [Int91]. The three definitions that are most relevant for this thesis are:
Peer entity authentication: “The corroboration that a peer entity in an association
is the one claimed” [Int91]. The term peer entity authentication is used for au-
thenticating the identity that a party claims in a communication process [Shi07]
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and for binding short lived session identifier to long lived host identifiers. Peer
entity authentication is performed in the context of an association between
two or more communication peers.
Data origin authentication: “The corroboration that the source of data received is
as claimed” [Int91]. In contrast to peer entity authentication, data origin
authentication is defined independently of an association between the sender
and the recipient [Shi07]. Therefore, no association exists between the verifier
and the sender.
Data integrity: “The property that information has not been modified or destroyed
in an unauthorized manner” [Int91]. Cryptographic data integrity is restricted
to the detection of unauthorized data manipulation. However, as described
above, a certain degree of data origin authentication or peer entity authen-
tication is required for answering the question what unauthorized means. In
the following, we use integrity protection as a synonym for cryptographic data
integrity protection, excluding non-cryptographic integrity protection mecha-
nisms, such as checksums, that aim at preventing non-malicious modifications.
The terms peer entity authentication and data integrity protection, as used by the
ISO and the IETF, already cover the goals a) and c). However, while the ISO’s short
definition of the term data origin authentication matches the goal b), the additional
elaboration in RFC 4949, restricts its use to the verification of a source without an
existing association between the sender and the verifier. Hence, it does not match
the verification of the origin of a single message in a communication association as
required in goal b).
In literature, the term source authentication is used for determining the source of
a packet within the context of an existing association [PCTS02]. However, the
IETF marks the term source authentication as ambiguous synonym for peer entity
authentication and data origin authentication. Thus, we cannot use this term in
combination with the above definitions. Moreover, it also encompasses the concept
of integrity protection. This is problematic for describing our work on the token-
based authentication mechanisms discussed in Chapter 6 because our work provides
the authentication of a message source without integrity protection. To resolve this
problem of overlapping and conflicting terminology, we use the term source-only
authentication to refer to the verification of the source of a packet without further
integrity protection or host identity verification within a communication association:
Source-only authentication: The corroboration that a peer was involved in the cre-
ation of a message as claimed. The verifier can, for a single message or piece of
information, verify that it originated from an authorized peer. However, this
term does not cover the integrity of the contents of the message in the sense of
integrity protection but only requires the minimal integrity protection required
for authenticating the source, as discussed above and depicted in Figure 3.1.
We assume that the sender and the verifier have established an association
context to which the authenticated messages belong.
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Protocol Primary end-to-middle auth. service Mechanism
HIP-MA peer entity authentication,
integrity protection
public-key signatures, nonces
ALPHA integrity protection delayed secret disclosure signatures,
hash chains and hash graphs
SPOTS tokens source-only authentication hash chain and hash tree tokens,
replay protection
Table 3.1 Authentication in the context of this thesis.
3.1.4 Authentication in this Thesis
This work focuses on end-to-middle authentication for the three authentication types
discussed above. Table 3.1 summarizes the different authentication goals and services
as well as the primary authentication mechanisms employed to achieve these goals.
HIP-MA provides peer entity authentication and integrity protection based on pub-
lic keys and cryptographic identities. The most relevant aspects of this authenti-
cation is the proof of a peer’s identity to a middlebox and a subsequent binding
of other session identifiers to this authenticated identity. In particular, HIP-MA
addresses a security weakness that allowed attackers to replay an authentic security
handshake to a middlebox and to undermine the end-to-middle peer entity authenti-
cation features of HIP. By the virtue of public-key signatures, HIP-MA also provides
end-to-middle integrity protection.
ALPHA provides per-packet integrity protection for control and payload packets.
As a necessary requirement for successful integrity protection, ALPHA also provides
middleboxes with the capability to authenticate the source of a packet. Hence,
middleboxes can determine whether the protected information in a packet was sent
by a specific peer.
SPOTS-based tokens provide end-to-middle per-packet source-only authentication
without integrity protection of further packet contents. This means, that only the
source information is required to have originated from the authorized source. Any
other information in a packet may be subject to manipulation and forgery. Due to the
integrated replay protection of SPOTS tokens, attackers cannot generate new packets
with valid source information nor can they reuse replayed packets several times.
Considering the interdependency between authentication and integrity protection
(c.f. Figure 3.1), SPOTS tokens provide a very limited degree of integrity protection
for the source authentication information only.
3.1.5 Identity
The concept of identity is closely related to the concept of authentication. In a
digital network, hosts use authentication to ascertain the identity of a host or, as
subsequent operation, ascertain that a piece of information was created by the host
represented by its identity.
Following the description in RFC 4949 [Shi07], the identity is a set of attributes that
makes a system distinguishable from another system. An attribute that allows for
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ascertaining the identity of a system is an identifier. Hence, an identifier is a handle
that allows a host in a communication to address and refer to its peer. The IETF
identifies two useful properties for identifiers in RFC 4949: a) the identifier should
make the entity unique so that it can be distinguished from all other entities and b)
for the same entities, different identifiers should be different. Especially property a)
is important for security sensitive scenarios because the difficulty of violating this
property determines the resiliency of the system against accidental or forged identity
collisions (e.g., an attacker using the IP address of a victim to impersonate it).
One way of raising the difficulty of maliciously assuming another host’s identity is the
use of cryptographic identities. These cryptographic identities rely on the strength
of a cryptosystem to prevent forgery. For example, public-key based identities are
widely used in the Internet. However, other cryptographic operations, such as hash
chains for one-time passwords or password-based challenge-response approaches, can
be used to protect the unauthorized use of identifiers. Cryptographic identifiers cre-
ate an asymmetric situation in which it is feasible for an entity to generate evidence
of its own identity while it is infeasible for any other entity to generate that very
evidence. For example the possession of a private key or password allows the legiti-
mate host to easily solve a challenge while an attacker would first have to break the
cryptosystem or guess the password.
3.1.5.1 Scope and Lifetime
Identifiers may posses different scopes and lifetimes for which they are valid or
usable. While some identifiers like domain names or public keys may be valid in a
global scope (any host can use a well-defined system to derive additional information
regarding the validity and meaning of the identifier) the scope of other identifiers
may be more restricted. For example, such restricted identifiers may only be valid
between two peers in a communication process. In this thesis, we discuss both
cases. The public-key based cryptographic identifiers of HIP in combination with
certificates can be considered to be of global scope. In contrast, the hash-chain and
hash-graph based identifiers used in ALPHA and the tokens in SPOTS are only
valid in the context of a single security association and cannot be re-used between
different peers.
Similar to the scope of identifiers, their lifetime may vary largely. Identifiers may be
valid indefinitely or may only be valid for a certain lifetime. This restriction may be
a policy decision or may be of technical nature. For example, restricting the lifetime
of a digital certificate is a policy decision to limit the threat in case of a compromised
key. In contrast, when using a single element of a hash chain (c.f. Section 3.4.2.3)
Protocol Scope Lifetime
Public key HIP-MA, ALPHA for IP global indefinite
Hash chain ALPHA, SPOTS tokens association association
Hash chain element ALPHA, SPOTS tokens association single packet
Table 3.2 Cryptographic identifiers used in this thesis
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to authenticate a host, it can only be used for a short time for technical reasons2.
Because of the very limited lifetime of hash chain elements it is useful to use the
sequence of hash chain elements, the whole hash chain, as an identifier. While the
actual identifier changes with each use of a hash chain element, the relation between
the elements can be verified easily. This makes it feasible to consider a hash chain
as an identifier that is valid for a single association.
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the cryptographic identifiers encountered in this work.
3.1.6 Security Goals and their Dependency on Authentication
Authentication is an enabler or requirement for a wide range of different security
goals. Hence, it can be considered as a fundamental building block for network secu-
rity. This section gives a high-level overview of further security goals and discusses
their relevance to end-to-middle security.
Authorization: Only authorized network entities or users should have access to re-
stricted resources, services, and data. Authorization is the counterpart of
authentication, defining what an authenticated entity is entitled to do. Hence,
secure authorization requires authentication. For middleboxes, authorization
grants a basis for distinguished treatment of different end-hosts or classes of
end-hosts.
Accountability: It should be possible to identify the use of a service by an authen-
ticated entity unambiguously in order to account for the use of the service.
Accountability is important for tracking the use of network resources used by
an authenticated user. Moreover, it is required for fair resource allocation in
multi-user scenarios.
Availability: An entity that provides services should not be vulnerable to attacks
that affect the availability or the quality of the services in a negative way. For
middleboxes, availability is an important security goal because end-hosts often
rely on these services to enable communication in the first place. The resources
of a middlebox must be allocated appropriately (e.g., based on priorities or on
a fair-share basis) and a malicious or selfish attacker should not be able to
degrade the service quality or service availability for victims that also use
the middleboxes. Moreover, since additional security measures may result in
additional resource use, special care must be taken to preserve or improve the
availability of the system when new security mechanisms are introduced.
Non-repudiation: A network entity or user should not be able to falsely deny its
participation in a communication. Non-repudiation is important if middle-
boxes perform tasks related to logging and accounting and must be considered
whenever end-hosts authenticate to middleboxes.
2Hash chain elements can only be used once and are not considered valid or fresh any more once
the peer has processed them.
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Privacy: The identity of a user or a network entity should not be revealed to unau-
thorized parties. This security goal is also called identity protection. End-
to-middle protocols support the communication between end-hosts and po-
tentially unknown network entities. Thus, new privacy concerns may arise if
middleboxes are supplied with additional information that allow to monitor or
track end-hosts. However, in this work, privacy concerns are a lesser concern.
Consistency: If two honest hosts establish a communication context, both should
have a consistent view of the parties involved in the communication process.
For end-to-middle purposes, the concept of consistency also includes middle-
boxes. Thus, if two honest hosts establish a communication context, both hosts
and a set of middleboxes should have a consistent view of the end-hosts in-
volved on the communication process. However, the end-hosts do not necessar-
ily require a consistent view of the middleboxes because the middleboxes may
be transparent to one or both end-hosts. For end-to-middle security, achieving
consistency is more difficult than in the end-to-end case because middleboxes
can be confronted with two colluding attackers while in the end-to-end case,
at least one end host can be assumed to be trustworthy. Consistency in the
end-to-middle case requires peer entity authentication by middleboxes because
otherwise malicious peers could claim the identity of one or both communicat-
ing end-hosts.
Confidentiality: Data should be protected from unauthorized access. This also ap-
plies to data in transit that must be encrypted to achieve confidentiality. Con-
fidentiality is not necessarily restricted to the protection of data but may also
comprise meta-information about the communicating entities. Confidentiality
is of special importance in end-to-end scenarios when information should be
kept secret. For end-to-middle purposes, end-to-end confidentiality can often
impair the function of implicit middleboxes because information cannot be
extracted from encrypted pieces of data. While authentication can aid con-
fidentiality (e.g., by ascertaining that sensible data is only communicated to
a legitimate destination), we consider confidentiality as orthogonal to our ap-
proaches. If end-to-end confidentiality is required, additional protection (e.g.,
IPsec in HIP) can be applied without loss of generality. End-to-middle confi-
dentiality (e.g., by sharing encryption keys with middleboxes) is not considered
in this thesis.
Freshness: Certain communication protocols require data to be new or “fresh” in
order to be valid or authentic. This data is only considered fresh if certain
temporal or causal restrictions apply. This means, the data must not have
been created or have been used before a certain time or event. For example, a
host or a middlebox that receives a piece of data typically may suspect that the
data was recently sent or created. However, if this expectation is not checked,
replay or delay attacks are possible.
Some of these security goals build on each other. For example, achieving account-
ability or authentication may be difficult without the requirement that both hosts
need a consistent view of the parties involved in the communication. However, these
dependencies may differ from one use-case to another. For example when identifiers
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are transmitted over insecure channels, privacy may require confidentiality while for
other uses it may not be required.
The combination of authentication, authorization, and accounting is of special im-
portance for the design of network architectures because the combination of all three
protects the network itself from unauthorized use and allows for charging users for
their actions [NN05]. Because of the significance of this combination, the abbrevi-
ation AAA or AAA-services is often used as a shorthand for services that provide
authentication, authorization, and accounting.
3.2 Security Model and Terminology
Considering middleboxes in the design of security protocols requires security mod-
els that take into account that these devices may also be the target of an attack.
Furthermore, the vulnerability of cooperative networks in regard to selfish resource
misuse requires a differentiation between malicious and selfish attackers to assess the
threat of an attack.
To discuss the security goals and security properties of our solution, we use the end-
to-end focused Dolev-Yao threat model [DY83] and the Internet Threat model [RK03]
as the underlying threat models. However, we slightly extend these models and dif-
ferentiate the capabilities of the attacker and the nature of the victims to meet the
requirements of discussing end-to-middle security protocols.
The two threat models assume a strong adversary, who can overhear and intercept
all traffic regardless of its source and destination. The adversary can inject arbitrary
packets with any source and destination addresses. Consequently, the adversary can
also replay previously overheard messages. However, the adversary is limited by the
cryptographic methods employed by the communicating hosts. Hence, the adversary
cannot subvert the cryptographic algorithms (e.g., ciphers and hash functions) nor
can it compromise one of the communicating hosts. In literature, these models are
often informally summarized as: “the attacker carries the message” [HGG09].
3.2.1 Extended Threat Model and Terminology
To match the scenario of end-to-middle authentication and cooperative networks,
we slightly modify the above attacker model. First, we need to consider the coop-
erative network structure as well as the motivation of users to become attackers.
Furthermore, differentiating the capabilities and location of the adversary in the
network is useful to reflect the different locations that an attacker can be located
at within a cooperative network. Finally, besides threats to Alice and Bob, we also
need to consider the threats to a benevolent victim node within the network (e.g.,
an uncompromised middlebox).
In the extended model, there are five classes of entities: A sender Alice, intending
to send messages to a receiver Bob across one or many relays Ron in the presence of
two different classes of adversaries Eve and Mallory. Alice intends to send messages
m to Bob via Ron in a way that enables Ron to verify certain security properties of
the message (e.g., data integrity, data origin authentication, and freshness).
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3.2.1.1 Attacker Capabilities
We use the classical distinction between Mallory and Eve based on their location and
capabilities. Mallory is a man-in-the-middle attacker located on the path between
Alice and Ron while Eve is an eavesdropper located besides the path. In terms of
capabilities, Mallory can overhear, drop and modify messages in transit while Eve
is limited to overhearing the communication between Alice and Bob and sending
forged or replayed messages. The conceptual difference between Mallory and Eve
is that Mallory can intercept and drop messages because she is within the set of
forwarding nodes for the message m. For Alice and Bob, the presence of Mallory
means that any message from Alice to Bob may be altered or dropped. The presence
of Eve means that messages from Alice to Bob will reach Bob without modifications,
however, additional forged messages may arrive. In general, Mallory can carry out
any attack that Eve can perform. Thus, when discussing attack possibilities for Eve,
these possibilities also exist for Mallory.
Mallory’s and Eve’s goal is to send messages m′ (imitating the security properties
of the original message m) that Ron falsely attributes to Alice. Mallory and Eve
succeed in their attack if Ron accepts m′ as an authentic message from Alice to Bob.
We also assume that Mallory and Eve can inject forged messages at a high rate.
Hence, a second goal of Mallory and Eve is to flood Ron with forged messages so
that he cannot provide service to Alice and Bob.
In a practical example, Mallory can be considered as a router on the communication
path between Alice and Bob. She forwards all messages from Alice to Bob and
can therefore apply a wide range of attacks. Eve can be considered as a peer on
a broadcast domain, such as an open wireless network or an Ethernet broadcast
domain. She can only inject forged messages and replay previously received messages
but she cannot alter or drop messages in transit.
In wireless broadcast networks, the boundaries between Eve and Mallory can be
blurred. There are two cases where this distinction is particularly difficult to make:
a) if Eve can eavesdrop and deliver packets to Bob faster than Alice can send packets
to Bob, and b) if Eve can drop packets by jamming the medium.
In the first case, Eve is in control of a faster link to Bob or a victim Ron in the middle
and she can read the packets from the network and deliver forged packets to Ron or
Bob before these victims receive the authentic traffic from Alice. In this regard, Eve
is not located on the regular path between Alice and Bob but on the fastest path.
Hence, whenever timing of incoming packets plays an important role and Eve can
deliver packets faster than the regular path, we treat Eve as a man-in-the-middle
attacker and consequently refer to her as Mallory although she obtained the packets
by eavesdropping.
In the second case, Eve can prevent the successful transmission of frames by jam-
ming the channel. In that case, Eve can intentionally intercept messages but she
cannot alter messages in flight. We discuss the relevance of such jamming attacks
in the security discussions of the individual end-to-middle authentication protocols
whenever applicable.
For simplicity’s sake we refer to Ron as a single entity although several individual
relays on the path between Alice and Bob are expected. We also restrict ourselves
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to the discussion of a unidirectional communication from Alice to Bob. However, a
bidirectional communication can simply be created from two unidirectional commu-
nication processes.
3.2.1.2 Attacker Motivation
Considering the motivation of an attacker is of high relevance for systems that protect
scarce resources. Following the argumentation of Buttyan and Hubaux [BH08], it is
important to distinguish two different attacker motivations: selfishness and malice.
A selfish attacker tries to use an inappropriate share of network resources, often
at the cost of some victim. Selfish attacks can be countered by either hampering
the attack completely or by making it economically unattractive to perform the
selfish action. Making an attack economically inefficient means that the attacker
has to spend more resources on the attack than it gains from it. On the contrary, a
malicious attacker is not driven by increasing its own profit but its motivation is to
harm a victim. Malicious attacks are more difficult to counter because making the
attack economically inefficient will not stop a malicious attacker from performing it.
However, increasing the cost of a malicious attack may still reduce its effectiveness.
3.2.1.3 Alternative Terminology
The different parts of this work were created within different contexts and within
different research communities. For example, the work on HIP-MA is strongly af-
fected by the previous work on HIP within the IETF, while the work on ALPHA is
influenced by previous work on delayed secret disclosure schemes. To avoid confu-
sion with other HIP-related documents, we adopted the HIP-related terminology in
Chapter 4. Similarly, Chapters 5 and 6 use slightly different terminology to match
the existing terminology in the problem area. While this approach maintains con-
sistency with prior work, it leads to slight differences in the naming of the acting
network entities within this thesis. To avoid confusion, we provide a brief overview
of the different terminology in Table 3.3.
The names Alice, Bob, Ron, Eve, and Mallory are used throughout all chapters for
security discussions and examples that require naming of specific acting entities in
a communication. The other names (Initiator, Responder, Signer, Relay, etc.) refer
to different roles of entities that are specific to the presented protocols. Hence their
names are chosen so that they match the role best.
Security discussions HIP-MA ALPHA SPOTS
Alice Initiator Signer Sender
Bob Responder Verifier Receiver
Ron Middlebox Relay Relay
Table 3.3 Alternative names of the acting entities.
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3.3 Threats in Network Security
To understand the rationale of security mechanisms in communication protocols,
it is necessary to understand possible attack techniques. This section gives a brief
overview of the most relevant attacks and countermeasures for these attacks. This
overview is not comprehensive but it comprises the most important attacks relevant
for end-to-middle source authentication and end-to-middle data integrity protection.
The attacks discussed in this section aim at undermining one or several of the security
goals stated above.
3.3.1 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping denotes the process of overhearing a communication. An eavesdrop-
per can read all or some messages that a group of communicating peers exchange.
Depending on the network topology and the employed transmission technology,
eavesdropping can be either simple or difficult: Eavesdropping on unprotected wire-
less communication channels is simple while eavesdropping on wired communication
is more difficult because it requires physical access to the medium. Without adequate
cryptographic protection, eavesdropping can compromise the confidentiality of data
in transit. Data encryption is the most common way to achieve confidentiality in the
presence of eavesdroppers. However, even if confidentiality is not a required security
goal of a protocol, eavesdroppers may be able to mount other attacks based on the
eavesdropped information. For example, an eavesdropper may replay messages or
may forge messages based on eavesdropped information. We consider eavesdropping
as a first step of further attacks like Denial of Service attacks and impersonation in
our end-to-middle authentication protocols.
3.3.2 Impersonation
Impersonation attacks take place whenever an attacker aims at maliciously pretend-
ing to represent another host or user. If, for example, Eve succeeds in pretending
to be Bob while communicating with Alice she impersonates Bob. Impersonation
undermines a range of security goals such as authentication, consistency, authoriza-
tion, non-repudiation, accountability and possibly data integrity and confidentiality.
Impersonation often requires to forge authentication data or to send messages with
forged identifiers. A special case of an impersonation attack is the man-in-the-
middle attack presented below. HIP-MA addresses the problem of impersonation of
attackers against HIP middleboxes.
3.3.3 Man-In-The-Middle Attacks
A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack is a special form of impersonation attack. It
can take place whenever an attacker is situated on the network path between two
hosts and can delay, modify, or drop packets. Assume Alice initializes a communica-
tion process with Bob and that Mallory performs a MITM attack. When Alice tries
to contact Bob, Mallory intercepts the messages between Alice to Bob and modifies
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the messages to make Alice and Bob believe that they are directly communicating
with each other while they are communicating with Mallory.
MITM attacks are one way to compromise systems based on public key cryptog-
raphy (cf. Section 3.4.1) if an attacker can modify the exchange of cryptographic
identities unnoticeably. Instead of attempting to break the public keys of Alice or
Bob, Mallory replaces their public keys in the messages with her own public keys.
If this manipulation is not recognized, both peers establish a security context with
Mallory. Mallory forwards all messages between Alice and Bob. This enables her
to act exactly like Alice and Bob would. As Alice and Bob have established a secu-
rity context with Mallory, she can decrypt, read, and possibly modify all messages
exchanged between them.
3.3.4 Delay and Replay Attacks
In a replay attack, the attacker uses authentic data in a fraudulent way to subvert a
communication protocol. In order to use a replay attack, the attacker (Eve) must be
able to eavesdrop on the communication channel and to send forged messages. Such
an attacker can retransmit previously sent messages. An attacker who is situated
on the communication path between the victims (Mallory) can, in addition, delay,
reorder, or drop packets. The attack can take place immediately after a message has
been recorded or at any later point in time. The goal of a replay attack is to trick
the receiver of the replays into triggering duplicate transactions. Recorded messages
can also be used to subvert communication processes other than the one from that
the messages were recorded. An attacker could, for example, try to use a recorded
protocol handshake to impersonate one of the parties that have been involved in the
original communication process. HIP-MA and SPOTS tokens implement counter-
measures to avoid such replay attacks in an end-to-middle context.
3.3.5 Denial of Service Attacks
Another attack is the Denial of Service attack that typically targets hosts that
provide some sort of service (servers) but is also relevant for middleboxes. The goal
of a DoS attack is to consume resources of a victim to an extent that it is not able
to provide adequate or any service to legitimate hosts. Thus, this attack aims at
undermining the availability of a system.
To maximize the impact of the attack, attackers try to invoke processes on the victim
that consume its available CPU time, memory, bandwidth, or other scarce resources.
Processes that are exposed to the network and do not require authentication are
especially prone to DoS attacks. Moreover, the authentication process itself can
be vulnerable. To amplify the impact of the attack, the attacker often mounts
parallel attacks, causing one, several, or hundreds of hosts to simultaneously initiate
as many resource-consuming processes as possible. An attacker can, for example,
waste resources of the victim by connecting numerous times until the resources that
are used for the connection establishment are depleted. In this situation, neither the
attacker nor legitimate clients can establish new connections with the victim that,
therefore, cannot provide its service any more. All of the end-to-middle protocols
presented in the following three chapters address the possibility of DoS attacks.
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3.3.6 Exhaustive Key Space Search and Cryptoanalysis
Besides attacks that try to exploit weaknesses in communication protocols, there are
attacks that specifically try to break the cryptographic primitives employed by the
protocol. As most cryptographic algorithms require the possession of a key, finding
the secret key is the natural way of breaking the applied protection.
Encryption schemes typically use keys for encrypting and decrypting data. One of
the least sophisticated ways to break such a key-based cryptographic algorithm is to
try different keys until one of the keys is usable for decrypting encrypted data. This
kind of attack is possible for all encryption schemes in that only one sensible plaintext
is possible for every ciphertext. Otherwise an attacker cannot decide whether or not
the decryption was successful. However, most cryptographic schemes minimize the
effectiveness of the exhaustive key space search by using large key-spaces, leading to
an enormous computational cost of an exhaustive key search. Due to the simplicity
and the high cost, the exhaustive key space attack is often called brute force attack.
Cryptoanalysis is the means of deciphering a message without knowledge of the
encryption key. Different ciphers and cryptographic mechanisms are vulnerable to
different cryptoanalytical attacks that exploit mathematical findings and shortcuts
that break or decrease the security of a cipher. Cryptoanalysis can either support
brute-force attacks by reducing the size of the probable key-space or make key-search
unnecessary by providing alternative ways of deciphering the cipher text.
In this work, we focus on the interplay of different security primitives rather than on
the vulnerabilities of these primitives. Hence, we do not consider brute force attacks
and cryptoanalysis against hash functions, symmetric ciphers, and asymmetric sig-
nature schemes explicitly. Following the Internet Threat Model (c.f. Section 3.2.1),
we assume that the attackers cannot compromise the basic symmetric and asymmet-
ric security primitives. Yet, the security primitives in this work are interchangeable
so that replacement algorithms can be used in case of a principal weakness of specific
primitives. In our work, we use ciphers, signature schemes and key-lengths that are
considered to be secure at the time of writing.
3.4 Security Mechanisms for Authentication
Network security protocols are built from a set of cryptographic algorithms and tech-
niques that can be seen as complementary building blocks. Each of these building
blocks provides protection against one or several threats discussed above and, thus,
ensures one or several of the security goals stated in Section 3.1.6. However, for
many purposes it is necessary to combine several mechanisms to reach a security
goal. This section introduces the security mechanisms relevant for end-to-middle
authentication in HIP-MA, ALPHA and tokens based on SPOTS. We exclude other
security mechanisms, such as symmetric ciphers, that do not serve the purpose of
authentication in this work.
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3.4.1 Public-key Based Authentication
Public-key (PK) cryptography uses encryption and decryption keys that are related
in a non-trivial way. This means, given one key, the other cannot be derived from
it without additional information. This property allows to make the encryption
key publicly accessible as a public key while the decryption key is kept secret as
a private key. PK cryptography enables hosts to send encrypted data to any host
without exchanging shared secrets first, provided the sender knows the public key of
the receiver. The fact that the keys for encryption and decryption differ has defined
the name asymmetric cryptography for this class of algorithms.
3.4.1.1 Trapdoor Functions
Public-key encryption algorithms are based on so-called trapdoor functions. These
functions can be calculated easily but are hard to reverse without additional infor-
mation in form of a private key. In this context, the terms hard and easy, as well
as feasible and infeasible relate to the complexity of the calculation. Computations
that take hundreds of years up to millions of years are denoted hard or infeasible.
On the contrary, computations that can be calculated in a matter of milliseconds,
seconds, or hours, depending on the computational power that is used, are denoted
easy or feasible.
Properties of trapdoor functions
Functions that are suited for public key cryptography must provide three properties:
• The function must be easy to compute and therefore the encryption is compu-
tationally feasible.
• It must be hard to reverse the function without the possession of additional
information, the private key. This provides that the encrypted data cannot be
decrypted without the private key (the additional information).
• It must be computationally hard for an attacker to calculate the secret if it is
in possession of the cryptographic algorithm, the public key, and an arbitrary
amount of encrypted data and corresponding plain text.
Public-key cryptography is based on mathematical problems that are hard to solve.
Prime factorization and the discrete logarithm problem are such problems. In com-
parison to symmetric algorithms, asymmetric public-key algorithms are considerably
more CPU intensive. Therefore, the cost of these algorithms are often amortized by
combining them with symmetric cryptographic algorithms. For example, many se-
curity protocols first establish a shared security context and perform peer entity
authentication based on asymmetric cryptography and then continue using sym-
metric mechanisms for subsequent payload encryption. In the following, we briefly
discuss the building blocks of establishing such security contexts: public-key based
key exchanges and digital signatures.
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3.4.1.2 Public-key Based Key Exchange
The first PK cryptosystem was published by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hell-
man [DH76]. It provides a way to securely exchange symmetric keys over insecure
channels. It is based on the discrete logarithm problem. The original version of the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange uses the multiplicative group of integers modulo
p. Given the primitive g modulo p, with p as a large prime number and g as a
generator of the modular group, computing x from gx is considered infeasible.
Among other security protocols, the Internet Key Exchange and HIP use the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange to securely negotiate a secret shared between the communicat-
ing peers in the beginning of a communication. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is
used as a measure for creating the symmetric end-to-end encryption keys that enable
the use of inexpensive symmetric cryptoprimitives, such as message authentication
codes and symmetric ciphers.
3.4.1.3 Public-key Signatures and Digital Identities
In addition to encrypting data and exchanging symmetric keys, asymmetric cryp-
tosystems can be employed for generating digital signatures. In order to create a
digital signature of a message m, Alice uses her private key to “encrypt”m. Other
hosts can use Alice’s widely distributed public key to decrypt the encrypted message.
A successful decryption proves that Alice has once encrypted m, and thus, serves as
evidence that Alice has created or processed the statement m.
In the following, we briefly introduce the digital signature schemes employed in this
thesis:
RSA Signatures: The RSA algorithm is a pubic-key encryption algorithm, pub-
lished by Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman [RSA78]. The RSA algorithm is named
after their initials. It is the first PK algorithm that was suitable for encryp-
tion as well as for message authentication. The RSA algorithm builds on the
fact that though multiplying two large prime numbers is easy, factorizing their
product into the two original prime factors is computationally hard. The prime
factorization problem is used as a trapdoor function, which enables encryption
and decryption with a public-key pair. RSA keys are considerably longer than
keys for symmetric ciphers. Key lengths between 1024 bits and 2048 bits are
considered equal to 80-bit symmetric keys [Nat11].
Digital Signature Algorithm: The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) has been
specified to be used with the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [Nat09]. It
is a variety of the El Gamal signature scheme and requires the use of a cryp-
tographic hash function. Like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, DSA relies
on the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem. The security properties,
application, and key-lengths of DSA are similar to RSA [Nat09]. However, in
contrast to DSA, RSA signature creation is significantly cheaper while DSA
signatures are considerably smaller.
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) is also defined by the NIST as a part of the DSS [Nat09].
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It uses the El Gamal signature scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC). In contrast to RSA and DSA, ECDSA keys are considerably shorter.
For example, key lengths between 160 bits and 224 bits are equivalent to 80-bit
symmetric keys [Nat11]. This short key length makes ECDSA a viable option
for protocols like PLA (c.f. Section 3.5.5), which transmits keys and signatures
in payload packets.
The public key of a host or user can be a measure to distinguish different hosts
because only the host in possession of the private key can use it to sign and decrypt
data. Hence, a public key can constitute a host’s digital identity. When establishing
a communication to its peer, peer entity authentication can be achieved by letting
the peer show that it is able to create a digital signature with the private key of the
claimed identity.
Table 3.4 shows benchmark results for RSA, DSA, and ECDSA for the hardware
used in the evaluation parts of this thesis. We used the OpenSSL benchmark (openssl
speed) for generating the results. The RSA and DSA signatures as well as the 224-
bit NIST prime curve (nistp224) are supported by protocols such as IKEv2 [Kau05],
HIPv2 [MHJH11], and TLS [DR08]. The 163-bit NIST Koblitz curve is used by PLA.
All algorithms and curves are defined in the NIST DSS standards document [Nat09].
A Public key infrastructure (PKI) is a system that allow to map the public key of
a host or a user to a real world identity, such as a person’s or company’s name, in
a secure way, thus, allowing to verify the binding between the user or host and its
key. Using PKI solves the problem of MITM attacks because a mis-binding between
an attacker’s public key and a victim’s identity can be recognized by consulting
the PKI. To constitute the correctness of a binding, a Certificate Authority (CA),
which is part of the PKI, issues a certificate that holds the public key and the
identity information of a host or user. The CA signs this certificate to protect it
from manipulations. This allows every host that is in possession of the CA’s public
key to verify certificates and, therefore, the binding between a public key and an
identity. The indirection via a certificate also enables hosts to change their public
and private keys should the private key be compromised.
The certificates can be used whenever a host needs to prove its real world identity
by means of public key cryptography. The public keys of trustworthy CAs are often
Geode 500 MHz AMD Athlon 2.5 GHz
Algorithm Key length / Curve Sign Verify Sign Verify
RSA 1024 bits 32 ms 1 ms 0.5 ms 0.03 ms
RSA 2048 bits 180 ms 5 ms 3.2 ms 0.09 ms
DSA 1024 bits 15 ms 18 ms 0.28 ms 0.31 ms
DSA 2048 bits 47 ms 57 ms 0.88 ms 1.04 ms
ECDSA nistk163, 163 bits 18 ms 47 ms 0.75 ms 1.79 ms
ECDSA nistp224, 224 bits 6 ms 24 ms 0.15 ms 0.70 ms
Table 3.4 Signature and verification performance of RSA, DSA, and ECDSA
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already included in the operating system or other software like web browsers. This
allows to verify certificates without the problem of getting the CA’s public key first.
3.4.2 Authentication Based on Cryptographic Hash Functions
One-way cryptographic hash functions are versatile cryptographic primitives that
are often used in authentication protocols. A one-way cryptographic hash function,
or short hash function, H(x) = y transforms a given value x of variable length into a
value y of fixed length n in a way that does not allow to compute the original value
from the result. Thus, the computation of H(x) should be feasible, while reversing
the function should be computationally infeasible. Hash functions inherit their name
from their way of operation because the characteristics of the hashed result resemble
a random number and cannot be correlated to the input any more. Cryptographic
hash functions are:
Preimage resistant: A hash function is called preimage resistant if for a given z =
H(x) it is computationally hard to find a preimage x′ with H(x′) = z.
Second preimage resistant: A hash function is second preimage resistant if for a
given x it is computationally hard to find x′ = x with H(x′) = H(x).
Collision resistant: A hash function is collision resistant if it is computationally
hard to find any two values x and x′ with x = x′ and H(x) = H(x′).
There are different ways of designing cryptographic hash functions. For one, their
design can be based on the same algebraic problems as public-key cryptosystems.
These hash functions have the same computational complexity but also the same
performance issues. Alternatively, block-cipher-based hash constructions like the
Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) [MMO85] construct in combination with the Merkle-
Damg˚ard construction [Mer90b, Dam90], can be used as a building block for hash
functions. The Merkle-Damg˚ard construction is a very common design for cryp-
tographic hash functions. It constructs hash functions with arbitrary input length
by cascading a compression function. Since the computational complexity of these
hash functions is very low compared to the complexity of public-key operations,
they are widely used for many purposes. Examples of popular cryptographic hash
functions are the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) hash function family [Nat95] and
Algorithm Input length Geode 500 MHz AMD Athlon 2.5 GHz
SHA-1 16 bytes 9.8 μs 0.5 μs
SHA-1 64 bytes 13.9 μs 0.7 μs
SHA-1 1024 bytes 62.5 μs 3.2 μs
SHA-256 16 bytes 17.1 μs 0.6 μs
SHA-256 64 bytes 30.0 μs 1.0 μs
SHA-256 1024 bytes 224.5 μs 7.0 μs
Table 3.5 Hash function performance for SHA-1 and SHA-256 on the evaluation hardware.
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MD53 [Riv92]. Table 3.5 gives an overview of the hash function performance for
SHA-1 and SHA 256 on hardware used in the evaluation parts of this work. In our
evaluations we used SHA-1 as the hash function.
3.4.2.1 Message Digests
In practice, cryptographic hash functions are often used for message authentication.
Signing long messages with asymmetric signature schemes, such as RSA, is CPU
intensive and can delay communication. Cryptographic hash functions can solve
this problem by creating a short fixed-length representation of the long message:
a message digest. The second preimage- and collision resistance properties of the
hash function ensure that signing the short message digest is sufficient to securely
sign the message. Although signing the fixed length digest signs an infinite number
of messages that map to the same hashed output, finding one of these alternative
messages is considered infeasible. Message digests are not only useful for reducing
the cost of public-key cryptography but are a general way of securely binding long
input values to short output values. Hash lengths that are considered secure today
range between 128 bits and 256 bits or longer (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-256).
3.4.2.2 Message Authentication Codes
Cryptographic hash functions provide a possible method to verify the authenticity
and the origin of a message without using public-key signatures. In order to sign
messages with hash functions, all communicating peers must be in possession of a
shared secret. This shared secret can be exchanged manually, by using the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, or in any other secure way. Given the shared secret key k,
a message m, and a cryptographic hash function H(x) = y, the peers compute a
Message Authentication Code (MAC), MACk(m), to sign a message m. The symbol
“|” denotes textual concatenation in this context.
MACk(m) = H(k|m)
This basic scheme allows hosts that know the secret key to authenticate the message
m by recalculating the MAC. Other hosts are not able to forge this signature because
they are not in possession of the secret key. The preimage resistance of the crypto-
graphic hash function prevents the secret k from being calculated from MACk(m)
and the property of collision resistance prevents an m′ with h(k|m′) = h(k|m) from
being found.
However, this is only true when an ideal hash function is used. Using practical hash
functions leads to security problems. Iterative hash functions that are designed ac-
cording to the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction principles are susceptible to length ex-
tension attacks, which cause serious problems with this naive MAC. An attacker can
forge the MAC for a suitable m. Mironov describes this attack and further security
issues for practical hash functions [Mir05]. Descriptions and practical implications
3Due to weaknesses in the design of MD5, major standardization bodies like the IETF discourage
the use of MD5. However it is still widely in use in deployed systems.
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of further attacks on hash functions were provided by [WY05, Jou04, Kam04], and
others.
The HMAC message authentication mechanism is designed to provide a safe way
to authenticate messages that is not susceptible to length extension attacks. It was
standardized by the IETF in RFC 2104 [KBC97]. The HMAC is calculated with the
following formula:
HMACk(m) = H
(
(k ⊕ opad)|H
(
(k ⊕ ipad)|m
))
The constants opad = 0x5c5c5c..5c and ipad = 0x3c3c3c..3c are strings of the same
length as the input block length of the hash function (512 bits for SHA-1 and MD5).
ipad and opad represent the inner and outer padding. The symbol ⊕ denotes exclu-
sive or.
The HMAC computation performs three steps. It concatenates a secret key with
the message. It adds noise to the key to complicate attacks on the mechanism and
uses two hash operations to generate the keyed-hash message authentication code.
Signature verification is analogous to the signature generation process. A receiver
computes the HMAC from a given signed message and the shared key and compares
the result to the HMAC attached to the message. If both match, both HMACs have
been created for the same message with the same shared key. This allows to verify
the origin of the message (i.e., the holder of the shared key) and the integrity of the
message.
A disadvantage of MAC and HMAC based signatures is that only messages ex-
changed between hosts that share a secret key can be authenticated. Therefore,
other measures are needed to identify a host and to verify messages from a host for
that no security context in form of a shared key exists. Typically the number of
hosts that share the secret is kept very small. Therefore, middleboxes that inspect
and forward packets usually have no knowledges of the shared keys that were used
for the HMAC authentication of packets they forward. Thus, they cannot verify the
HMAC signatures.
Compared to public-key cryptography, HMAC generation and verification is very
cheap in terms of CPU cycles. It only requires two hash computations. HIP uses
HMACs to authenticate control messages on an end-to-end basis, ALPHA uses
HMACs for generating end-to-middle signatures without shared keys.
3.4.2.3 Hash Chains
In 1981, Leslie Lamport proposed to use chains of hashes to protect remote password
authentication over insecure channels from replaying and eavesdropping [Lam81].
Hash chains have been applied in a wide field of applications, such as the authenti-
cation and integrity protection of link-state routing updates [HPT97, Che97], elec-
tronic cash [STS99] and micro payments [RS96], integrity protection of multicast
data [PCTS02], wormhole detection in mobile ad-hoc networks [HPJ03], and secure
macro mobility and multihoming in IP networks [TY05].
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The fundamental idea behind hash chains is the iterated application of a crypto-
graphic hash function H on a random seed value s. The first result H(s) = h1 is
used as the input for the next round, yielding H(H(s)) = H(h1) = h2 until the hash
chain has reached the desired length n. The last element of the chain hn is called
the anchor.
h0 = r
hn = H(hn−1)
= Hn(r) = H(H(H(· · ·H(r) · · · ))) n times (3.1)
The sequence (hn . . . hi+1, hi, hi−1, hi−2, . . . , h1, r) is called the hash chain. Its first
element hn is the hash chain anchor. In order to use a hash chain, the anchor is
published while the rest of the chain is kept secret. The elements of the hash chain
are disclosed in reverse order of their generation beginning with the anchor value.
Hence, the first element that is revealed is hn, the second one is hn−1, and so on.
Used in this way, hash chains provide a number of appealing properties, enabling
their use for authentication in several ways.
• Given hi and hi−1, it is easy to verify that hi−1 belongs to the same hash chain
as hi. This property results from equation 3.1 and the basic requirement for
hash functions, that it should be feasible to calculate a hash function.
• It is computationally hard to find hi−1 if only hi is given. This property
is provided by the preimage resistance of the hash function. It ensures that
someone who is not in possession of the hash chain cannot calculate unrevealed
elements from already disclosed ones.
• Given hi, it is hard to find an h′ with H(h′) = H(hi−1) = hi. This property
also arises from the preimage resistance of the hash function. It ensures that
no one can forge a single unrevealed element of the hash chain.
• Given hi, it is possible to verify that hi−n is part of the same hash chain if
0 < n ≤ i. This property results from the iterated construction of the hash
function. The check requires iterated application of the hash function to hi−n:
Hn(hi−n) = hi. It ensures that hash chain values can be verified even when
some values get lost due to transmission errors or attacks.
Hash chains can serve as an identity for hosts and allow a host to prove its identity.
In terms of a protocol, the owner of a hash chain first exchanges the anchor with its
peer. When required to authenticate itself, the owner reveals the next undisclosed
hash chain element, and thus enables the receiver of the element to verify that it
is in possession of the hash chain. Attaching a notion of identity to a hash chain,
hosts can prove their identity for re-authentication by disclosing previously undis-
closed elements of the chain as used by Hauser et al. [HPT97]. Note that additional
identity-providing techniques, such as public-key-authenticated hash chain anchors,
are required for a strong assurance of identities.
In this work, ALPHA uses hash chains to create signatures as well as for protecting
state transmissions. The tokens of the SPOTS family use hash chains for authenti-
cating individual packets of a payload flow.
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3.4.2.4 One-time Signatures
Based on hashes and hash chains, Lamport proposed one-time signatures. A host
uses two random values r and r′ and applies the hash function H to both. The
results H(r) and H(r′) are published as a public key. A one-bit message can be
signed by publishing r as the signature s if the bit is 1 and r′ otherwise.
Comparing the hash of the signature H(s) with the public key values H(r) and H(r′)
verifies or falsifies the signature of the message.
This signature can be used to sign l-bit messages by using 2l hashes. The signature
allows instant verification, provided the public key is known. However, 2l hashes
must be calculated per signature.
An improvement of this scheme [Mer88] reduces the number of hashes to l+log2(l)+
1 and the average number of hashes per signature to l+log2(l)+1
2
. This is achieved by
only signing the bits with value 1. The number of bits with the value 1 is appended
to the message and signed as well to prevent signature forgery. This improves the
efficiency almost by a factor of two.
Zhang et al. [Zha98] propose two protocols for signing routing messages. These
protocols use hash chains to provide the hashes for the signature. This enables
the use of one public key consisting of a set of hash chain anchors to sign several
messages. The signature size for these protocols is about 2 to 4 KB per signature
and has the same computational overhead as Merkle’s scheme.
In this work, we use one-time signatures in their very basic form of commitments to
express binary information: ALPHA uses one time signatures for signaling successful
receipt (or lack thereof) of packets.
3.4.2.5 Merkle Trees
A Merkle Tree [Mer90a] is a binary tree with the ith leaf bi containing the hash of
the pre-image mi and each node containing the hash of the concatenation of its two
children. Figure 3.2 illustrates such a Merkle Tree4. The root r of the Merkle Tree
depends on the contents of all leaves and, therefore, of all nodes in the tree. The
modification of a single leaf or node results in a different root. Moreover, Merkle
Trees allow for verifying the relation between a message mi and the root r without
knowledge of any other message mj with i = j.
One application of Merkle Trees is to authenticate data: a signer constructs a Merkle
Tree by splitting the data into blocks mi and using these as leaves bi of the tree. To
authenticate a block mi independently of other blocks, a verifier requires r, mj and
the set {Bc} of complementary branches, which, for each level of the tree, consists of
the sibling node of the nodes on the path from bi to r. The verifier calculates the tree
root r∗ by reconstructing the path from bj = H(mj) to r from the nodes in {Bc}. A
block mj is authentic only if the known root r matches the computed value r
∗. As
example, take message m3. For this message, the set of complementary branches is
4Note that the leaf index j of the Merkle Tree is given in a binary representation to emphasize the
tree structure.
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root r︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b0|b1)
 
b0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b00|b01)
b1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b10|b11)



b00︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b000|b001)

b01︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b010|b011)

b10︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b100|b101)



b11︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(b110|b111)

 
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b000︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m0)
b001︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m1)
b010︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m2)
b011︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m3)
b100︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m4)
b101︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m5)
b110︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m6)
b111︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(m7)
       
m0 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
Figure 3.2 ALPHA-M: A Merkle Tree binds all messages mi to one single root value r.
Bc = {b010, b00, b1} and the verifier compares H(H(b00 |H(b010|H(m3)))|b1) = r∗ to
r in order to verify the validity of m3.
ALPHA uses Merkle Trees as amortization mechanism that allows to protect a large
number of packets by only protecting the root of the tree. One of the loss-tolerant
token schemes of SPOTS uses Merkle Trees for allowing computationally cheap re-
covery from burst losses of packets.
3.4.3 Other Building Blocks for Security Protocols
In order to combine symmetric and asymmetric algorithms as well as hash functions
into coherent security protocols further building blocks are needed. In this section we
discuss three of these building blocks that we use in the design of our end-to-middle
protocols: sequence numbers, cryptographic nonces, and client puzzles.
3.4.3.1 Sequence Numbers
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, attackers can try to manipulate network protocols by
replaying, reordering, or dropping packets. Sequence numbers are a simple measure
to avoid such attacks. A sequence number is a monotonically increasing number that
is assigned to every message. This allows the receiver of a message to determine if
a message was received and has been processed before. Messages without an old
sequence number can be identified as duplicate messages or as a part of a replay
attack. The decision whether to consider a message as a part of an attack can be
based on a strict or relaxed matching of sequence numbers. Strict matching means
that all preceding packets must be received before a packet with a higher sequence
number is accepted or processed. Alternatively, hosts can use a window of legitimate
sequence numbers, enabling less restrictive ways of matching. In this approach, a
range of sequence numbers is considered valid and packets with any sequence number
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within the window can be accepted. Such window allows to use sequence numbers
in cases where in-sequence delivery of packets is not guaranteed.
The use of sequence numbers alone does not provide a sufficient protection against
attackers that can modify the contents of a packet. Therefore, the sequence numbers
must be integrity protected. This can be done by using keyed message authentication
codes (cf. Section 3.4.2.2), digital signatures (cf. Section 3.4.1.3), or data encryption.
ALPHA uses sequence numbers to indicate the position of a packet in a burst of
packets. Tokens based on SPOTS use sequence numbers without strict matching for
indexing authentication tokens and for enforcing the strictly ascending order of the
tokens.
3.4.3.2 Cryptographic Nonces
The term nonce is a shorthand for “number used once”. Nonces are another way
of defending against replay attacks. They are often used in request-response mech-
anisms, e.g., when Alice sends a nonce to Bob who is expected to send the nonce
back, possibly in an encrypted or otherwise integrity protected way. This mechanism
allows Bob to verify that Alice can respond to the nonce, proving that she is able
to respond to packets addressed to a certain network address. Moreover, nonces can
be used to prove the possession of a secret. Alice can send a nonce to Bob with
the request to apply a cryptographic technique like encryption or signatures to the
nonce. Bob can only solve this task if he is in possession of the secret. The fact
that the nonce is only used once forestalls replay attacks because the messages of
the exchange containing the nonce cannot be reused by an attacker.
Nonces are often derived from random or pseudo-random numbers but they may also
include information that a host intends to embed in encrypted or unencrypted form.
The sender of a nonce can use such embedded information to check whether a nonce
in a response packet was originally generated by it. Furthermore, the embedded
information can be used to ease the verification of the uniqueness of the nonce.
HIP-MA uses middlebox-generated nonces to ensure the freshness of public key
signatures.
3.4.3.3 Client Puzzles
Attackers that perform DoS attacks often target mechanisms that do not consume
many resources from the attacker but require much effort or the use of especially
scarce resources from the victim. How quickly an attacker can invoke vulnerable
processes determines how fast the resources of the victim are depleted and, there-
fore, how effective the attack can be. Client puzzles are a way to level this imbalance
by allowing a host to artificially generate CPU load on its peer, and thus, the po-
tential attacker. Requiring a correct solution of the puzzle as a precondition before
allocating scarce resources increases the attack cost for an attacker, which makes
subverting such vulnerable mechanisms less attractive to attackers and forces at-
tackers to reduce their attack rate.
To not increase the load on the victim, the puzzle solution must be easy to verify
while difficult to calculate. Many puzzles, for example the puzzle mechanism in
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HIP [MNJH08], are based on cryptographic hash functions (c.f. Section 3.4.2).
The peer or attacker must repeatedly apply a cryptographic hash function to the
concatenation of a server-generated nonce and a varying client-chosen value until
the result of the hash function exhibits a certain property.
In the following, we highlight the puzzle variant that HIP uses. Assume Bob is a
potential victim who wants to defend against a DoS attack. If Bob uses the puzzle
mechanism, he sends a random or pseudo-random value i to Alice. Alice is required
to find a number j for which the binary representation of the result of H(i|j), has
k bits with the value 0 as lowest-order bits. Alice must vary j and apply the hash
function to the concatenation with the new j until a suitable solution for the puzzle
is found. This kind of puzzle requires Alice to try 2k−1 values for j on average while
Bob can verify the validity of a solution within constant time.
As increased puzzle difficulties force an attacker to spend more CPU time on solving
the puzzle, simultaneous attacks by a single attacker are slowed down to a degree
that the server can handle. However, legitimate clients with limited CPU resources,
such as mobile devices, suffer from difficult puzzles as well. These clients may not
be able to solve the puzzle within acceptable time.
In HIP-MA, middleboxes use the above puzzle mechanism to shelter against DoS
attacks.
3.5 Security Protocols
Security protocols employ selected cryptographic algorithms and methods to achieve
some or all of the security goals mentioned above. These protocols specify how two
or more communicating parties must act in order to reach the goals. In this section,
we discuss four groups of security protocols that are related to our work on end-to-
middle authentication: (1) We begin with a description of IPsec as a general network
layer security suite for IP. HIP, and consequently HIP-MA, employ IPsec for securing
payload. The TCP/IP implementation of ALPHA borrows the concept of parent
and child associations from IPsec and the token-based authentication of SPOTS
was originally motivated by the lack of end-to-middle source-only authentication in
IPsec. (2) We briefly introduce the Host Identity Protocol because it forms the
basis for the HIP-MA end-to-middle extensions. Furthermore, HIP with HIP-MA
is suited as a bootstrapping and control protocol for ALPHA and the token-based
source-only authentication schemes based on SPOTS. (3) We discuss protocols that
employ signatures based delayed secret disclosure. This technique is the basis for
the end-to-middle authentication mechanisms of ALPHA. (4) Finally, we discuss
PLA as end-to-middle authentication protocol based on public-key signatures. PLA
pursues the same goals as the protocols presented in this thesis. Hence, it can be
considered as related work.
3.5.1 Security Contexts and Security Associations
The security protocols presented in this section either establish a security context
or use an already established security context to secure communication. A security
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context consists of parameters for the employed security mechanisms, such as the
choice of security algorithms, keys, and the state of the communicating peers. The
shared security context is also called security association [Shi07].
The life cycle of a security context or a security association typically consists of
an establishment phase during which all communicating peers agree on a set of
algorithms and the required keys. After the establishment phase, the security context
is used to secure the communication between the peers. Eventually the security
context is modified and other algorithms or keys are used. The life cycle ends with
the closing of the security association and the deletion of the security context.
3.5.2 The IP Security Architecture
The Internet Protocol (IP) itself does not offer sufficient security for many appli-
cation scenarios. It provides no defenses against eavesdroppers or attackers that
modify or forge IP packets. In 1998, the IPsec security architecture was published
as RFC 2401 [KA98] to counter the security threats in the Internet. It was later
replaced by RFC 4301 [KS05]. For end-to-end communication, IPsec allows for
authenticating the source and the integrity of IP packets and can ensure confiden-
tiality for IP payload. Support for IPsec is mandatory for standard-compliant IPv6
implementations.
3.5.2.1 IPsec Security Associations
To use IPsec, both communication endpoints must agree on a set of algorithms and
keys. These negotiations can either be pre-configured or can take place during a
separate handshake. The choice of how to negotiate the keys and algorithms is not
strictly specified by IPsec. Therefore, hosts can employ a range of protocols (e.g.,
IKE or HIP) for this purpose. IPsec assumes that a shared symmetric key is present
at both IPsec endpoints. This key is part of the security context that two hosts
must share to communicate securely over IPsec. The shared security context is also
called a Security Association (SA). According to RFC 4301 [KS05], IPsec security
associations are simplex connections that afford security services to the traffic carried
by them. This means that two SAs – an incoming and an outgoing SA – are necessary
to protect a duplex channel. IPsec SAs protect traffic on an end-to-end-basis. On-
path middleboxes are not considered in the establishment of the security context and
the security associations. In particular, middleboxes typically do not have access to
the shared symmetric keys used for IPsec encryption and integrity protection.
3.5.2.2 IPsec Modes and Protocols
In its basic form, IPsec offers two modes of operation. Firstly, IPsec can protect
traffic between hosts in an end-to-end fashion. IPsec uses the transport mode for
this purpose. Secondly, IPsec allows to securely connect several networks over a po-
tentially insecure communication link to form a virtual private network. IPsec uses
the tunnel mode for this purpose. In this mode, complete IP packets are tunneled
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Figure 3.3 The packet header structures and packet encapsulation for the two basic IPsec
modes and the BEET IPsec mode.
from one network gateway to a gateway of a different network. A third non stan-
dard mode is the Bound End-to-End Tunnel (BEET) mode. It is currently under
discussion as implementation option in the context of HIP. BEET combines aspects
of the tunnel and transport mode. It also implements an address translation step in
which inner IP addresses are translated into outer IP addresses. HIP uses this trans-
lation step to map non-routable HITs to routable IP addresses (see Section 3.5.3).
Figure 3.3 illustrates the three modes.
IPsec offers two security protocols for protecting IP payload. The Authentication
Header (AH) protocol [Ken05a] ensures the authenticity of an IP packet and its
source whereas the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol [Ken05b] addi-
tionally applies encryption. AH is applicable whenever IP packets must be integrity
protected but not necessarily encrypted. In order to protect an IP packet, AH
employs checksums, based on cryptographic hashes as described in Section 3.4.2.2.
Standard-compliant IPsec implementations must support HMAC with SHA-1 [Man07].
ESP protects IP payload against eavesdroppers by employing symmetric cryptog-
raphy. It also allows the receiver of an ESP protected packet to authenticate the
sender.
A sequence number field in the IPsec header protects both protocols from replay
attacks. Instead of expecting the packets to arrive in strict sequential order, IPsec
defines a range, a so-called window of sequence numbers that are considered valid.
This window is called a replay protection window. This loose matching of sequence
numbers is necessary because the IP protocol does not necessarily deliver packets in
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the right order. The range of valid sequence numbers (the position of the window) is
determined by the size of the window and the highest valid sequence number received
by a host. This highest sequence number sets the “right” edge of the window. All
packets with lower sequence numbers are dropped if their sequence number is lower
than the “left” edge of the window. For packets with sequence numbers within the
range of the window, a host must verify that no packet with the same sequence
number was received and processed before. Thus, the replay protection windows
allows out of order delivery of IP packets in certain bounds. In our work on HIP-
MA, we show how the IPsec sequence numbers can be used by middleboxes to detect
replay attacks and packet forgery (see 4.5.2.4).
3.5.3 The Host Identity Protocol
The Host Identity Protocol [MNJH08, MHJH11] is a proposal for using crypto-
graphic keys in the TCP/IP communication stack5 By introducing a new crypto-
graphic namespace it introduces secure communication, mobility, and multihoming
to the Internet protocol suite in a simple and architecturally clean way. Two IETF
groups, the HIP working group and the HIP research group, are working on the
protocol details and on related problem areas.
HIP introduces a new namespace that uses self-certifying cryptographic identities to
address hosts. These Host Identities (HIs) consist of RSA or DSA public keys for
HIP Version 1. In HIP version 2 [MHJH11] we added support for ECC identities,
which offer shorter key lengths and better performance. A HIP host can prove
that it is the legitimate owner of an HI by using the corresponding private key.
The Host Identity Namespace is used by the transport layer and all layers above.
5The HIP main documents were published as experimental RFCs in 2008 (HIP version 1). We
are currently revising the HIP specifications (HIP version 2) to implement cryptographic agility and
an extended set of cryptographic primitives. However, most changes made in HIP version 2 are not
relevant for this work. Hence, if not mentioned otherwise, we refer to HIP version 1 (RFC 5201 and its
companion documents).
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Figure 3.4 The integration of HIP in the communication stack. HIP is a key exchange protocol
that resides between the transport and network layer. HIP utilizes IPsec for protecting payload.
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Figure 3.4 shows the integration of HIP and IPsec in the TCP/IP communication
stack. Logically, HIP resides between the network and transport layer and maps IP
addresses to HIs and vice versa via a distributed address resolution service, e.g., a
DHT [VHRG11].
When creating a new HIP connection, both hosts establish an IPsec tunnel that
protects the payload exchanged between the hosts. If a mobile host moves to a dif-
ferent network location and is assigned a new IP address, HIP changes the mapping
between IP addresses and HIs dynamically. HIP also adjusts the tunnel endpoints
accordingly, redirecting the encrypted payload flow to the new location of the mo-
bile host. Like all HIP addressing, this change is transparent to the transport and
application layer because it uses HIs instead of IP addresses. HIP was designed to
be incrementally deployable and compatible with the existing Internet infrastructure
and non-HIP-aware legacy applications.
3.5.3.1 The HIP Base Exchange
In order to use HIP for unicast Internet communication, two hosts must establish
a HIP association. This association consists of all properties and aspects that con-
stitute the HIP communication context between two hosts. A HIP association has
a certain lifetime during which both hosts share the communication context. Both
peers can communicate, using HIP, during the lifetime of the association.
Two hosts establish the HIP association during the HIP handshake, the so-called
Base EXchange (BEX). We explain details of this handshake here because HIP-MA
modifies and extends the handshake. The purpose of the handshake is to authenti-
cate the identity of the peers (peer-entity authentication), to establish the HI-to-IP
address mappings, and to create a shared secret, which can be used for symmetric
end-to-end encryption and integrity protection. HIP is a variant of the SIGn and
MAc (SIGMA) [Kra03] family of key exchange protocols, which describes a general
pattern on which many of today’s key exchange protocols are based.
The peers in the handshake are named regarding to their role in the communication.
The peer that initiates the handshake and sends the first handshake packet is called
Initiator while the host that responds to the Initiator’s request is called Responder.
These roles are forgotten once the handshake is completed.
HIP uses HIP control messages (the control channel) to carry the necessary informa-
tion in the handshake. HIP control messages consist of a fixed HIP header, which,
among other information, contains the HITs of both hosts. Additional informa-
tion and parameters can be attached to the HIP header (e.g., a sequence numbers,
HMAC, or asymmetric signature).
The BEX consists of four packets, I1, R1, I2, and R2. The packet names indicate
the sender of the packet and the sequence. Hence, the I1 packet is the first packet
of the Initiator while the R2 packet is the second packet of the Responder.
Figure 3.5 depicts the HIP base exchange. The first message, initiates the exchange
while the other three messages are used for the creating a shared secret with an
authenticated Diffie Hellman (DH) key exchange [DH76] and for setting up an en-
crypted tunnel between the peers. The Responder sends its Diffie-Hellman public
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Initiator Responder
 
I1 : HITI,HITR

R1: {HITI,HITR, IDR,DHR, puzzle, nonceR}sig(IDR)ff
I2: {{HITI,HITR, IDI,DHI, solution, nonceR, ipsecI}HMACk}sig(IDI) 
R2: {{HITI,HITR, ipsecR}HMACk}sig(IDR)ff
IPsec Payload
ff
tim
e
Figure 3.5The HIP Base Exchange implements an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange
based on the SIGMA protocol family.
value DHR in a signed envelope, generated with the private key of its host identity
IDR in the R1. The R1 message can be pre-created to avoid costly processing of
storms of forged I1 packets. The Initiator can verify the signature sig(IDR) to ascer-
tain that the Diffie-Hellman value was once created by the Responder. Based on the
Responder’s Diffie-Hellman key and its own Diffie-Hellman key, the Initiator creates
the keying material for the HIP association, from which it draws the symmetric key
k for the message authentication codes HMACk(x) and for the IPsec tunnel. The
R1 packet also contains a nonce for a challenge/response mechanism and the seed
for a cryptographic puzzle.
The Initiator crates the I2 message, which carries its own host identity HII and
contains the response to the challenge as well as the solution to the puzzle. The
Initiator protects the contents of the I2 packet against manipulation with a MAC
based on the symmetric keys as well as with a signature created with the private key
belonging to its HI. The Initiator also transmits additional parameters for setting
up the IPsec processing of the payload.
The Responder concludes the handshake with an R2 packet, containing its own IPsec
processing parameters. By applying the MAC and a digital signature, the Responder
proves that it is actively involved in the handshake.
3.5.3.2 HIP Updates
HIP hosts can change aspects of a HIP association during its lifetime with an update
mechanism. Most importantly, hosts can signal changes in their point of network
attachment with this mechanism. This enables HIP to change the IP addresses of
the hosts in case of mobility or multi homing. The HIP update process was designed
to provide a general signaling channel between the peers. In particular, extensions
can define new contents for update packets, allowing for secure signaling of arbitrary
association-related information. Like HIP BEX packets, HIP update packets consist
of the HIP header, additional HIP parameters, and possibly a digital signature and
MAC.
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HIP updates may also affect middleboxes. For example when a peer shifts traffic
from one to another interface, the set of middleboxes on the path may vary. As
middleboxes like authenticators or NATs may establish state per end-host or per
network address, these devices may need to observe and act on changes of a HIP
association. To secure HIP associations against malicious state corruption of a mid-
dlebox by forged update packets, these packets also carry digital signatures that
middleboxes can verify.
3.5.3.3 Closing HIP Associations
If one of the peers decides that an association is not required anymore, it can explic-
itly close the association. Closing of an association allows the peers to remove all
association related HIP and IPsec state that the peers maintain. At the same time,
closing an association prevents further packets from reaching the application because
the IPsec processing rules for new incoming packets are not present anymore.
HIP middleboxes may also process HIP close messages. Similar to end-hosts, these
devices can remove the state from their memory and free all allocated resources.
Moreover, middleboxes can deny the forwarding of packets for closed HIP associa-
tions, thereby cutting off the flow of undesired traffic within the network. As for
HIP update packets, HIP close packets are protected by public-key signatures that
middleboxes can verify.
3.5.4 Signatures Based on Delayed Secret Disclosure
The computational complexity of public-key signatures has fostered research on
lightweight alternatives for integrity protection. Anderson et al. show that non-
repudiation and integrity protection are possible only based on few hash applica-
tions [ABC+98] by using signatures based on commitments and delayed secret dis-
closure. In particular, signatures based on delayed secret disclosure are suitable for
scenarios in which no common shared secret for generating a hash-based keyed MAC
can be assumed. Hence, these mechanisms are an interesting building block for end-
to-middle authentication scenarios in which no shared secrets between the end-hosts
and the middleboxes exist.
In the following, we discuss two approaches for authentication based on delayed
secret disclosure: a) time based approaches and b) interaction based approaches.
Common to both approaches is the fundamental authentication mechanism: A signer
creates a secret k and creates a MAC(m, k) for the message m with k as the key
at time tsign. It sends the MAC and the message to the verifier, which stores both
values at time tstore. By later publishing the secret k at time tdisclose, the signer can
prove that it created the MAC at a time for which k was only known to the legitimate
signer. The possession and application of the key k before it is disclosed represents
an advantage that the legitimate signer has over an attacker. This advantage is the
asymmetry that is needed for creating an authentication mechanism that allows to
distinguish the legitimate signer from an attacker. Using hash chains as the source
of the secret k allows the signer to create several subsequent signatures for which
the receiver can validate the source and integrity.
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To maintain the asymmetry between the signer and an attacker, the following tem-
poral relation must be fulfilled and clearly evident for the verifier:
tsign < tstore < tdisclose (3.2)
In the following, we discuss the two approaches for achieving this separation: a)
temporal separation and b) interaction.
3.5.4.1 TESLA and Time-Based Signatures
The Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication protocol (TESLA) [PSC+05,
PCTS02] uses a time-based approach to create the separation between tsign and
tdisclose to sign (integrity protect and source authenticate) messages. It defines dis-
tinct phases, called epochs, during which the secret key is used for signing a message
and phases during which the key is published to enable verification. For imple-
menting these phases, the approach requires loose time synchronization between the
communicating peers.
In terms of a protocol, the signer first sends a hash anchor to a group of verifiers
during a bootstrapping phase. Later, each messagem is protected by an HMAC that
is created with an unrevealed element of the hash chain. The signer sends m and
the HMAC to the verifier, which stores these unverified values. The signer uses each
unrevealed element of the hash chain as a secret key to sign messages for a certain
time span: one epoch. The hash chain element is disclosed after this time span. Re-
ceivers can authenticate the buffered messages as soon as they receive corresponding
hash chain element. The verifier drops incoming messages that are signed with an
element that has already been disclosed because the temporal separation between
tsign and tdisclose is not evident to the verifier.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the message flow. The signer uses the hash chain element hi
to generate the HMAC of the messages during the first epoch. The verifier accepts
and buffers all packets while hi is valid. It drops messages signed with hi if they
arrive in the next epoch. In the figure, this happens to message m4. The verifier
can begin to verify the buffered messages after receiving the disclosed element of the
hash chain hi in m5.
The time synchronization in TESLA ensures that verifiers only accept packets with
the message m while the signer has not disclosed the corresponding hash chain
element. This ensures that only the signer, who is in possession of the hash chain,
can sign messages. An attacker can only sign packets after the disclosure of the
element. At that time, the verifier does not accept any more packets signed with the
hash chain element. Hence, the following relations exist for a valid signature that
was received during the right epoch:
tsign < tsign + x < tstore (3.3)
tsign < tsign + x = tdisclose (3.4)
The time span x marks the time between the creation of the signature and the end
of the epoch tdisclose. For x > 0, the basic relation for time delayed secret disclosure
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Figure 3.6 Signatures with the TESLA protocol. The signer (Alice) signs and sends multiple
messages. The verifier (Bob) verifies the messages after the signer disclosed hi.
signature holds: tsign < tstore < tdisclose. In practice, x must be larger than the
network delay between signer and verifier, including the processing at the hosts, to
make the temporal separation evident to the verifier.
The cryptographic operations used in TESLA only require inexpensive hash func-
tions and hash-based MACs. Hence, the computation cost of TESLA is very low
compared to public-key based signatures. However, TESLA introduces an addi-
tional delay to implement the epochs. A verifier cannot verify the message m before
the signer discloses the corresponding hash chain element at the end of the epoch.
Thus, the verifier has to buffer the messages until it receives the key at the end
of the epoch. The epoch duration corresponds to the worst-case assumption of the
network delay for a given scenario. On the one hand, if the epoch time is chosen
too short, the temporal separation is not evident to the verifier and it cannot verify
the message. On the other hand, long epochs require the verifier to buffer more
data and increase the end-to-end delay for applications. Perrig et al. proposed a
mechanism that moves the buffering of the messages from the verifier to the signer
of a message [PCST01]. This sender-side buffering reduces the amount of data that
must be buffered during an epoch but cannot eliminate it.
μTESLA [LNZJ05] was developed in order to improve the efficiency of TESLA for
sensor networks by using only symmetric cryptography and restricting the number
of authenticated signers in the network. This reduces the resource requirements for
storing hash chains.
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3.5.4.2 Interactive Signatures Based on Hash Chains
Torvinen and Ylitalo [TY05] use an approach similar to TESLA to sign messages
with hash chains and hash functions in the Weak Identifier Multihoming Protocol
(WIMP). Like in TESLA, a mechanism is required to separate the time span during
which a hash chain element is used for signing messages from the time when it
is used for message verification. In WIMP, the temporal separation between tsign
and tdisclose is achieved by implementing an interactive locking protocol between the
signer and the verifier.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the signature process. We label the packets of the exchange
based on their sequence and purpose. Signature packets are labeled with S and the
acknowledgment packets with A. In the S1 packet, the signer sends to the verifier
the message m and a MAC, generated with an undisclosed hash chain element. The
verifier acknowledges the receipt of the message with the A1 packet and buffers the
message and the MAC. The signer discloses the corresponding hash chain element
in the S2 packet after it received the A1 packet with the acknowledgment. Like
in TESLA, the verifier can verify the buffered message as soon as it receives the
disclosed hash chain element.
The protocol must fulfill two basic requirements in order to be secure.
a) The verifier must receive the message and the respective MAC, signed with a
hash chain element hi, before the signer discloses hi.
b) The verifier must not accept any messages signed with hi after the signer has
disclosed hi.
Requirement a) ensures that only the host that possesses the hash chain (the signer),
can sign messages. An attacker cannot sign messages with the signer’s hash chain
because it is not in possession of the required hash chain element. The signer does
not disclose its next hash chain element in an S2 packet before it received the ac-
knowledgment in an A1 packet from the verifier. Requirement a) demands that the
signer can distinguish valid acknowledgments from forged acknowledgments of an
attacker.
Requirement b) ensures that an attacker cannot sign any messages with a disclosed
element of a hash chain. The verifier does not accept any further S1 packets after
Signer Verifier
 
S1 : hSi ,m,MAC(hSi−1,m)

A1 : hViff
S2 : hSi−1

tim
e
Figure 3.7 Interactive hash chain signature. The Sender first signs and sends a message.
The verifier then acknowledges the receipt. Finally, the signer discloses the message and the
secret hash chain element.
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it has received the signature from the signer in the S1. Providing this property
demands that the verifier must be able to distinguish S1 packets from bogus packets
that an attacker could send to disturb the communication. Otherwise, an attacker
could constantly send forged packets to force the verifier to deny valid signature
packets.
Securing the acknowledgment message against forgery is vital to achieve security
with this scheme. To protect the acknowledgment against forgery, not only the
signer but also the verifier uses a hash chain. Hence, every packet contains a hash
chain element as clear text. This hash chain element ensures that the packet was
created by the legitimate signer (source-only authentication). Thus, lacking a new
hash chain element, an attacker cannot generate a forged acknowledgment. The two
hash chains are an unforgeable sequence of triggers with each element of the one
chain triggering an element of the other chain to be published.
The interactive approach utilizes interaction between the hosts to establish the tem-
poral separation required for delayed secret disclosure schemes. The verifier explic-
itly acknowledges the receipt of the message and the MAC, which indicates that the
signer can securely disclose the key. The temporal relationships can be captured as:
tsign < tsign + x = tstore (3.5)
tstore ≤ tack (3.6)
tsign < tack + y = tdisclose (3.7)
The values x and y are greater than 0 and represent the time for sending out the
messages, for forwarding a message in the network and for processing the messages
by a verifier. Hence, this scheme fulfills the requirement tsign < tstore < tdisclose
Interactive hash chain signatures do not require loose time synchronization nor do
they introduce an RTT-dependent delay for the interaction. However, they require
mechanisms for retransmission in cases of packet loss.
Relabeling attack against WIMP
In [Hee06], we identified a relabeling attack on WIMP, that allows to break its
implementation of the interactive hash chain authentication scheme. As we took
into account this attack in the design of ALPHA, we briefly highlight the attack
here.
In WIMP, two communicating hosts use one pair of hash chains for each bidirectional
WIMP association. Both peers can exchange authenticated messages over insecure
channels by using the interactive signature scheme of WIMP. However, this scheme
is not secure against a MITM attacker, Mallory, if both peers initiate a signature
process at the same time. Figure 3.8 illustrates the attack. Assumed Alice and
Bob have established a communication context and have exchanged their hash chain
anchors hAi+1 and h
B
i+1 earlier. The superscript of h indicates which host (A for
Alice, B for Bob) the hash chain element belongs to. Further assume that both
peers initiate a message exchange at the same time.
Mallory can delay the first S1 packets and use the hash chain element hBi to ac-
knowledge Alice’s message before Bob has received it. Mallory can generate a forged
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Figure 3.8 A signature reformatting attack against WIMP allows a MITM attacker to forge
a signature.
acknowledgment A1’ for Alice’s first S1 packet from hBi . In turn, Alice processes the
relabeled A1’ packet, containing hBi as a valid acknowledgment, and assumes that
Bob has received the first message from Alice. Consequently, Alice reacts to the
acknowledgment by disclosing hAi−1. Mallory is now in possession of h
A
i and h
A
i−1
although Bob has never acknowledged the receipt of hAi . Therefore, Bob will accept
messages that are signed with hAi−1. Mallory can now generate a valid signature for
an arbitrary message that appears to be signed by Alice.
The root cause of this attack is that Alice cannot distinguish hash values of Bob
that are meant for acknowledgments from hash values that are meant for signatures.
As discussed in Chapter 5, we use two dedicated hash chains per host to avoid such
relabeling in ALPHA. In ALPHA, every host generates a dedicated signature chain
and an acknowledgment chain. Signatures are created with elements from the signa-
ture chain while acknowledgments use hash chain elements from the acknowledgment
chain. Hence, Mallory cannot generate acknowledgments from signature packets.
3.5.5 PLA: Packet Level Authentication
The Packet Level Authentication protocol, PLA, [CLK05] is a protocol that achieves
end-to-middle authentication by attaching certificates and signatures to payload
packets. The goal of PLA is to improve the security in the network by enabling mid-
dleboxes to verify the origin, authenticity, and integrity of relayed packets. With this
capability, middleboxes can drop forged, maliciously altered, and unauthenticated
traffic.
The PLA architecture comprises end-hosts, middleboxes, and a trusted third party
(TTP). Every end-host possesses a public-private key pair that represents its identity.
The TTP issues certificates for the public keys of authorized hosts. A signer attaches
to each packet the TTP certificate and a signature generated with its private key.
For each packet, middleboxes can verify the integrity and origin of the packet based
on the signature. Moreover, by verifying the TTP certificate, the middlebox can
determine if the host is authorized to send packets.
Since public-key signatures are vulnerable to replay attacks, PLA requires defenses
against replayed packets to prevent flooding-based DoS attacks. PLA uses two con-
cepts for preventing replays: a) time stamps, and b) sequence numbers. Middleboxes
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only consider a packet as valid if it was created within a specified time frame. Times-
tamps reduce the time during which replay attacks are possible. Sequence numbers
further reduce the window of opportunity for an attacker. Since each packet con-
tains a monotonically increasing sequence number, middleboxes can detect replays
of packets for which the timestamp is still valid. In addition, the sequence number
can be used for accounting purposes.
Long public keys would consume a considerable amount of packet space, which would
not be available for payload traffic. To avoid such space overhead, PLA makes use
of elliptic curve cryptography with shorter keys. It uses 163-bit ECDSA keys (NIST
K-163 [Nat09]) as host identities. Because of the high CPU requirements of ECDSA
verifications (see Table 3.4 in Section 3.4.1.3), PLA relies on hardware acceleration
for processing the signatures for high-volume payload traffic. Ja¨rvinen et al. created
an FPGA design that theoretically achieves up to 166000 signature verifications per
second [JFS07]. If implemented in practice, a system with such specialized hardware
could authenticate about 200 Mbit/s, assuming a packet size of 1280 bytes (minimum
IPv6 MTU).
Driven by the lack of PLA hardware acceleration in commodity devices, Al Ha-
sib [A. 09] presented Wireless PLA, a PLA variant for wireless scenarios. This
variant uses concepts from LHIP and ALPHA and achieves throughputs of about
50 Mbit/s on PC hardware without hardware acceleration.
3.6 Summary
This chapter introduced background material, terms, and definitions used in the
following descriptions of our solutions. We presented a range security goals, mecha-
nisms, and protocols that target these goals with a focus on end-to-middle authenti-
cation. The solutions presented in the next sections use and extend the mechanisms
presented in this chapter to enable direct end-to-middle authentication in multi-hop
networks. The main challenges for the design of our solution is selecting appropriate
cryptographic primitives and combining them into coherent systems.
This chapter also introduced related authentication protocols that employ similar
techniques (e.g., TESLA and WIMP) and target goals that are similar to the goals
of our solutions (e.g., PLA). Hence, the discussion of these protocols can be consid-
ered as background material and as related work. While this chapter treated these
approaches as background material, we pick up the discussion on these protocols in
the related work sections of the following three chapters to discuss the similarities
and differences between the protocols in detail.
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4
HIP-MA: Authenticated
End-to-Middle Signaling with HIP
The establishment of a new connection, the modification of an existing connection
or the closing of an obsolete connection mark important events for on-path mid-
dleboxes. During these phases, end hosts may implicitly or explicitly request a
change in the behavior of a middlebox (see Section 2.2.1, implicit and explicit mid-
dlebox design). For example, a host sending packets from behind a network address
translator implicitly requests that the NAT should forward return packets from an
external source to it. Likewise, a host may explicitly request that a middlebox should
stop forwarding packets for a connection by closing that connection.
Explicit requests for changes of connection-related parameters are typically commu-
nicated via a signaling mechanism, such as a signaling channel. Authentication and
integrity protection for the signaled information is of utmost importance if hosts
can explicitly request actions that are related to security. For example, an attacker
should not be able to maliciously close an existing connection for another host be-
cause this might result in a DoS attack. As a second example, hosts that request
access to restricted network resources (e.g., access to a non-public network) should
prove their identity before the middlebox grants access to the host. In addition,
even changes in the network that are not strictly security-related may require au-
thentication of hosts to prevent selfish and unfair overuse of network resources.
Using cryptographic identities for hosts (e.g., public-key based identities) greatly
simplifies the authentication of hosts and the integrity protection of their signaled
information by giving hosts the capability to sign messages. Interpreting the set of
possible public keys as a cryptographic namespace allows to securely refer to the
identity of a host by using its public key as an identifier. The Host Identity Protocol
(HIP) [MN06, MNJH08, MHJH11] is a key-exchange protocol that introduces such
a cryptographic namespace for secure end-to-end communication. In addition to its
end-to-end security capabilities, HIP was designed with middleboxes and advanced
security-related network services in mind. In this chapter, we analyze and extend
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the end-to-middle signaling capabilities of HIP and show how middleboxes can use
the cryptographic namespace that HIP provides. Although the work in this chapter
primarily addresses HIP, the proposed end-to-middle authentication scheme can also
be applied to other end-to-end key-exchange protocols that are based on public-key
identities (e.g., the family of SIGMA protocols [Kra03]).
In this chapter, we develop a path-coupled signaling approach [MBSF05] for security
protocols that prevents replay attacks against middleboxes on the practical example
of HIP and IPsec. It is based on our published work on end-to-middle authentica-
tion for HIP [HHK+09, HWK11]. The remainder of this chapter is structured as
follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of HIP and its cryptographic namespace
to clarify the benefits that middleboxes gain by using this namespace for identifying
hosts. Section 4.3 shows that HIP, as specified by the Internet Engineering Task
Force in 2008, leaves middleboxes vulnerable to replay attacks that can be used for
successfully performing identity theft in the form of impersonation. In Section 4.4,
we propose an approach for middleboxes to eliminate the replay vulnerability. We
discuss how different security-related functions can be realized by HIP with the
proposed extensions and show the limitations of this approach that motivated our
research on the SPOTS token scheme family (c.f. Chapter 6). Finally, we provide
a performance analysis of the public-key based approach and show its applicabil-
ity and limitations that, in turn, motivated the research on ALPHA for lightweight
end-to-middle authentication.
4.1 The Host Identity Protocol and Middleboxes
HIP is a key-exchange and signaling protocol that the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) suggested as an experimental standard in 2008. We are currently
extending HIP to provide the cryptographic agility (i.e., interchangeable crypto-
primitives), necessary for a long-lived standard track (non-experimental) proto-
col [MHJH11]. HIP belongs to the class of end-to-end protocols for which the
existence of middleboxes was anticipated at design time. Middlebox friendliness
was one of the design goals, however not a primary goal, in the design phase of
the protocol (see Section 2.2.1, explicit middlebox design). This explicit middlebox
design manifests in the fact that end-hosts apply unencrypted public-key signatures
to HIP control channel packets. Middleboxes can verify these signatures, thereby
verifying the source and integrity of the packet and its contents. The basis for these
signatures are self-certifying public-key-based identities.
HIP uses two distinct channels between a pair of communicating hosts: the control
channel is a signaling channel for establishing and maintaining the HIP association,
while the payload channel carries the data of the transport layer. HIP protects the
latter through IPsec Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) tunnels [JMN08] to offer
end-to-end authentication, encryption, and integrity protection for the transport
layer. At the end hosts, the IPsec packets are mapped to the HIP association by
their Security Parameter Index (SPI). The end-to-end encrypted payload channel
cannot be inspected by middleboxes. Hence, we focus on the properties of the
signaling channel in this chapter.
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The cryptographic Host Identities (HIs) are used to securely address and refer to
hosts, thereby creating a new cryptographic namespace. A host’s identity is repre-
sented by RSA, DSA, or ECDSA public keys. A host then can prove that it is the
owner of an HI and the corresponding private key by using public-key signatures.
Public-key signatures are present in all HIP control packets that modify connection
parameters, and therefore, carry information of interest to middleboxes. By veri-
fying and interpreting the HIP signaling messages, a middlebox can appropriately
react state changes regarding the HIP association. In the following, we will discuss
the most important signaling events for HIP and the signaled information that is
important for middleboxes:
Association establishment: In the beginning of a HIP association, the two end-
hosts perform a mutual authentication based on their public-key identifiers.
During this phase, the locators of the hosts (IP addresses) are communicated
and the cryptographic algorithms for payload protection are negotiated. Addi-
tional capabilities can be signaled in the form of digital third-party certificates.
For middleboxes, the verification of the public-key identity may be of impor-
tance if the middlebox selectively provides service to certain end-hosts that
are defined by an access control list or by the capabilities certified in a third-
party certificate. Based on the identity of a host, a middlebox can decide if
it provides service at all to the host or if it differentiates between different
service qualities. Additionally, middleboxes may start the tracking of the use
of network resources for accounting purposes.
Middleboxes may use the cryptographic host identities for referring to hosts in
their internal state. Hence, instead of a host’s IP address, a network address
translator may use the host identity as a handle for a host. This allows mid-
dleboxes to refer to a host even if it changes its network-layer identifier (e.g.,
due to host mobility).
Association update: Using HIP, hosts can signal modifications of an active con-
nection to their peer and to middleboxes. A first example for such changes is
the shifting of traffic from one interface to another for a multi-homed host. A
second example is a mobile host that changes its point of network attachment
and receives a new IP address. In both examples, the middlebox must adjust
its forwarding state (e.g., a network address translation mapping or a firewall
rule) because the characteristics of the connection have changed. A third ex-
ample may be a host that requests a different kind of service for its packets or
for a subset of packets.
For all of these operations, middleboxes need to authenticate the source and
the integrity of the signaled information to avoid malicious tampering with
the state of the middlebox. For example, an attacker should not be able to
divert the traffic that was intended for another host, thereby interrupting the
communication between the legitimate peers. Likewise, an attacker should not
be able to influence the treatment of traffic of another host. By using the
cryptographic identities and signatures in the HIP association update packets,
a host can verify that only the legitimate peers can manipulate the respective
per-association processing state of the middlebox.
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Association teardown: HIP allows hosts to explicitly close an association. On an
end-to-end basis, this mechanism only serves the purpose of releasing the mem-
ory needed for storing the association-related state. For a middlebox, the clos-
ing of an association may have additional relevance. For one, the middlebox
may be able to use the newly-freed resources for other hosts. For another, the
middlebox may block further traffic between the end-hosts from passing. This
block can be used as a defense mechanism against flooding-based DoS attacks.
Again, the origin and integrity of the signaling that relates to the closing of
an association must be authenticated to avoid that malicious hosts can simply
delete association-related state on the middlebox.
In addition to the aforementioned connection management operations, HIP can
be used to signal arbitrary information to a middlebox in a signed and integrity-
protected envelope. Hence, HIP and the use of its cryptographic namespace are a
flexible tool for end-to-middle signaling. In the following, we will show the benefits
of the cryptographic namespace that HIP provides in more detail.
4.2 Host Identity Namespace
HIP transparently wedges between the network and the transport layer (see Sec-
tion 3.5.3 for details). Thus, it provides the new namespace and its services to
protocols of the transport layer and above. It achieves compatibility between the HI
namespace and IPv6 addresses through 128-bit hashes, so-called Host Identity Tags
(HITs), of the potentially long HIs (RFC 5338 [HNK08] discusses IPv4 compatibility
on a similar principle).
As discussed in Section 3.5.3, HIP’s cryptographic namespace elegantly addresses
a number of security and trust-related problems that have previously been tackled
separately without further thought about interoperability: end host macro mobility,
multihoming, NAT traversal, migration of processes and virtual machines, and nu-
merous trust and authentication-related issues in today’s Internet. Middleboxes can
also benefit from HIP for the majority of AAA-related tasks based at the network
layer:
a) End-host entity authentication: Hosts can be authenticated without additional
authentication protocols and authentication infrastructure by observing the
identity of a host that is transmitted via the HIP signaling channel. This means
that no additional authentication servers or PKI infrastructure is required to
verify the identity of a host. Based on this identification, further measures like
access control and accounting can be realized.
b) Authorization: Host-identity based entity authentication can greatly aid autho-
rization because hosts can be identified by strong cryptographic HIs rather
than by implicit and often unreliable information about the network topol-
ogy (e.g., IP-address-based and Ethernet-port-based filtering) and non-crypto-
graphic protocol properties (e.g., protocol numbers and statistical analysis).
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Hence, more sophisticated per-user and per-device authorization can be ap-
plied instead of crude grouping by such unreliable network characteristics. In
addition, public-key certificate-based authentication schemes can be integrated
with the public-key based host identities. This allows for an off-line delegation
of capabilities without an on-line connection to an authentication or autho-
rization server.
c) Accounting: Finally, accounting, e.g., the tracking of the use of certain resources,
is also aided by strong cryptographic identities. By logging the control mes-
sages of end-hosts, middleboxes can prove that these were sent by the end-hosts
(cf. Section 3.1.6, non-repudiation). Therefore, a middlebox can prove that a
host has requested a certain service and accordingly account for the service.
The security service of non-repudiation is essential for providing a solid proof
of use.
Based on these basic AAA services, HIP-MA can serve as a building block for ad-
vanced middlebox functions, such as identity-based logging, identity-based QoS and
flow prioritization, active state removal, and admission control.
4.3 Replay Attack against HIP Middleboxes
HIP end-hosts use the signaling and control channel for authentication, key-exchange,
and negotiating HIP association-related parameters, such as end-point locations
(IP addresses), cryptographic algorithms, and keys. End-hosts sign control-channel
packets with public-key signatures to support the verification of association-related
information by middleboxes on the path1. However, we show how a pair of collabo-
rating attackers can replay HIP control-channel packets and impersonate legitimate
end-hosts towards the middlebox. In the remainder of this section, we will show two
facets of the attack. First, we show how two malicious end-hosts can assume the
identity of two legitimate end-hosts by replaying signaling channel messages. Sec-
ond, we show how the attackers can extend the attack to create a valid IPsec ESP
payload channel. The attackers can use this forged payload channel to exchange
arbitrary (not necessarily replayed) payload across the middlebox. In the attack
description, we use the attacker terminology introduced in Section 3.2.
4.3.1 End-host Impersonation
The attack consists of two phases. In the first phase, an unprivileged attacker (Eve
or Mallory) observes and records a HIP handshake or HIP update between two
privileged legitimate hosts Alice and Bob (the victims). Eve, as an off-the-path
attacker, can, for example, gather the HIP control channel packets by eavesdropping
on an unencrypted wireless communication link. Mallory, as a man-in-the-middle
attacker can gather the packets because she is located on the communication path
between Alice and Bob. In the second phase, Eve or Mallory replay the handshake
1Note that the use of encrypted HIs is not possible when HIP is used for HI-based authentication to
middleboxes.
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via another middlebox with the help of an accomplice. The distinction between
Eve and Mallory is not required for the second phase because it can be performed
in absence of Alice and Bob. In the following, we describe the second phase in
more detail. We use Eve as attacker because the capabilities of an eavesdropper are
sufficient to carry out both phases of the attack.
In preparation of the second attack phase, Eve shares the recorded HIP control
messages (i.e., the I1, R1, I2, R2 packet sequence) with her accomplice. At any
later point in time, Eve and her accomplice decide to replay the control messages
to a middlebox, Ron. To this end, the attackers simply send the recorded packets
via the target middlebox in the same order as Alice and Bob did for the authentic
middlebox. Since the replayed HIP control packets contain valid contents, as well as
valid signatures created by Alice and Bob, the replayed handshake appears authentic.
When processing the replayed packets, Ron assumes that the legitimate peers request
the services that Alice and Bob once requested from some middlebox. Hence, Eve
and her accomplice may gain the privileges (e.g., network access) of Alice and Bob.
It should be noted that the attack is purely targeted at middleboxes and that per-
forming the attack requires two colluding attackers. The attack is not possible if one
attacker attempts a replay attack by replaying Alice’s packets to the real host Bob
because Bob is able to detect the attack by a mismatch in the end-to-end keying
material and will not complete the HIP signaling process. In the following, we assess
the severity of the attack.
4.3.1.1 Attack Severity
At this point, it is important to assess the severity of the attack to see which end-
to-middle AAA-related security services of HIP are impaired. We briefly summarize
the severity of the attack before explaining the implications in detail:
Using the attack, any pair of attackers can attack any middlebox
by using any recorded HIP handshake at any time at arbitrary
network locations multiple times.
In the following, we explain the aspects of this statement detail:
Any pair of attackers: There are no special restrictions for the attacker. The at-
tackers are not required to be in control of special network resources or secret
information. The possession of any recorded HIP base exchange or other HIP
signaling is sufficient to carry out the attack. Moreover, the computation and
communication capabilities of the attackers do not matter because it is not
required to break ciphers or flood the middlebox in a DoS attack.
Any middlebox: There are no restrictions on the victim middlebox. In particular,
the victim middlebox is not required to be the same middlebox for which the
authentic handshake was recorded because the signed and integrity protected
part of the control packets contain no information that ties the signaling pack-
ets to a special path or middlebox.
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Any recorded HIP handshake: There is no special requirement for the recorded
handshake. Specifically, there are no end-host properties that restrict the
scope of the attack. Hence, any pair of victim end-hosts can be impersonated
by the colluding attackers.
Any time: The HIP signaling messages contain no time information. Thus, the at-
tack can be carried out at any time after the authentic handshake was recorded.
This means that the replay can be performed against the same or another
middlebox immediately after the handshake was recorded (almost at the same
time) or much later.
At arbitrary network locations: As discussed above, the attack is not tied to a par-
ticular attacker or victim location or a particular middlebox or communication
path. A once-recorded HIP signaling exchange can be replayed to an on-path
middlebox by attackers located at any location in the network. It is not re-
quired that the attackers are located in the same sub-networks or at the same
IP addresses as the victim hosts were located when they first exchanged the
authentic HIP signaling messages.
Multiple times: Once recorded, the handshake can be replayed repeatedly to the
same or different middleboxes. Only if the middlebox keeps state for previous
HIP signaling events, the middlebox can detect repeated attacks.
Due to the severity of the attack, middleboxes cannot safely rely on the HI names-
pace to authenticate hosts for access control, QoS, or accounting since they cannot
detect that the HIP signaling occurs between hosts that are not the legitimate own-
ers of the corresponding HIs. Moreover, the attack can be carried out easily and
may serve malicious as well as selfish attackers (c.f. Section 3.2). A malicious at-
tacker can disrupt existing connections by signaling outdated state information to
the middlebox. As we show in the next Section, selfish attackers can hijack or open
a payload channel and gain access to network resources that should be reserved for
Alice and Bob.
4.3.2 Payload Channel Hijacking
So far, we have considered the basic replay attack to signal replayed information
to a middlebox. This section shows how attackers can gain additional benefits by
further exploiting this attack. To this end, the attackers use the attack to setup a
valid payload channel.
Currently, HIP specifies IPsec ESP as the sole option for a payload channel. The
IPsec ESP packets are end-to-end encrypted and integrity protected by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms (HMAC, and symmetric ciphers). These mechanisms use
the symmetric keys drawn from the keying material that was generated in the end-
to-end Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Hence, middleboxes are not in possession of the
symmetric keys and cannot use the payload protection mechanisms. Simply sharing
the symmetric keys with middleboxes would be a security threat by itself because
middleboxes could modify the protected parts of the packets unnoticeably. Since
the IPsec ESP packets are end-to-end encrypted, the middleboxes can only use the
64 4. HIP-MA: Authenticated End-to-Middle Signaling with HIP
unprotected information in the IP, UDP, and IPsec headers to distinguish different
IPsec ESP streams. In particular, HIP middleboxes can use the IP addresses of the
ESP packets and the IPsec Security Parameter Index (SPI) numbers in the IPsec
header for demultiplexing different payload streams.
During the authentic HIP base exchange, Alice and Bob prepare the establishment
of an IPsec ESP payload channel by signaling the IPsec SPI numbers within the
signed part of the HIP control channel messages. As the attackers overheard the
control messages including the SPI numbers, they can set up a “fake” IPsec ESP
channel with the same SPI numbers that Alice and Bob used for the authentic IPsec
ESP channel. To this end, Eve and her accomplice would agree on symmetric keys
for the “fake” IPsec ESP channel before the attack and establish their own IPsec
channel with these pre-shared keys. Since the middlebox, Ron, does not know the
integrity protection and encryption keys for the ESP channel, he cannot distinguish
valid ESP packets from fake ones. In fact, the “fake” ESP payload channel may be
a proper ESP payload channel for which the symmetric keys are not the result of
the Diffie-Hellman key agreement in the replayed HIP base exchange. As a result,
collaborating attackers can use any replayed BEX to falsely authenticate to the
middlebox and to successfully establish a payload channel.
4.3.3 Non-Solutions
For end-hosts, HIP counters replay attacks by utilizing nonces and a shared secret
derived from a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. However, these end-to-end anti-replay
measures are not applicable to middleboxes, leaving these devices with no measures
to verify the genuineness and freshness of a HIP handshake.
The root of the problem is the absence of any cryptographically secured discrimi-
native information that allow middleboxes to distinguish fresh from replayed HIP
signaling exchanges. Such discriminative information could be time stamps and
network-level identifiers. However this information is not present in the public-key
signed part of the HIP signaling packets. By including time information in the HIP
signaling packets, the window of opportunity for the attack could be limited to a
certain time span. Including IP addresses in the signed part of the HIP packets
could limit the choice of valid attack locations. However, as we will discuss in the
following, the lack of such an information was intentional in HIP because both op-
tions require unrealistic assumptions. The main disadvantages of using these two
options for a network-layer security protocol like HIP are:
a) Signed timestamps: The secure use of time stamps requires global time syn-
chronization, which leads to the problem of dealing with un-synchronized end-
systems or middleboxes. Hence, a middlebox with wrong time information may
accept replayed messages as valid while it rejects authentic packets. In addi-
tion, since certain discrepancies of the local time counters of distinct devices
are to be expected (e.g., because of clock drift), a certain duration in which
packets are accepted as valid must be considered. While limiting this duration
reduces the window of opportunity for a replay attack, it cannot completely
prevent it because attackers could replay the HIP signaling to a middlebox
immediately after it was recorded.
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b) Signed location information: Tying HIP associations to network-level identi-
fiers by means of end-host-generated signatures leads to severe incompatibil-
ities with network address translators that modify the network addresses in
the packet headers. This means, that the addresses in the IP header may not
match the addresses within the signed and integrity protected part of the HIP
packet after the packet was mangled by a NAT or NAPT. Thus, depending on
the network topology and the presence of NATs, a mismatch of the network
addresses cannot be interpreted as attack because many valid HIP signaling
packets would be treated as attack traffic as well.
4.4 HIP Middlebox Authentication Extension
As discussed, purely end-host driven options, such as the inclusion of timestamps
and node locations, can at best reduce the window of opportunity for an attacker.
However, due to inaccuracy in time synchronization and scoped address spaces by
NATs, attack possibilities still remain. To eliminate the possibility of an attack, we
extend HIP from a purely end-to-end oriented and bilateral protocol to a multilat-
eral protocol in which middleboxes can actively participate in the HIP handshake,
mobility, and multihoming signaling. There are two viable options for including
middleboxes in the on-path protocol:
As first option, a middlebox can act as a first-class object that establishes a full HIP
association with both end-hosts. This approach requires the middlebox to estab-
lish shared secrets with the end-hosts via additional Diffie-Hellman key exchanges.
However, the increased computational complexity for computing the Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange with every middlebox on the path and the additional packet-space
requirements for transferring the additional Diffie-Hellman public keys rule out this
option.
As a second option, middleboxes can implement a challenge-response mechanism by
injecting their own nonces into the end-to-end HIP control packets they forward.
A middlebox can select the nonce in the very meaning of the term as a “number
used once” and request the inclusion of the nonce in the signed part of the HIP
control packet. The end-host can prove its participation in the exchange by echoing
the nonce in the signed part of the packet. If the nonce is of sufficient length and
is chosen randomly or pseudo-randomly with sufficient entropy, the middlebox can
take the fact that the nonce is covered by the signature as evidence that the holder of
the private key was involved in the signaling process with the particular middlebox
on the path. Hence, the signed packet authenticates the end-hosts and the signed
and integrity-protected part of the packet is guaranteed to have originated from the
authenticated host. We use this second option as a basis for our extension.
We distinguish two phases for the HIP end-to-middle authentication extension. In
an initial first phase, the end-hosts gather the middlebox nonces and prove their
identity to the middleboxes. This first phase is performed whenever a pair of hosts
establish a new HIP association or when the set of middleboxes changes due to a
change in the end-host’s point of network attachment in an update packet. During
this phase, every middlebox establishes new state for the end-hosts. HIP signaling
that occurs in the second phase (after the first phase is complete) modifies existing
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state at the middleboxes. As the end-hosts have already proven their liveness in the
association, new middlebox nonces are not required in this phase. Instead, a unique
session identifier is included in HIP signaling messages in the second phase to avoid
replays. In the remainder of this section we discuss both phases of the multilateral
authentication mechanism for HIP.
4.4.1 Phase One: Initial End-to-Middle Authentication
Before a host can include the nonces in a HIP control packet, it must receive a nonce
from each middlebox on the communication path. Detecting all on-path middleboxes
individually and querying them for a nonce may significantly increase the delay
until a signaling message can be sent. To avoid this overhead, we interweave the
middlebox detection and nonce delivery with the regular HIP message exchanges.
This interweaved middlebox detection and nonce collection is performed by letting
the middlebox add nonces to regular HIP control packets. This is possible because
HIP control packets are composed of an integrity-protected and an unprotected part.
On-path entities can add contents to the unprotected part of the packet without
invalidating the HIP integrity protection mechanisms.
The decision to piggyback the middlebox nonces to the end-hosts on HIP control
packets has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, this solution allows
a clean integration in the HIP protocol flow without additional messages between
the middleboxes and end-hosts. Moreover, this method avoids repeated authentica-
tion exchanges for cascades of middleboxes and does neither increase the number of
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(b) Interweaved end-to-middle authentication.
Figure 4.1 Figures (a) and (b) show design options for end-to-middle authentication based on
nonces. Solid arrows show the HIP base exchange and payload messages. Dashed arrows signify
additional messages required for delivering nonces. Steps that require public-key signature
generation are marked with a key symbol.
4.4. HIP Middlebox Authentication Extension 67
RTTs, nor the number of public-key signatures for end-hosts. On the other hand,
piggybacking nonces on regular HIP packets requires that the middlebox forwards
some HIP control messages without prior authentication to allow end-hosts to receive
the nonces. Malicious or selfish attackers can exploit such unauthenticated forward-
ing of HIP control messages to establish a covert channel. We discuss this attack
possibility in Section 4.5.2.2. Figure 4.1 shows the steps of the two alternative design
options. In this work, we focus on the interweaved end-to-middle authentication (see
Figure 4.1b). The lower part of Figure 4.1a (I1, R1) shows a hybrid form between the
step-by-step and interweaved end-to-middle authentication. The Nonces N ′1 and N
′
2
are piggybacked on Alice’s HIP control message after all middleboxes authenticated
Alice.
The most relevant message exchanges for which end-hosts initially prove their iden-
tity to middleboxes are the HIP handshake and the HIP update. Both messages
may lead to the creation of new local state on middleboxes. The HIP handshake
creates a new HIP association for which no previous state exists. The HIP update
may change the flow of packets through the network because of host mobility or
multi-homing. This may lead to the presence of a different set of middleboxes on
the new communication path, possibly resulting in the establishment of new state
at newly present middleboxes.
In the following, we discuss how we can interweave the nonce mechanism with the
HIP handshake and the HIP update packet exchanges. The extended signaling for
both packet exchanges follows a simple pattern: The first packet towards a host
collects all nonces from the on-path middleboxes. The subsequent response packet
contains the nonces in the public-key signed part of the packet.
End-to-Middle authentication in the HIP base exchange
Figure 4.2 illustrates the extended HIP handshake. For the sake of conciseness, we
discuss only the packets, parameters, and operations that are relevant for middle-
boxes. Text in curly braces represents packet contents that are signed with the HI
of the original sender of the packet. In this explanation, we only discuss the proce-
dure for a single middlebox. However, multiple middleboxes are supported without
additional mechanisms.
The I1 packet does not contain any public-key or Diffie-Hellman related parameters.
This is a precaution that protects the Responder from resource exhaustion attacks
(cf. [MNJH08] Section 5.3.1) that would be possible if the I1 packet invoked costly
operations. To preserve the DoS resilience property, the middlebox forwards the I1
packet without modification (i.e., without adding a nonce).
The R1 packet contains the Responder’s HI as well as its HIT. In order to challenge
the Initiator, the middlebox adds a nonce NI to the R1 packet. The subscript I
indicates that the nonce N is meant for authenticating the Initiator. The Initiator
must return NI in a signed envelope. Additionally, NI serves as a seed value for a
cryptographic puzzle of difficulty d that serves as a DoS protection for the middle-
box2. Upon receiving the R1 packet, the Initiator solves the puzzle and returns the
2The duality of NI as a challenge and puzzle is a precaution to keep the amount of middlebox data
in each packet low to avoid segmentation and MTU issues when multiple middleboxes are on the path.
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I1
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R1: idRffR1: idR + (NI, d)ff
I2: idI, {(NI, SI)}  I2: idI, {(NI, SI)}+ (NR, d) 
R2: idR, {(NR, SR)}
ffR2:, idR, {(NR, SR)}ff
tim
e
Figure 4.2 Modified HIP handshake with middlebox. Only relevant parameters are shown.
The new N parameter represent middlebox nonces while d parameters are part of a middlebox-
driven puzzle mechanism (c.f. Section 4.4.3.1)
solution SI as well as the signed nonce NI in the I2 packet. As the HIP standard
requires the Initiator to sign a part of the I2 packet to prove its identity to the
Responder, the Initiator can simply append NI to the signed part of the I2 packet
without additional signature overhead for a second signature. Hence, for the Initia-
tor, proving the Initiator’s identity to the middlebox does not cause any considerable
overhead in terms of cryptographic computation cost.
On receipt of the I2 packet, the middlebox validates the puzzle before checking the
nonce and verifying the public-key signature to authenticate the end-host. Identity
verification of the Responder is achieved in the same way by using the nonce and
puzzle seed NR
3. Depending on the desired security function of the middlebox, it
can authenticate the Initiator, the Responder, or both by injecting the nonces into
the R1 or I2 packet respectively.
End-to-Middle authentication in the HIP update process
The HIP handshake is performed over a stable communication path. This results in
all four handshake packets being forwarded by the same middleboxes. This assump-
tion is not necessarily true for mobility updates of a multi-homed host because the
packet carrying the initial update packet is sent via the path between the primary
communication interfaces of the HIP end-hosts while the return routability checks
are performed between all interfaces. This means that different middleboxes may
receive a different set of update packets.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the problem. The first update packet from Alice to Bob collects
the nonces from the middlebox Ron1, which is located on the primary communication
path between Alice and Bob. The responses, including the signed nonces, are then
sent across all possible communication paths. Middleboxes that are located on the
secondary path but not on the primary path (Ron2) will neither recognize the nonces
nor the puzzle solutions. Therefore, the identity of the Responder cannot be verified
when the middlebox on the secondary path verifies the second update packet.
3Responders become vulnerable to DoS attacks when solving difficult middlebox puzzles uncondi-
tionally. Therefore, they should prioritize BEX packets with low puzzle difficulty.
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Figure 4.3 HIP update packets of multi-homed hosts may traverse different sets of middle-
boxes. For example, Ron2 cannot receive the complete message exchange.
We addressed this problem in [HWK11] and provide a detailed analysis there. For
completeness, we provide a brief description of the process here. If verifying the
of the Responder to an update is an objective of the middlebox, this verification
can be achieved by extending the three-way update process by a fourth packet from
the Responder to the Initiator of the update process. Hence, the middlebox on the
secondary path adds its nonces and puzzles to the U2 packet and the U3 packet and
expects an additional U4 packet. With this fourth packet, the general authentication
mechanism for HIP update packets is identical to the authentication of the end-hosts
in the HIP handshake.
4.4.2 Phase Two: Subsequent End-to-Middle Authentication
After the initial phase-one authentication, end-hosts and middleboxes can use the
simpler and more lightweight phase-two authentication to verify the authenticity of
subsequent HIP control packets. Middleboxes can securely authenticate further HIP
packets without further nonces if the signed part of the packet contains a unique
session identifier. The advantage of using a unique session identifier is that packets
can be verified without first requesting and echoing a nonce. This allows middleboxes
to verify subsequent HIP update or close requests instantly. We discuss two options
for such unique session identifier: a) end-host-generated sequence numbers that allow
the middleboxes to tie the HIP control packet to a session or b) middlebox-generated
session identifiers (e.g., the nonce from the previous HIP update exchange).
The end-hosts and middleboxes agree on the session identifier when performing the
phase-one authentication. The session identifier must be statistically unique and
must be contained in the signed part of the phase-one-authenticated packet. This
provides evidence to the middlebox that the session identifier was freshly provided
by the authentic end-host.
Using an end-host provided session identifier allows to use a single identifier for all
middleboxes while for middlebox-defined session identifiers several identifiers, one
per middlebox, may be required in each control packet. On the other hand, if end-
host provided session identifiers are used, the middleboxes must trust the end-hosts
that these identifiers are not reused for other sessions. Otherwise, an attacker could
combine signaling messages from several distinct sessions to maliciously change the
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Figure 4.4 A sequence of the possible authentication processes in HIP-MA.
state of a session. In the following, we discuss how both choices can be integrated
in the HIP control channel.
Host-selected session identifiers: HIP control messages do not contain any unique
session identifiers by default. However, the sequence numbers in HIP signal-
ing messages can be used as a session identifier. To this end, the sequence of
sequence numbers must identify a session uniquely. By default, sequence num-
bers are initialized to zero at the beginning of a HIP association. Changing
this initialization to a random value r in the number range of the sequence
number type (between 0 and 232) and choosing subsequent sequence numbers
based on this initial value reduces the likelihood of sequence number equality
between sessions. The initialization value of the sequence numbers r must
be communicated in the base exchange to allow end-hosts to process the first
update packet in sequence because the sequence number of the first packet
will not be determined by the specification (zero) but is randomly selected at
runtime.
For pairs of hosts that send high numbers of control messages and frequently
establish connections with the same peers, a 32-bit number space may prove
insufficient. In such cases, a longer host-selected session identifier can be spec-
ified in a new HIP parameter.
Middlebox-selected session identifiers: Allowing each middlebox to select a ses-
sion identifier enables each middlebox to set the probability of session identi-
fier collisions by selecting the length of the session identifier. Moreover, the
security of the scheme does not depend on the quality of the identifier that the
end-host selected.
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Possible session identifiers are the middlebox nonces N , since these values
are already known to the end-hosts from the first phase of the end-to-middle
authentication process.
An obvious disadvantage of middlebox-selected nonces is the fact that for each
middlebox, packet space must be reserved for the respective session identi-
fier. This additional space requirement may lead to packet fragmentation for
scenarios with deep cascades of middleboxes, small packet sizes, or long crypto-
graphic keys and signatures (see Section 5.7.2.3 for the effects of fragmentation
on end-to-middle integrity protection in the context of ALPHA).
After completing the phase-one authentication, the end-hosts continue with phase-
two authentication by simply including the session identifier in each new public-
key signed HIP signaling message. However, if a change in routing or a change
of the end-host network attachment leads to a new path for HIP control packets,
the set of middleboxes may change. In such a situation, a middlebox that has not
observed a phase-one authentication process can convert a phase-two authentication
procedure into a phase-one authentication procedure by adding a nonce and puzzle
difficulty (N, d). Figure 4.4 shows how two end-hosts first authenticate with the
phase-one protocol, transition to the phase-two protocol and transition back to the
phase-one protocol because middlebox Ron1 requests a phase-one authentication by
adding a nonce. Any middlebox on the path can request a phase-one authentication,
regardless of its position on the path and whether or not it observed the initial HIP
handshake.
4.4.3 DoS Protection for Middleboxes
Although the performance effects of our extension are marginal for end-hosts, mid-
dleboxes must perform new security-related tasks that may result in DoS vulnerabil-
ities. Especially public-key based HI verification and the maintenance of HIP-related
state information can be exploited to create DoS attacks. Therefore, we dedicate
the next sections to the mitigation of CPU and memory targeted attacks.
4.4.3.1 Defense against CPU Exhaustion Attacks
Processing floods of forged I2, R2, and update messages can easily exceed the com-
putational capabilities of a middlebox because for each packet the middlebox must
verify the public-key signature belonging to the HI of the sender. Therefore, de-
fenses against malicious flooding are essential for keeping a middlebox functional in
the face of an attack. To frustrate CPU-targeted attacks, we use the well-known
technique of client puzzles [ANL01] (c.f. Section 3.4.3.3). Client puzzles are com-
putational tasks that are difficult to solve but for which the solution can be verified
in a computationally inexpensive way. We reuse the puzzle defined in the HIP base
document RFC-5201[MNJH08] for protecting the middleboxes from CPU-targeted
attacks.
The HIP puzzle consists of an input value and a value for the difficulty of the
puzzle. We use the middlebox nonce N as a puzzle input value to reduce the space
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requirements for the middlebox puzzle and middlebox nonce mechanism. However,
a separate input value could have been used as well4. Along with the nonce N ,
the middlebox attaches the puzzle difficulty value d to each HIP control packet
towards an end-host that needs to be identified. The end-host is expected to solve
the puzzle by finding a value S such that H(N |S) results in a value with the d least
significant bits equaling zero. The end-host sends the solution S to the middlebox in
the subsequent HIP return packet. The middlebox can check the correctness of the
solution S for the puzzle N before verifying CPU intensive public-key signatures.
If the middlebox experiences normal load and no attack is suspected, d is set to zero
(no puzzle required), indicating that any value S is acceptable. When a middlebox
suspects an attack, it increases the puzzle difficulty d, forcing the end-hosts to solve
a more complex puzzle. The complexity of the puzzle grows exponentially with d.
This allows to throttle attacks that target the computational asymmetry between
creating an invalid signature (any arbitrary string) and verifying a signature with
CPU-intensive public-key algorithms. Thus, flooding packets with invalid signatures
becomes CPU-intensive for attackers as well. Because of the dual functionality of
N as the nonce and puzzle input value, it must exhibit a sufficient randomness to
prevent malicious re-use of the solution.
To use the puzzle efficiently, middleboxes should distinguish attack directions (e.g.,
source and destination network interfaces). If the majority of the CPU load is
caused by verifying HIP messages that arrive on a certain network interface or from
a certain network segment, middleboxes can increase the puzzle difficulty for HIP
control packets that leave that interface or are destined to that network segment.
It is important that the classification of attack directions should not be based on
packet characteristics that can easily be forged (e.g., source IP addresses without
ingress filtering).
Missing puzzle support in phase-two authentication
The phase two end-to-middle authentication (c.f. Section 4.4.2) does not provide the
puzzle protection because no new puzzle seed N is exchanged prior to sending the
control channel message. Hence, middleboxes cannot shelter against CPU-targeted
DoS attacks in the second phase. However, in case of an attack, a middlebox can
use the phase-one procedure as a fallback to force the end-hosts to solve the puzzle
before the middlebox verifies the public key signature. In order to initiate a phase-
one exchange, the middlebox simply adds (N, d) to the forwarded phase-two update
packets and proceeds as described in Section 4.4.1.
Phase-one authentication of both end-hosts is possible for packet exchanges with at
least three packets. The HIP connection teardown mechanism, however, only con-
sists of two messages. Without introducing a third message for closing a connection,
a middlebox has two choices: a) to verify the closing of a connection as a phase-two
operation without puzzle protection or b) to authenticate the acknowledgment of
the close request only (with puzzle protection). The second option is a viable option
because the closing of an association does not require consent between the hosts. A
host can end the communication unilaterally at any given point in time. Thus, if the
4A separate puzzle value was used in the first revision of draft-heer-hip-middle-auth but was removed
due to IETF community feedback.
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Responder expresses that it will not continue to use the connection, it is reasonable
to assume the connection to be closed even if the close request from the Initiator
was not authenticated.
Finally, closing a connection is typically not an operation with real-time require-
ments because the connection to be closed is not required any more. Hence, state
manipulation related to closing requests can be treated with low priority. Middle-
boxes with sufficient buffer space can store phase-two authenticated close messages
during times of high traffic and prioritize time-critical phase-one authenticated mes-
sages. The stored phase-two messages can then be processed in times of low CPU
load.
4.4.3.2 Defense against Memory Exhaustion Attacks
Memory exhaustion attacks are another threat for memory-restricted middleboxes,
such as routers and firewalls. Especially unauthenticated establishment of state
(e.g., for half-open connections) can be exploited with flooding attacks to exceed
the memory capabilities of middleboxes. The TCP SYN flooding attack [Edd07] is a
popular example for an attack that targets the state memory of hosts. Similar attacks
are possible against every protocol that establishes state for half-open associations.
Tracking the full handshake, beginning with the I1 and R1 messages, would require
the middlebox to establish state based on unauthenticated packets. At this point
neither the identity of the hosts nor the validity of their IP addresses is ensured,
which opens a large window for attacks.
The nonces in the R1 and I2 packet also serve as a return-routability test, and hence,
enable middleboxes to recognize and frustrate attacks from spoofed IP addresses. As
precaution, middleboxes should delay the state establishment, especially the tracking
of a connection, until one or both end-hosts prove their identity.
Establishing state should be delayed until the middlebox receives a packet with
a valid signed middlebox nonce and puzzle solution. Such a packet testifies a) the
return-routability of the Initiator’s IP address, b) the ability of the Initiator to spend
CPU cycles for the puzzle solution, and c) the identity of the peer. However, by using
the stateless connection approach presented in [AN97], the nonce mechanism allows
the middlebox to even stay stateless at this point by transferring the middlebox’s
state information as a nonce to the Responder in the R2 packet. As the required state
information is small for most cases (authentication state and time), it can be enclosed
in a small encrypted envelope for which only the middlebox possesses the key. Using
this envelope as the nonce NR allows the middlebox to send its state information to
the Responder and to receive it in the R2 packet. Thus, state variables don’t require
buffer space on the middlebox before the R2 arrives. Alternatively, middleboxes
can use a keyed hash of the relevant association parameters (e.g., IP addresses and
HITs) as NR, allowing the middlebox to recognize a valid nonce. When receiving
the R2 packet containing NR, the middlebox reconstructs the hash function output
by hashing the information from the R2 packet combined with the secret key. Using
hashes instead of encrypted envelopes results in smaller, constant sized nonces but
may require several hash computations if the state space for s is large. In both
cases, the middlebox can defer the time of state establishment until the handshake
is complete and both end-hosts have authenticated and computed a puzzle. Such
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a late state establishment forces attackers to use valid network-layer addresses and
HIs, and thus, significantly strengthens HIP middleboxes against memory exhaustion
attacks.
A last requirement for late state establishment is that all authentication-related in-
formation (signature, nonce, and corresponding public key) is present in the respec-
tive packet. However, HIP R2 packets do not carry the public key of the Responder.
Therefore, another small modification to the HIP specification is necessary: each
packet containing a signed nonce must also contain the host’s identity, that is, its
public key. Due to the modular protocol design of HIP, this change does not impair
the interoperability with legacy hosts that do not support HIP-MA.
4.4.4 Summary
In this section we discussed how middleboxes can shelter against CPU and memory
targeted DoS attacks by deferring the point of state establishment until the existence
and identity of the end-hosts was verified. In addition, middleboxes can utilize the
HIP puzzle mechanism to force end-hosts to prove that they spent a sufficient amount
of computation time as a sign of honesty and good-will.
4.5 Security Benefits and Limitations
This section focuses on the practical security benefits that HIP-MA enables. HIP-
MA brings HIP one step closer to being a protocol that allows for end-to-end and
end-to-middle security. However, as we show in this section, the limitation of HIP-
MA to securing the HIP signaling channel cannot prevent attacks that target the
IPsec payload channel. In this section, we first discuss the practical benefits of
HIP-MA and then show the practical limitations of the approach.
4.5.1 Benefits of HIP-MA
The HIP middlebox authentication extension provides two main security benefits to
middleboxes:
a) End-to-middle host authentication: Middleboxes can verify whether a certain
host is involved in the establishment of a HIP association and thus, in the
establishment of the payload channel. This property can be used to restrict
access to network resources to authorized hosts. Moreover, traffic handling
policies (e.g., QoS, or service restrictions) can be enforced on a per-association
level.
b) End-to-middle integrity protection for HIP parameters: Middleboxes can ver-
ify the integrity of the protected parameters in the HIP control packets. Hence,
hosts can express information in the protected parameters and bind this in-
formation to their identity. The parameter structure of HIP allows to define
arbitrary parameters without a loss of compatibility. With HIP-MA, hosts can
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bind properties (e.g., payload channel attributes such as the source and desti-
nation IP addresses or IPsec SPIs) to their HI and the HIP association. Mid-
dleboxes can verify these bindings and use the specified attributes to enforce
certain restrictions on the payload channel, e.g., to exhibit the same attributes
as the control channel. Therefore, HIP-MA can serve as a foundation for other
HIP extensions that require secure signaling to middleboxes.
Based on the end-to-middle host authentication and integrity protection, middle-
boxes can extract cryptographically protected association-relevant information (e.g.,
the HIs and the SPI number assignment) from the control channel. Optionally,
other information (e.g., IPsec sequence numbers) could be communicated within the
signed HIP control packets to create a strong attribute binding for access control
or accounting. Moreover, an implicit binding between the IP address and the HI of
a host can be derived from the use of the IP address in packets carrying the HIP
control packets. Middleboxes can use these attribute bindings to selectively admit
payload traffic for which the attributes apply. For example, a middlebox can permit
payload traffic for a pair of authenticated hosts and the middlebox can enforce that
the payload traffic must have defined source and destination addresses, SPI numbers,
and IPsec sequence numbers.
End-hosts and middleboxes can implement a secure channel for service negotiations.
We presented such a framework in [HWV11a]. End-hosts can use the end-to-middle
authenticated signaling channel to subscribe to services offered by the middlebox.
Examples for such services are a) the forwarding of data (access control) and b) the
forwarding of data with certain quality of service properties for traffic that requires
low delays or high bandwidth. The end-to-middle authenticated signaling channel
offers peer entity authentication, integrity protection, and non-repudiation as basic
security services for middleboxes. These services allow middleboxes to a) determine
if a host has indeed requested a specific service (source authentication and integrity
protection) and b) to prove later to a third party that the host has requested the
service (non-repudiation). For both operations, the proof of peer involvement (i.e.,
the signed nonces) in the signaling process as provided by HIP-MA is essential.
4.5.2 Attack Scenarios
In this section we highlight possible attack scenarios against HIP-MA and discuss
how HIP-MA copes with these threats. The attacks either target the HIP control
channel and its end-to-middle authentication or target the ESP payload channel.
For each attack, we discuss the severity and possible countermeasures that HIP-MA
already provides or that require an extension of HIP-MA by additional mechanisms.
For the discussion of attack scenarios and threats, we use the threat model introduced
in Section 3.2.1.
4.5.2.1 Diverted End-to-Middle Authentication
When authenticating towards a middlebox, the end-host implicitly subscribes to the
services offered by the middlebox. An attacker could divert packets from their regular
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path through the network to an unrelated middlebox in order to let the end-host
authenticate towards this middlebox although this authentication is not necessary.
The motivation, the severity, and possible countermeasures largely depend on the
service that the other middlebox offers and how the middlebox uses the end-host
authentication.
For security or policy reasons, hosts may decide not to use the services of a particular
middlebox or type of middlebox. It is important to understand that the fact that
the end-host is willing to prove its identity by echoing the nonce does not imply
consent with the offered service per se. Thus, an essential link is missing between
the authentication and the use and provisioning of a service: the service negotiation.
In [HWV11a] we proposed a framework to negotiate services and service terms be-
tween end-hosts and middleboxes. Just like the nonce N , a middlebox can add a
service offer to HIP control packets. By acknowledging this service identifier with
an explicit service acknowledgment in the next HIP control packet, an end-host can
communicate consent with the terms of service. The service identifier states the
nature, properties, and requirements of the service. By replying the hashed service
offer in the signed part of the next HIP packet as an acknowledgment, an end-host
clearly indicates that it is aware of the service and its function and that it accepts its
terms of usage. The service identifier may also include information on the identity of
the middlebox, allowing the end-host to only subscribe to known services or known
devices. In contrast to the mere presence of middlebox nonces, the service acknowl-
edgment can be taken as consent between the end-hosts and the middlebox. With
service identifiers, a diversion of HIP payload traffic becomes un-effective because
the end-hosts can selectively deny to authenticate to un-wanted middlebox services.
4.5.2.2 Covert Channels
As already discussed in Section 4.4.1, interweaving HIP-MA with the regular HIP
signaling channel messages greatly reduces the effort for detecting middleboxes and
for delivering the respective nonces. However, this interweaving requires that end-
hosts can send unauthenticated HIP packets across a middlebox to collect nonces
from all middleboxes along the path. For the HIP base exchange, the I1 and R1
packets are forwarded before the end-host identities are verified by the middleboxes.
For the HIP update process, the first update packet is forwarded before the end-host
identities are verified.
If HIP-MA is used for access control purposes, the unconditional forwarding of HIP
control packets may cause problems. An attacker can use the unconditionally for-
warded packets to implement a covert channel, similar to the covert channels well
known from DNS covert channels to rogue DNS servers. This misuse of the HIP sig-
naling channel can be thwarted by implementing a step-wise acquisition of nonces
as depicted in Figure 4.1 instead of an interweaved process. However, as described
in Section 4.4.1, HIP-MA does not select this option.
Accepting that middleboxes must forward a certain amount of unauthenticated pay-
load information, we can assess the severity and impact of this attack. A first ob-
servation is that a covert channel cannot be used to establish arbitrary connections
to any destination. In addition, a pair of collaborating attackers is needed because
4.5. Security Benefits and Limitations 77
an uninitiated end-host would not detect the information hidden in the covert chan-
nel. Thus, an attacker cannot establish a valid payload channel to arbitrary hosts.
Second, HIP control messages are expected to be infrequent and rare. Simple rate-
limiting of HIP signaling packets based on network-layer addresses (IP addresses)
can limit the usability of the covert channel to an attacker to an extent where the
attack is not attractive any more. This limited usability may reduce the incentives
for selfish hosts to sufficiently thwart the attack for this class of attackers. At the
same time, authenticated HIP packets (phase-two authentication) can be treated
with higher priority to avoid negative effects on benign hosts.
In conclusion, the interweaved middlebox detection and nonce delivery scheme of
HIP-MA is applicable if the chance of a low-bandwidth covert-channel is acceptable
but should not be used for access control otherwise. Other end-to-middle authen-
tication properties like the verification of end-host identities, non-repudiation, or
access control for payload channels are not affected by the covert channel.
4.5.2.3 Control Packet Pollution
The interweaved middlebox detection and nonce delivery within the regular HIP sig-
naling packets can also be the target of a Denial of Service attack in which Mallory,
as a MITM attacker, fills the packet with bogus middlebox nonces to prevent other
middleboxes from adding their nonces and from authenticating the end-host identi-
ties and signaling packets. Adding too many middlebox nonces to a packet leads to
two different problems for middleboxes and end hosts: First, too large packets may
lead to the creation of packet fragments at middleboxes. Second, the return packets
may not offer sufficient space for echoing all nonces within one un-fragmented IP
packet. Both problems lead to fragmentation at the IP layer. Middleboxes that do
not implement fragment reassembly for technical or policy reasons may not be able
to verify fragmented HIP control packets, which may lead to a failure of the HIP
end-to-middle signaling process.
While we acknowledge the possibility of such packet pollution attacks, we like to
stress that simple dropping of the complete HIP control packet will result in the
very same effect: a persistently failing HIP signaling process. Hence, a simpler
and equally effective attack exists with the same adverse effects. However, it is
not possible to defend against simple dropping of packets by malicious middleboxes.
We conclude that defending against this specific attack cannot improve the overall
security because a simpler and equally effective attack remains.
4.5.2.4 Payload Channel Attacks
Since our proposed middlebox authentication extension for HIP prevents an unau-
thorized attacker from opening new HIP control and payload connections, our main
concern is to prevent adversaries from injecting packets into already established pay-
load channels of legitimate hosts. Although the binding between the IPsec payload
channel and the HIP control channel is cryptographically strong from the perspective
of the end-hosts, a middlebox is limited in its options for mapping IPsec ESP traffic
to the corresponding HIP associations. As middleboxes do not have access to the
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shared keys that are used within an end-to-end IPsec SA, the middlebox can only
use non-cryptographic packet properties to map IPsec packets to a HIP association.
Although the middlebox can observe and verify the establishment and modification
of a HIP and IPsec association, the middlebox cannot verify the source, destination,
and integrity of individual payload packets in a cryptographic sense due to the lack
of middlebox-friendly authentication information. Specifically, a middlebox cannot
verify whether a payload packet was sent by the legitimate host or if the packet was
modified in transit.
A practical exploit of these shortcomings allows malicious or selfish end-hosts to
misuse an already established payload channel for transmitting payload. There
are two options for carrying out this attack: a) scavenging of an established but
orphaned payload channel and b) packet injection into an active payload channel.
End-to-middle authentication measures as presented in Chapters 5 and 6 for AL-
PHA and the SPOTS tokens can thwart these attacks. However, in this section, we
discuss both attacks because end-to-middle authentication for payload traffic is not
an integral part of HIP-MA.
Payload channel scavenging
HIP allows end-hosts to explicitly close an existing connection after it is not needed
or wanted any more. Middleboxes can verify the messages of this closing procedure
and remove association-related state. However, middleboxes that do not receive HIP
closing messages will keep their session-related state as long as they receive payload
channel messages. The absence of messages that terminate the HIP association must
be expected and can be caused by host mobility or multi-homing if a middlebox is
not any more on the communication path between two hosts and consequently does
not receive any HIP messages after the mobility or multi-homing event.
Attackers can misuse such an orphaned payload channel for transmitting payload
across it. However, depending on the bound payload channel attributes, attackers
can only send payload traffic that mimics the original payload channel (i.e., identical
source and destination IP addresses, identical SPI numbers and consistent IPsec
sequence numbers). Mimicking the original payload channel characteristics seriously
limits the usefulness of the attack but cannot prevent it completely. In the following,
we assess the severity and usefulness of the attack.
First, an attacker can only send payload traffic to and from the bound IP addresses.
This means that the attacker must either inherit the orphaned network layer address
or must be able to spoof packets with this source address. Moreover, since the
destination address is fixed as well, the attacker can only send packets to a second
malicious host that inherited the IP address of the other host or that can eavesdrop
on the path to that address. This seriously limits the usefulness of the attack for a
selfish attacker who intends to gain a benefit from the attack.
Second, the orphaned payload channel is an IPsec ESP channel with specific channel
properties. This means that only a pair of colluding attackers can use the channel
to transmit payload because a benign destination host does not have sufficient pro-
cessing state (SPI numbers, IPsec sequence numbers) to successfully process the
incoming IPsec packets.
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However, the attack may limit the applicability of HIP-MA for use-cases that involve
time-based or volume-based accounting by middleboxes for mobile hosts because
attackers could generate bogus traffic that would be accounted to the victim host.
To avoid such mis-attribution of packets, mobile HIP end-hosts could either signal
upcoming mobility events and terminate the local HIP state at the middlebox before
the path changes or use additional end-to-middle authentication mechanisms for
payload (e.g., the SPOTS tokens described in Chapter 6).
Payload channel packet injection
In contrast to the previously discussed attack, the second variant of payload channel
misuse does not utilize an orphaned payload channel but attempts to interfere with
an active payload channel. The idea behind the attack is to inject forged packets into
the established payload stream. In analogy of the scavenging of orphaned payload
channels, attackers can send payload packets that mimic the packets of an established
and active payload channel. This limits the opportunity of a successful attack.
Likewise, only attackers that can receive packets addressed to a legitimate host can
receive the injected packets.
However, attackers that can spoof IP addresses and eavesdrop on packets destined
to the bound IP addresses can still successfully inject packets in the existing payload
stream. Note that the IPsec implementation of the receiver will drop the injected
packets because these do not contain end-to-end authentication information. There-
fore, the attack is purely targeted at middleboxes while the end-to-end security
properties of HIP and IPsec are not affected.
The location of the attacker makes a difference to its attack opportunities. Hence,
we distinguish between Mallory and Eve. Mallory, as an on-path attacker, can read,
modify, drop, and forge payload packets, whereas Eve, as attacker besides the path
(e.g., at the local network of the victim), can only read and send forged payload
packets. The attack from Eve becomes evident to Ron because the middlebox can
detect duplicate ESP sequence numbers. As all IPsec packets are numbered (see
Section3.5.2.2 for details) and the number sequence can be monitored by Ron, he
can easily detect that ESP packets are injected by Eve by observing duplicated ESP
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Figure 4.5 Eve injects forged IPsec ESP packets p′ into an established payload channel.
Ron can detect duplicate ESP sequence numbers but he cannot distinguish between forged
and authentic packets.
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sequence numbers. However, Ron can only detect the presence of duplicates but
cannot filter forged packets since it cannot determine which duplicate is authentic.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the detection of duplicated packets. If Ron would decide to
accept the first packet with a given sequence number, Eve can easily adjust her
strategy and increase the sequence numbers faster than Alice. If Ron would decide
to accept the latter packet with a given sequence number, Eve can again adjust her
strategy and send packets with lower sequence numbers than Alice’s packets.
An attack from Mallory does not become evident to Ron because she can replace
the authentic packets with forged ones without creating duplicate sequence numbers.
Although Bob can detect the forged packets based on the message authentication
code in the ESP packets, Ron has already provided service for the forged packets
when they reach Bob. Therefore, the end-to-end mechanisms can thwart attacks of
selfish users but cannot prevent resource-targeted attacks from malicious users.
Concluding, as for the scavenging of orphaned payload channels, the attack is difficult
to carry out and is of limited use to selfish users who intend to benefit from the
attack. However, for mitigating the attack, end-to-middle authentication of the
payload channel (e.g., by using the SPOTS tokens as presented in Chapter 6) is
necessary.
4.5.2.5 Summary
We discussed four possible attacks against HIP in combination with HIP-MA: a)
diverted authentication signaling, b) covert channels within the HIP signaling mes-
sages, c) control packet pollution, and d) misuse of the payload channel. In gen-
eral, our HIP middlebox authentication technique significantly complicates attacks
against the functions of HIP-aware middleboxes by reducing the effectiveness of ex-
isting attacks like payload channel misuse. The increased complexity and limited
use of the attacks can turn the economics for selfish users, making these attacks
sufficiently unattractive for this group of offenders.
While attacks become more difficult to mount and are less useful, the security mea-
sures for the HIP signaling channel cannot secure the end-to-middle processing of
HIP payload channel packets. Hence, additional end-to-middle authentication mech-
anisms like ALPHA or SPOTS are required to eliminate payload channel misuse.
4.6 Compatibility and Incremental Deployment
In order to stay fully compatible with unmodified HIP implementations, we use the
modular header design of HIP and define all additional middlebox authentication pa-
rameters as non-critical (non-mandatory). Thus, unmodified HIP implementations
simply ignore middlebox nonces and echo responses. Although such HIP implemen-
tations cannot authenticate toward a middlebox, they can act as a peer of a host
that authenticates to the middlebox without compatibility issues.
If a host does not provide sufficient information to authenticate towards the mid-
dlebox, the middlebox can decide whether to deny service completely or to treat
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the packets of the unauthenticated hosts differently (e.g., by treating them as low-
priority traffic). Such differentiated treatment provides incentives for hosts to up-
grade their end-to-end security protocols in order to receive better service from the
network.
Incremental deployment of HIP-MA is possible because HIP-MA middleboxes can
interoperate with other HIP middleboxes and plain IP middleboxes without impair-
ing their function. Even with a partial deployment, HIP-MA middleboxes can fulfill
their security functions because they do not depend on a complete chain of HIP-MA
middleboxes between the two end-hosts. Cascaded deployment of HIP-MA middle-
boxes is possible with the restriction that all middlebox nonce parameters must fit
the initial and the return packet to avoid fragmentation. With ECC cryptography,
which features short public keys, cascades of tens of middleboxes can be supported
without exceeding the maximum packet size5. Deep cascades require additional
mechanisms, such as cascaded authentication (see 4.4.1, Figure 4.1). However, mix-
ing a cascaded approach with the interweaved approach that we have chosen is not
straightforward. Furthermore, when tens of active HIP-MA middleboxes are on the
path, serious delay penalties for public-key verification by middleboxes must be ex-
pected. In such a case, grouping multiple middleboxes in trust domains with one
verification per domain can alleviate the problem of processing delay and packet
space exhaustion.
4.7 Application Scenarios and Use cases
Based on HIP-MA we show two use cases that illustrate the use of HIP authentication
by middleboxes: a distributed access control mechanism for certificate-based access
control and extended end-to-middle signaling, for user authentication within the
network.
4.7.1 Use Case 1: Distributed Identity-based Access Control
With HIP-MA, middleboxes can manage resources based on HIs. As an example,
assume that a middlebox only forwards HIP payload packets after a successful HIP
BEX or HIP update. The middlebox uses the parameters in the control channel
(specifically IP addresses and SPIs) to filter the payload traffic. The middlebox
only forwards payload traffic from and to specific authenticated hosts and drops
other traffic. The benefit of the HIP-based firewall is that firewall rules refer to
host identities rather than to IP addresses and ports. Regardless of the location
of a (potentially mobile) host, the firewall can decide whether payload traffic is
allowed to traverse the middlebox. Furthermore, if one of the hosts denies the HIP
handshake or closes the HIP association, the middlebox can block all payload traffic
from reaching that host.
Public key-based host authentication is especially useful in cooperative networks
without persistent connectivity to an authentication server. Even without an a
5The actual number of supported middleboxes depends on the contents of the HIP control packet.
Since these are not fixed and vary with different ECC and DH key sizes, end-host-nonces, etc., we
cannot provide a precise number here.
82 4. HIP-MA: Authenticated End-to-Middle Signaling with HIP
priori trust relation between the middlebox and the end-host, the end-host can
prove its identity without third parties. However, pure authentication may not be
enough for many security applications. For authorization and accounting purposes,
additional certified information about a host may be necessary. The use of third-
party generated certificates can provide such additional information.
The HIP certificate container can carry Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI)
[EFL+99] and X.509 [HPFS02] certificates in HIP control packets. The issuer of the
certificate can make certified statements about a host by referring to its Host Identity
Tag. By including the HIT in the certificate, the certificate links the statement to
the identity of the host, which in turn can prove its identity to the middlebox
via HIP-MA. Hence, end-hosts can transmit additional information, certified by a
certificate authority. There is no need for the certificate authority to be on-line
once the end-host has received the certificate. The end-host authentication and
certificate verification by the middlebox can take place without connectivity to the
certificate authority, provided that the public key of the certificate authority is known
to the middlebox. Such certificate support drastically simplifies the implementation
of host-based policies because each host can signal its respective policies to the
middlebox in a secure way. This use case provides firewalls with a more meaningful
representation of networked elements than IP addresses and port numbers.
4.7.2 Use Case 2: Secure End-to-Middle Signaling
Besides access control, explicit signaling of additional information to middleboxes
allows to implement further security-related rules and behavior that surpasses the
capability of current port-based and address-based firewalls. Ziegeldorf extends the
decision basis of firewalls by using HIP-MA for implementing a secure signaling
channel between end-hosts [Zie11] to signal further security-relevant information.
Similar to the goal of HIP-MA, the proposed architecture enables middleboxes to
make security-related decisions based on verifiable information. However, in addition
to HIP host identities, Ziegeldorf includes information about the user context of the
communication users, the application name and context as well as arbitrary auxiliary
information. Selectively signaling such information to middleboxes on the path
allows security-related middleboxes to answer advanced questions like: a) Which
user is trying to access a network resource? b) Which application causes the current
traffic? c) Which host is using the network?
Based on this richer information, firewalls can implement more dynamic rules that
replace conventional IP and port based rules. Such dynamic rules match better
scenarios with mobile users (e.g., employees with notebooks that change between
different sub-networks of a company), rich application environments (i.e., users can
install new software on company devices), and scenarios with shared devices (e.g.,
publicly accessible terminals). For such scenarios, pure IP and port based rules fail
because a fixed grouping of users, applications, and devices in trusted or untrusted
IP and port ranges is not possible. For example, Ziegeldorf’s solution can detect
viruses, trojans, and botnets that mask as other applications by using well-known
ports of important services (e.g., DNS or HTTP) to disguise their actions in the
network. A second example is the support for network access control on a per-user
basis for multi-user devices, such as shared networked PCs. Simply enabling network
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access on a per-host level, as 802.1X-based solutions propose, is not suitable for such
shared devices because once network access is enabled, further unauthorized users
can use the network without authentication. Hence, Ziegeldorf’s solution enables a
more flexible solution for making security decisions within the network.
HIP-MA is the foundation of Ziegeldorf’s architecture because it provides the basis
for securely signaling the additional information to middleboxes. On top of HIP-
MA, the solution consists of privileged end-host applications that detect when new
network connections are opened, which users and applications are involved in the
process, and which privileges are required within the network. On the middlebox,
a HIP firewall extension requests and verifies the information about the end hosts
(e.g., device ID, user ID, application name and context) and checks this information
against a ruleset.
4.8 Implementation Details
We specified the presented end-to-middle authentication extension in the context
of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) as an Internet draft [HWK11]. We
implemented the specification based on the HIP for Linux (HIPL) implementation.
At this time, the implementation of HIP-MA is part of the base development branch
of HIPL and was also implemented by a commercial vendor, LANCOM Systems6
for their proprietary router platform.
The Linux implementation consists of two parts: a) a modification of the HIP dae-
mon for end-hosts as well as b) a modification of the HIP firewall for middleboxes.
The implementation is available for x86 Linux PCs, Maemo 5 based mobile phones
(N900), and OpenWRT based embedded Linux routers. The HIP firewall uses the
netfilter/IPQ framework [The11a] and captures forwarded traffic. The implemen-
tation supports authentication of the end-hosts towards the middlebox during the
HIP handshake as well as during the HIP update process.
4.9 Performance Evaluation
The overall performance of HIP-MA is composed of the end-to-end performance of
HIP as well as the verification performance of HIP-MA. For end-hosts, the basic
cryptographic overhead of HIP-MA equals the cryptographic overhead of HIP be-
cause the same cryptographic components are re-used for end-to-middle signaling
in HIP-MA. Despite the need for digitally signed nonces and puzzles, no additional
performance-relevant operations are added because the CPU-intensive digital signa-
tures are already present in the basic HIP protocols. Signing a larger amount of data
does not change the performance of the digital signatures because the longer input is
reduced to a fixed-sized message digest before CPU-intensive operations are applied.
Hence, we assume the end-to-end performance of HIP-MA to be largely equivalent to
the performance of HIP without HIP-MA. In [Hee06] we analyzed the cryptographic
end-to-end performance of HIP in detail and showed that even lightweight mobile
6www.lancom.de
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devices (e.g., a Nokia N770 with an 220 MHz ARM-926 processor) can complete the
BEX within few hundred milliseconds. In our evaluation, we ignore the effort for
solving the puzzle because, depending on the puzzle difficulty, the efforts range from
none to high processing costs and can be set at will. However, we evaluate the effort
for creating the puzzle and for verifying the puzzle solution.
In contrast to the end-hosts, HIP-MA changes the forwarding performance of mid-
dleboxes because it introduces additional processing steps on the path to implement
multi-lateral authentication. Since signed HIP control packets are only forwarded
after their verification, the verification performance of HIP-MA middleboxes limits
a) the number of authenticated HIP control packets that a middlebox can process
and forward in a given time and b) the processing delay, which results in higher
network delay for HIP control packets. In the following, we evaluate both aspects
based on our prototype implementation. We do not present the end-to-end payload
throughput of HIP because the HIP payload channel is unaffected by HIP-MA. We
refer to our performance evaluation in [HJH+10] for details on the ESP forwarding
performance of the HIP firewall.
4.9.1 Evaluation Setup
Throughout this thesis, we use the following two device classes for our experiments:
a) powerful end-host PCs and b) resource-constrained ALIX wireless mesh routers.
The PCs are equipped with an AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual Core Processor 4800+, 4
GB of RAM, and a 1 Gbit/s network interface card. The ALIX mesh router features
a 32-bit 500 MHz AMD Geode LX800 x86 processor, 256 MB of RAM, and a 100
Mbit/s network card. The ALIX devices are a popular platform for building low-
cost meshed wireless networks. Their CPU and memory performance roughly equals
other commodity wireless router platforms (e.g., the Linksys WRT160NL wireless
router and the Netgear WNR3500L). Hence, in our evaluation, the ALIX hardware
platform represents the class of resource-constrained wireless nodes in community
networks.
We evaluate a scenario in which Alice and Bob communicate across a middlebox
Ron. Alice acts as HIP Initiator and Bob acts as the Responder. We used the
PC-class devices as the Initiator and Responder to avoid performance bottlenecks at
the end-hosts. As middleboxes, we used either a PC class device or an ALIX mesh
router to measure the end-to-middle performance of HIP-MA. Hence, we evaluate
two settings: a) PC end hosts and PC middlebox and b) PC end-hosts and ALIX
middlebox. Since we are primarily evaluating the cryptographic performance of
HIP-MA, we did not use the wireless interface of the ALIX router to avoid the non-
deterministic behavior. For each setting, we measured the performance for RSA and
DSA with key lengths of 1024 bit. For other signature schemes and key lengths we
refer to the performance numbers in Section 3.4.1.3.
The network latency is an important factor for the end-to-end delay for establishing a
HIP connection. In our test network, we measured a packet RTT of 0.20 ms with the
ALIX middlebox and 0.13 ms with the PC middlebox as the relay on the path. These
low latencies are not typical for Internet scenarios. However, as the performance of
the middlebox and the cryptographic overhead of the systems are independent of
the network latency, we did not evaluate HIP-MA for higher latencies.
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The presented results are the mean values of 500 individual HIP base exchanges
per setting and per signature scheme. We measured the time spans by using the
gettimeofday function provided by Linux.
4.9.2 Performance Evaluation
We benchmarked the different steps of the HIP base exchange to determine the veri-
fication performance of HIP middleboxes and the additional overhead that HIP-MA
introduces. In our experiments, Alice and Bob repeatedly establish a HIP association
via Ron. As the HIP base exchange consists of a number of subsequent independent
steps, judging the impact of our extensions and evaluating the performance of the
middlebox is not possible by measuring the duration of a complete base exchange
alone. Instead, we extended the code of HIPL with sampling points at which we
measured the duration of the sub-steps of the base exchange. We do not provide
an evaluation of the HIP-MA update and close process because the cryptographic
operations relevant for HIP-MA (the processing of the host identities, middlebox
nonces and puzzles) are identical to the operations of the HIP base exchange.
In our performance evaluation, we measure different time spans during the base
exchange, which represent the processing time spent by the middlebox for different
parts of the packet processing. These time spans relate to the different functions of
the base exchange. In the following, we briefly list these time spans in chronological
order and explain these time spans. Note that not all packets contain all steps. For
example, challenge verification is not performed for the I1 and R1 packet because
no challenge solution is present in these packets.
1) Demultiplexing: When receiving a packet, the middlebox must first determine
the packet type and whether a related HIP association exists. Moreover, the
middlebox must check that the packet is not malformed and it must perform
general packet decoding to make the packet parameters accessible for further
processing. This cost is independent of the packet type.
2) Connection tracking: The HIP host must match the packet against its internal
state machines to determine whether the packet matches the current state of
the HIP association.
3) Verify challenge: Before performing costly public-key operations, the middlebox
verifies its challenge. This verification involves hashing and string matching.
We evaluate this operation separately because it is special to HIP-MA.
4) Convert and store HI: Next, the middlebox decodes and converts the Host Iden-
tity in the packet and stores it for further use.
5) Verify packet: After preparing the Host Identity, the HIP daemon hands over
the Host Identity to the openSSL library for verification. This step involves
costly public-key verification and its duration depends on the chosen signature
scheme and the key length. Within this step the middlebox also verifies the
identity of the peers.
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6) Other HI processing: Besides the verification and storage of the HI, other oper-
ations, such as HI matching and parsing are necessary. We accumulate these
different costs as Other HI processing.
7) Add challenge: Middleboxes in HIP-MA add challenges. As described above,
the creation of a challenge includes the creation of a pseudorandom number
and hashing of this number with other host-specific information. We measured
this operations separately to show the impact of our extension.
8) Other processing: We summarize other packet processing and state handling
steps, for example the configuration of the ESP forwarding and minor packet
processing steps, that fit in none of the above categories as Other processing.
However, these steps are not specific for HIP-MA.
9) Finish packet: After completing the packet processing, the HIP firewall adjusts
its internal state and hands over the forwarding decision for the packet to the
IPQ framework. The duration of this process is depicted as Finish packet.
The measured time spans cannot represent the complete packet processing cost be-
cause further steps outside the HIP implementation are necessary for receiving and
sending HIP control packets. This cost is mainly caused by the communication sub-
system and the inter-process communication between the IP subsystem and the HIP
implementation. However, in [Hee06] we showed that this cost is dwarfed by the cost
of the cryptographic operations in HIP.
4.9.2.1 Performance of the PC Middlebox
Figure 4.6 shows the performance results for the PC middlebox. In addition, Ta-
ble 4.1 in Section 4.9.2.3 summarizes the results of all evaluation scenarios in num-
bers.
Since the I1 packet does not require expensive public-key operations, the required
processing time is very short. The processing times of all other packets are dominated
by the HI handling and HI verification. A comparison between Figure 4.6 a) and b)
shows the asymmetry between RSA verification and RSA signature generation that
we already described in Section 3.4.1.3. Since RSA verification is significantly more
efficient than DSA verification, the middlebox processing time for the R1, I2, and
R2 packets are considerably shorter with RSA.
HIP-MA provides middleboxes with a mechanism to add nonces and puzzles as a
challenge to the HIP base exchange. These challenges serve two reasons: a) to pre-
vent replay attacks and b) to mitigate CPU-targeted DoS attacks. Mitigating DoS
attacks is only possible if the puzzle generation and verification are significantly
cheaper than the operations that the puzzle protects. Figure 4.6 (3) shows that the
challenge verification only requires a short amount of processing time (between 5 μs
and 6 μs). In contrast, the operations protected by the challenge (HI processing)
consume several hundred μs. Hence, a middlebox can abort the processing of packets
without valid puzzles directly after the demultiplexing and packet processing phase.
The time of the puzzle verifications can even be moved further to the beginning if the
puzzle is designed in a way that does not require the demultiplexing and connection
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(a) Processing time for a PC middlebox with 1024-bit RSA end-host keys
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(b) Processing time for a PC middlebox with 1024-bit DSA end-host keys
Figure 4.6 Figures (a) and (b) show the required processing time for a HIP base exchange
from the perspective of the PC middlebox Ron for 1024-bit RSA end-host keys and 1024-bit
DSA end-host keys.
tracking steps. Such design can be achieved by using the demultiplexing information
(e.g., IP addresses and HIs) as an input for the puzzle. Since the challenge verifica-
tion cost is constant for arbitrary puzzle difficulties, the middlebox can effectively
shelter against CPU based DoS attacks by increasing the puzzle difficulty.
The figure also shows that the processing time for packets that are not protected by
puzzles is relatively short. However, the R1 processing shows a considerable amount
of time spent for conversion and storage of the HI. To further reduce the DoS attack
possibilities, the HIPL firewall implementation could be adapted to perform this step
in the processing of the R2 packet instead of the R1 packet. This would reduce the
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(d) Processing time for a PC Responder with 1024-bit DSA end-host keys
Figure 4.7 Processing times for the steps of the HIP base exchange messages of the End-
hosts. Connected message processing is represented by a dash (/) (e.g., R1/I2 means that the
bar represents the processing an incoming R1 message and preparing the outgoing I2 message).
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possible damage that the unprotected R1 can cause and would move the additional
overhead to the R2 packet, which is protected by the puzzle mechanism.
Comparing the time consumption of the processing steps of the different packets
shows that public-key related operations (HI conversion and HI verification) consume
the largest part of the time. In contrast, the processing time for creating a new
middlebox nonce and puzzle amounts requires only between 19 μs and 24 μs for the
R1 and I2, respectively. This time is slightly higher than the puzzle verification time
because, besides hashing, it requires the drawing of a pseudorandom number.
The maximum processing time for a HIP control packet within the HIP firewall im-
plementation amounted to 0.53 ms for RSA and 1.21 ms for DSA. For the middlebox,
the complete processing time for the base exchange within the HIP implementation
was 1.22 ms for RSA and 2.61 ms for DSA. These numbers indicate that the HIP
implementation on the PC middlebox is capable of verifying hundreds of HIP base
exchanges per second. As each base exchange represents the creation of a new HIP
association between two hosts, we deem the performance of the middlebox as fit even
for larger company networks of thousands of hosts. Compared to typical Internet
roundtrip network latencies of tens of milliseconds, the additional delay of 1.21 ms
or 2.61 ms for the establishment of a HIP connection is not a major factor. In ad-
dition, as shown below, the end-to-end processing of HIP amounted to about 28 ms
alone for the PC end hosts (see Figure 4.7). Hence, the impact on the connection la-
tency for a single middlebox can be considered as low. However, the delay increases
linearly with the number of middleboxes. Therefore, deep cascades of middleboxes
may increase the connection delay considerably.
For completeness, we also show the analysis of the end-host processing with a 1536-
bit Diffie Hellman key exchange in Figure 4.7. The processing times for the PC
Initiator and Responder are clearly dominated by the Diffie-Hellman shared key
generation. Other packet processing costs, including the puzzle solution and param-
eter handling, are small compared to the cost for the public-key processing. The
results in the figure include the processing time for a middlebox puzzle with diffi-
culty one. We chose to use a low puzzle difficulty because the puzzle can be set
arbitrarily to achieve different loads. We used the difficulty one instead of zero to
avoid shortcuts in the code that completely circumvent the puzzle processing in case
of a difficulty of zero, for which any solution suffices. Instead, the end-hosts compute
at least one hash to determine whether the solution is valid.
4.9.2.2 Performance of the ALIX middlebox
The results for the ALIX middlebox are similar to the results of the PC middlebox.
Therefore, the general interpretation of the results for both scenarios is identical.
However, for the ALIX middlebox, the impact of the public-key operations on the
communication delay and processing time consumption is stronger than for the PC
middlebox. Comparing Figures 4.8 a) and b) clearly shows the asymmetry between
the RSA and DSA verification. While the ALIX middlebox can verify the RSA
signature within 1.88 ms, it consumes 18.06 ms for verifying the DSA signature.
As a result, the complete processing within the HIP firewall for the base exchange
amounts to 7.32 ms for RSA and 39.84 ms for DSA. This limits the number of HIP
base exchanges that can be processed per second to about 140 for RSA and 25 for
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DSA with 1024-bit keys. In practice, since the middlebox has no influence on the
type and key-length that the end-hosts use, the numbers may be even lower if longer
keys are in use.
Since each base exchange represents a distinct connection between two previously
unconnected hosts, and thus constitutes an infrequent and relatively rare event, we
assume that the performance of the ALIX middlebox is sufficient for serving tens
of hosts at the same time. Hence, this performance is sufficient for the intended
scenario of a cooperative network, such as Wi-Fi sharing.
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(a) Processing time for an ALIX middlebox with 1024-bit RSA end-host keys
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(b) Processing time for an ALIX middlebox with 1024-bit DSA end-host keys
Figure 4.8 Figures (a) and (b) show the required processing time for a HIP base exchange
from the perspective of the PC middlebox Ron for 1024-bit RSA end-host keys and 1024-bit
DSA end-host keys.
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Similar to the PC system, the impact of the additional puzzle creation (0.070 ms)
and verification (0.034 ms) is small for the ALIX middlebox while on average each
public key signature verification amounts to 2.19 ms for RSA and 18.41 ms for DSA
with 1024-bit keys. Hence, the defense mechanism only consumes less than 2% of
the processing time that the cheaper public key signature requires. This shows that
the mechanism is efficient on both hardware platforms.
We do not depict the end-to-end base exchange results for the ALIX middlebox here
because they equal the end-to-end results for the PC middlebox since they were
performed with the same settings and the same hardware. However, for completeness
we provide the packet processing times for all cases in Table 4.1 and provide the end-
to-end graphs for the ALIX middlebox in Appendix A.
4.9.2.3 Summary
Our evaluation shows that, depending on the chosen middlebox hardware, HIP-MA
can provide end-to-middle authentication at a frequency of hundreds to thousands
of signaling events per second. At the same time, HIP-MA uses inexpensive de-
fense mechanisms against middlebox-targeted DoS attacks that help middleboxes
to safeguard against DoS attacks. Table 4.1 summarizes the results. Because of
its asymmetric signature and verification performance, RSA performs better than
DSA for HIP end-to-middle authentication because middleboxes only verify packet
PC ALIX
RSA-1024 DSA-1024 RSA-1024 DSA-1024
Initiator (Alice)
Send I1 0.10 ms 0.10 ms 0.09 ms 0.10 ms
Receive R1 / Send I2 13.43 ms 13.47 ms 13.47 ms 13.47 ms
Receive R2 0.21 ms 0.91 ms 0.21 ms 0.91 ms
Total 13.74 ms 14.47 ms 13.76 ms 14.48 ms
Middlebox (Ron)
Process I1 0.11 ms 0.11 ms 0.53 ms 0.55 ms
Process R1 0.28 ms 0.29 ms 0.93 ms 0.98 ms
Process I2 0.53 ms 1.21 ms 3.29 ms 19.46 ms
Process R2 0.30 ms 1.00 ms 2.56 ms 18.84 ms
Total 1.22 ms 2.61 ms 7.32 ms 39.84 ms
Responder (Bob)
Receive I1 / Send R1 0.08 ms 0.08 ms 0.08 ms 0.10 ms
Receive I2 / Send R2 14.00 ms 14.08 ms 14.01 ms 14.05 ms
Total 14.08 ms 14.16 ms 14.09 ms 14.15 ms
Table 4.1 Packet processing time within the HIP implementation.
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contents and do not create signatures. The difference shows clearly in the processing
times on the resource constrained ALIX middlebox.
While the public-key based end-to-middle authentication is a viable option for the
sporadic signaling traffic of HIP, it is not suited for protocols with a high-frequency
of authentication events. In particular it is not suited for full payload authentication
because payload streams of tens or hundreds of Mbit/s require verification durations
of fractions of milliseconds. A simple example calculation illustrates the problem.
A payload stream of 20 Mbit/s with a payload size of 1000 bytes per packet re-
quires more than 2600 verifications per second while the ALIX middlebox cannot
verify more than 140 1024-bit RSA signatures or 25 1024-bit DSA signatures per
second. Hence, this public-key based scheme cannot perform full traffic authentica-
tion at higher throughput rates without special hardware acceleration. To address
this shortcoming, we designed and analyzed alternative end-to-middle authentica-
tion schemes that rely on inexpensive cryptographic components. We present these
alternatives in Chapters 5 and 6.
4.10 Related Work
The related work to HIP-MA can be arranged into three groups, which we discuss
separately. First, we discuss PLA for HIP, a HIP extension that has the same
goals as HIP-MA and employs similar methods. Second, we discuss the 802.1X
authentication infrastructure in combination with RADIUS, which provides user-
authentication for wireless networks and thereby pursues similar goals but with
different methods. Finally, we discuss orthogonal work in end-to-middle signaling
that is related to HIP-MA.
4.10.1 PLA for HIP
In 2010, two years after our first publication of HIP-MA as draft-heer-hip-middle-
auth-00 [HWK07], Lagutin proposed his work of using PLA for end-to-middle au-
thentication for HIP [Lag10a]. At the time of writing this thesis, these PLA exten-
sions for HIP are the closest related work to HIP-MA.
PLA for HIP uses time synchronization and timestamps in HIP control messages to
ensure the freshness of HIP signaling. Middleboxes can check that the signature was
created within a certain time span. This time span is determined by the accuracy of
the system clocks of the end-hosts and middleboxes. PLA for HIP also uses sequence
numbers to avoid rapid replays of HIP control packets.
A major advantage of PLA for HIP is that the changes to HIP are minimal. The in-
clusion of simple time and sequence counters in each HIP control packet is sufficient.
Hence, an alteration of the HIP packet sequences or an interaction with middle-
boxes, as in HIP-MA phase one authentication, is not necessary. In this regard,
the use and performance of PLA for HIP is comparable to HIP-MA with phase-two
authentication.
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Accurate time-synchronization is an assumption that might not hold in distributed
networks without permanent reachability of a time server. Since exact time synchro-
nization between end-hosts and middleboxes is unlikely, packets must be considered
valid for a determined time span.
PLA for HIP limits the time during which an attack is possible but does not impose
a limit to the location where such an attack can take place. In particular, a mid-
dlebox cannot verify if the PLA packet is a recent replay of a HIP packet that was
transmitted over a different network path. Thus, parallel session attacks are possible
against PLA for HIP. HIP-MA eliminates the possibility of a parallel session attack
by letting middlebox choose unique nonces.
Summarizing the similarities and differences of HIP-MA and PLA for HIP, we ob-
serve that both protocols address the problem of missing end-to-middle authentica-
tion for HIP with different measures (nonces vs. timestamps and sequence numbers).
4.10.2 Authentication Servers, 802.1X and EAP
A common approach for middleboxes to authenticate end-hosts is to use an authen-
tication server. Popular protocols following this scheme are RADIUS [RWRS00]
and DIAMETER [CLG+03]. These approaches solve the particular problem in an
infrastructure-based scenario. However, this scenario requires separate authentica-
tion protocols and hardware. In general, it does not follow the concept of path-
coupled signaling. One essential difference between the use of an authentication
server as in 802.1X and HIP-MA is that the authentication server requires an a pri-
ori trust bootstrapping between the middleboxes and the authentication server as
well as between the end-hosts as the server. In addition the server must be reachable
while the end-host authenticates to the middlebox. Hence, a trusted third party is
required to be reachable whenever authentication is required. While this require-
ment is acceptable for a large number of use cases related to access control and
accounting, it is problematic in distributed cooperative networks without efficiently
reachable central trusted infrastructure.
4.10.3 Other Related Work
Martin et al. [MBSF05] proposed to use path-coupled signaling for explicit config-
uration of forwarding entities, such as firewalls and NATs. Their approach uses
the notion of probable trust based on non-cryptographic network- and transport-
layer identifiers (e.g., address ranges, port numbers, etc.). This approach has the
advantage that it does not require public-key authentication or persistent security
associations between neighboring network entities. However, applicability of the
approach is limited to cases that do not require provable identities.
The Resource reSerVation Protocol (RSVP) [BZB+97] is a protocol for QoS reser-
vation on on-path middleboxes. To avoid resource misuse, it employs a hop-by-
hop authentication and integrity protection scheme based on certificates and pair-
wise keys between adjacent routers. However, the initial trust bootstrapping, key-
management, and router-coordination introduce a considerable management over-
head.
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The HIP registration extension [LKE08] defines how HIP hosts can register to a
network service. This mechanism could also be used to register to a middlebox and
to exchange information with it. However, it requires middlebox detection and ex-
plicit registration with a middlebox using a separate HIP handshake. Although this
procedure makes the full set of authentication services (i.e., AAA) available to the
middlebox and allows the middlebox act as an end system by being the explicit end-
point of the HIP association, it introduces considerable cryptographic overhead and
protocol complexity. Especially cascaded middleboxes require several detection and
registration steps that slow down connection establishment and mobility signaling.
4.11 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have shown how on-path middleboxes can use cryptographic host
identities as a basis for AAA-related services. With such a cryptographic namespace,
middleboxes can rely on secure first-level host identities rather than on secondary
host and protocol information that is implicit and not cryptographically secure. In
particular, we address an impersonation attack that targets HIP-aware middleboxes
and mitigate it by active participation of the middlebox in the HIP handshake.
The proposed extensions integrate well with the HIP standards documents, have a
notably low additional computational overhead for end-hosts, and provide counter-
measures against memory- and CPU-exhausting DoS attacks against middleboxes.
However, the performance of public-key based approaches is not sufficient for pro-
tecting higher volumes of payload. Therefore, the payload channel is still vulnerable
to packet injection and malicious scavenging of orphaned payload channels. To
mitigate these attacks, additional lightweight source authentication and integrity
protection measures are necessary. We discuss such measures in the next two chap-
ters. With the presented extensions, on-path middleboxes can use the benefits of
the cryptographic HIP namespace and achieve a higher level of security.
5
ALPHA: Lightweight End-to-middle
Authentication for Payload
In this chapter, we focus on end-to-middle authentication and integrity protection for
payload traffic. In contrast to the protection of low-volume signaling traffic by HIP-
MA, for which public-key signatures are sufficient, the potentially high throughput
demands of payload traffic prohibit CPU-intensive per packet processing. Driven by
this limitation, we focused on more lightweight source authentication and integrity
protection mechanisms based on hashing and symmetric message authentication
codes. The Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for Hop-by-hop Authentication, AL-
PHA, uses a hash-based authentication scheme and extends this scheme with differ-
ent amortization techniques to further decrease the per-packet processing cost and
increase the throughput performance. Solely relying on these less CPU-intensive
authentication mechanisms, ALPHA relays can verify volumes well above hundred
megabit per second in IP networks without special hardware acceleration. ALPHA
relays can be forwarding nodes in a Wireless Mesh Network, Wireless Sensor Net-
work, Mobile Ad-hoc Network or other infrastructure elements, such as firewalls, that
carry out the authentication of forwarded traffic. As discussed in Section 3.2.1.3, we
use the term relay as a synonym for the term middlebox in the context of ALPHA
because it emphasizes the forwarding of the payload traffic.
5.1 Overview
This chapter discusses two distinct but related components, reflecting the separation
of the ALPHA protocol into its functional parts: a control channel and a payload
channel. This separation is similar to the split between IKE/IKEv2 [HC98, Kau05]
or HIP/HIPv2 [MNJH08, MHJH11] as the control channel and IPsec ESP [Ken05a]
or IPsec AH [Ken05b], as the payload channel.
We first describe ALPHA as a pure payload channel protection protocol and later
discuss the requirements for a control channel, following and extending the work on
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Channel Protocol Function Internet examples
Control ALPHA for IP, HIP-MA Authenticate peer; set up
and modify payload chan-
nels
IKE/IKEv2, HIP
Payload ALPHA Process payload packets IPsec AH, IPsec ESP
Table 5.1 Protocols and communication channels in ALPHA
ALPHA as published in [HGGMW08]. By focusing on the basic payload protection
mechanisms, ALPHA can be applied in a wide range of scenarios with scenario-
specific control channel designs. Second, we show such a scenario-specific adaptation
of ALPHA for IP networks: ALPHA for IP. ALPHA for IP provides a control chan-
nel and management protocol for ALPHA and is specifically designed for TCP/IP
networks. Thus, it takes into account the capabilities of end-hosts and middleboxes
in such networks as well as the behavior and characteristics of the TCP/IP protocol
suite. Table 5.1 gives a brief overview of the relation between ALPHA and ALPHA
for IP and shows analogous separations of control and payload channels for Layer 3
Internet security protocols.
Figure 5.1 shows a functional view of the relation between ALPHA and ALPHA for
IP. In the beginning of a communication, Alice uses the ALPHA control channel,
ALPHA for IP, to set up a security association in an initial handshake. In this
process, Alice may prove its identity to Bob and one or more Rons. During the
handshake, ALPHA for IP configures and establishes one or several ALPHA payload
channels between Alice and Bob in a way that Ron can verify the origin and integrity
of the forwarded payload packets.
In the remainder of this chapter, we first introduce ALPHA and discuss the details of
ALPHA for IP later. This order may seem counter-intuitive because, following the
chronological order in the communication process, both hosts begin with ALPHA
for IP and later use the ALPHA payload channel. However, we chose to discuss
ALPHA first because its details are important for the design and implementation
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Figure 5.1 Design overview of ALPHA for IP and ALPHA. ALPHA provides an end-to-middle
authenticated and integrity protected payload transport for a control protocol like HIP-MA or
ALPHA for IP.
5.2. Introduction to ALPHA 97
of ALPHA for IP, while the ALPHA payload processing is largely agnostic to the
design and implementation details of its control channel protocol.
5.2 Introduction to ALPHA
In wireless multi-hop networks, a communication between end-hosts may involve a
large number of forwarding nodes, making resource exhaustion attacks (e.g., target-
ing energy, bandwidth, and CPU resources) on any element of a communication path
particularly effective. Without in-network defense mechanisms for payload traffic,
forged or misdirected messages can traverse a large number of nodes, creating a con-
siderable effort for forwarding, before their authenticity is verified by an end-host.
To limit the impact of this attack, it is vital to efficiently verify the authenticity of
a message and its sender’s identity as early as possible to detect and drop forged
or unauthorized messages before these consume scarce resources. Such in-network
verification also allows on-path entities to authenticate data, e.g., for control and
signaling data between end-hosts and forwarding nodes, such as location updates
from mobile devices. Such authenticated end-to-middle signaling enables end-hosts
to protect association-specific state, stored at middleboxes, from manipulation by
malicious or selfish third parties. Together, forgery detection and data extraction
form the basis for enabling more complex security services, such as rate and resource
allocation within the network, controlled by end-hosts but enforced by intermediate
nodes.
Conventionally, light-weight end-to-end integrity protection is based on shared se-
crets and symmetric ciphers. However, these end-to-end mechanisms cannot enable
integrity checking on a hop-by-hop basis because forwarding nodes typically have no
access to the shared secrets. Therefore, relays cannot use these mechanisms to verify
the authenticity and integrity of data and the identity of the communicating peers.
Simply sharing the symmetric keys with forwarding relays is not possible because
malicious relays could use these keys to manipulate data in transit. Hence, packet
manipulation and unauthorized transmission are only detected by the destination
host and cannot be filtered by intermediate nodes. While public-key cryptogra-
phy does not suffer from this limitation, it is computationally significantly more
complex than the symmetric approaches. This overhead and the resulting impact
on throughput and communication latency is prohibitive for public-key based per-
packet verification in the vast majority of multi-hop scenarios.
Hash chains represent a practical basis for solving this problem because they are
computationally efficient and are successfully employed in different specialized pro-
tocols, such as TESLA [PCTS02], CSA [BCC00], ZCK [WW03], the Guy Fawkes
Protocol [ABC+98], and WIMP [TY05]. However, existing solutions either lack on-
path data verification or are too inefficient in multi-hop networks for both infrequent
low-volume and high-volume transfers. Moreover, they are designed for tightly re-
stricted use-cases, making it difficult to apply them in a broader scope.
In this chapter, we present and evaluate the ALPHA payload protocol, an adaptive,
flexible, and lightweight scheme for integrity protection and re-authentication based
on hash chains. ALPHA provides end-to-end as well as hop-by-hop integrity pro-
tection for multi-hop wireless networks like Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs),
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Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs), and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Thus,
it can replace traditional shared-secret-based end-to-end integrity protection, which
cannot be authenticated by relays. We combine concepts from interactive signa-
tures [TY05, ABC+98, BCC00, YFN06] and Merkle Trees [Mer90a] that have been
successfully applied in end-to-end-oriented network security. Our main contribution
is to tie these techniques together into a single coherent system that provides generic
and efficient end-to-end and hop-by-hop integrity verification in unicast communi-
cation. We extend the set of existing hash-chain-based protocols by presenting three
operational modes for ALPHA, allowing adaptation to the bandwidth, CPU, and
memory capabilities of network nodes. We first evaluate the efficiency and adap-
tiveness of the proposed scheme to illustrate its practical applicability in protecting
three distinct scenarios and platforms: WSNs, WMNs, and lightweight mobile de-
vices. Then, we evaluate a full implementation of ALPHA for IP networks to show
its performance in practice.
5.3 Related Work
This section briefly discusses related work and background for the ALPHA payload
channel. We first discuss other protocols that are related to ALPHA in a technical
sense but do not target end-to-middle or in-network authentication and integrity
protection. We use and extend these authentication mechanisms, therefore, these
protocols can be considered as background literature as well as related work. Second,
we discuss other protocols for in-network authentications with a target scenario that
is similar to ALPHA but which differ in their technical concepts. In particular, these
hop-by-hop authentication protocols also allow for in-network detection of forged and
altered packets.
5.3.1 Authentication Based on Delayed Secret Disclosure
Hash-chain based authentication forms the foundation of our work in ALPHA. There
are three conceptually different approaches for signing and verifying messages with
hash chains: one-time signatures, time-based, and interaction-based. The remainder
of this section gives a short overview of time-based and interaction-based approaches
and their properties. One-time signature schemes (e.g., [Mer88, Zha98]) are not
considered further because of their prohibitively high computational costs and large
signature sizes (see Section 3.4.2.4).
5.3.1.1 Time-based Approaches
Cheung introduced time-based signatures for securing link-state routing [Che97].
Later, Perrig et al. proposed to use time-based hash-chain signatures in the Timed
Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [PCTS02] protocol. TESLA
uses a time-based approach and hash chains to sign multicast traffic. Although
TESLA was designed for point-to-multipoint integrity protection, we consider it
because it would also be a viable option for securing point-to-point communication.
For a technical background on TESLA see Section 3.5.4.1.
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Time-based approaches like TESLA provide only limited applicability to and adapt-
ability for on-path authentication of general payload traffic in wireless multi-hop
networks: First, jitter may lead to packets being delivered to a verifier after the cor-
responding hash-chain link was disclosed. The verifier consequently discards such
packets. Thus, the minimum size of the time frame is determined by the maximum
expected delay, drastically increasing the application-to-application latency in high
variance networks, such as multi-hop wireless networks. Although Perrig et al. ex-
tended TESLA to adapt to different network latencies [PCST01], this adaptation
focuses on latency differences between multiple receivers of a multicast stream and
does not apply to unicast communication. Second, time-based approaches reveal
hash elements at a regular interval even when no payload is transferred. Hence,
they incur computational overhead in networks with low or varying volume. Finally,
existing time-based and end-to-end focused approaches do not take into account on-
path integrity verification, and therefore, are not applicable to this specific problem.
In particular, because of the epoch-based scheme, middleboxes cannot block senders
from flooding the network with commitments or messages. Thus, it is not suited
to prevent flooding-based attacks with forged packets. Because of these limitations,
we investigated interaction-based approaches, as discussed below. However, in Sec-
tion 6.6.2 we sketch how TESLA can be transformed into an end-to-middle capable
protocol by using SPOTS tokens for securing the forwarding and buffer space at
middleboxes.
5.3.2 Interaction-based Approaches
Interactive hash chain (IHC) based signatures exploit the interaction between a
signer and a verifier to guarantee temporal separation between the generation of a
signature, and the disclosure of the corresponding hash-chain element. Anderson et
al. proposed the Guy Fawkes protocol [ABC+98] that uses interactive delayed secret
disclosure for integrity protection and authentication of unicast streams. Bergadano
et al. [BCC00] proposed the Chained Stream Authentication (CSA) scheme, an in-
teractive scheme for authenticating unicast and multicast streams. Torvinen and
Ylitalo have shown that hash-chain-based signatures can be used for mobility and
multihoming signaling in future IPv6 networks [TY05]. Weimerskirch and West-
hoff [WW03] use an interactive approach in the Zero Common Knowledge (ZCK)
protocol for re-recognition of communication partners. Yao et al. [YFN06] use an
interactive protocol to secure broadcast messages in sensor networks where a sin-
gle source (the base station) sends identical messages to all nodes. Although the
protocol achieves on-path authentication of messages, it does not provide efficient
point-to-point communication between arbitrary nodes. IHC signatures in general
do not require time synchronization and do not introduce a fixed delay until the
verifier can verify the packets. Thus, they adapt well to scenarios with a widely
varying network latency while their resource requirements are comparable to the
requirements of TESLA.
Neither the time-based nor the interactive approaches lend themselves to securing
point-to-point communication in combination with on-path authentication of pack-
ets to suppress unsolicited traffic within the network. Moreover, the protocols lack
adaptation capabilities regarding varying latency, bandwidth, and reliability require-
ments, and hence, each approach is restricted to a specific use-case.
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5.3.3 Hop-by-hop Authentication
LHAP [ZXSJ06, LP05] and HEAP [AKR08] were specifically designed for hop-by-
hop authentication in MANETs. LHAP uses TESLA for bootstrapping trust re-
lationships between nodes and it uses authentication tokens when forwarding data
packets. Lu and Pooch [LP05] propose a system that builds on LHAP but uses a
TESLA-like protocol for securing data transmission between two adjacent routers.
HEAP uses pair-wise symmetric keys and a modified HMAC function to authen-
ticate packets hop-by-hop. Gouda et al. present three protocols for hop integrity
protection [GEHM02], in which symmetric keys between adjacent routers are used
to identify injected and modified packets.
All of the aforementioned protocols aim at preventing outsider attacks by unau-
thorized senders. However, they cannot mitigate insider attacks, such as forged or
manipulated messages by otherwise trusted nodes. Protection against these attacks
would require end-to-end integrity protection that can be verified on every hop.
Zhu et al. [ZSJN07] and Ye et al. [YLLZ05] solve the problem of efficient en-route
verification with probabilistic approaches. However, both techniques are tightly cou-
pled to a large sensor-network scenario with multiple cooperating sensors, sensing
and sending the same information to a fixed sink (base station). Therefore, the
employed methods are not suitable for point-to-point communication between single
hosts in networks of all sizes. Zhang et al. [ZSW08] use polynomial-based cryptogra-
phy for authenticating packets in WSNs. Their approach assumes the presence of a
central security server that provides keying-material to all nodes before deployment.
Although this assumption is viable for many WSN scenarios, it is inapplicable to
many dynamic and decentralized deployments.
PLA addresses the problem of end-to-middle authentication and integrity protection
by using public-key signatures and replay countermeasures [CLK05]. As discussed
in Section 3.5.5, end-hosts generate ECC signatures for PLA packets. These signa-
tures enable middleboxes to discard forged or unauthorized packets. The security
services offered by PLA are very similar to the security services required for ALPHA.
However, the use of public-key signatures imposes serious performance limitations
for PLA. To circumvent this problem, PLA relies on specialized hardware accelera-
tion to achieve higher throughput [JFS07]. In this work we do not assume special
hardware acceleration but focus on the capabilities of commodity hardware, such as
wireless routers and PCs. Thus, we do not use per-packet public-key signatures but
limit the use of public-key operations to rare signaling events, such as bootstrap-
ping. We compare the performance of ALPHA to PLA and its more lightweight PLA
variant WPLA in the performance evaluation of this chapter (c.f. Section 5.9.4).
5.4 Design of Basic ALPHA
In this section, we present the design of the Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for
Hop-by-hop Authentication (ALPHA) as an end-to-middle source authenticated and
integrity protected payload channel. ALPHA is designed for unicast communication
between arbitrary nodes in a multi-hop network with limited trust between the
nodes (e.g., a cooperative WMN scenario). However, it can also be applied if only
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Figure 5.2 ALPHA dynamically establishes a protected path between a signer s and a verifier
v over several relays r i.
a single or no intermediaries are located between the communicating hosts. Hence,
a priori knowledge about relaying nodes and explicit addressing of intermediaries
is not necessary. In this chapter, we first provide an abstract high-level view on
ALPHA before discussing the details of the protocol.
As depicted in Figure 5.2, ALPHA uses the notion of a protected path between a
signer s and a verifier v. Before sending potentially large volumes of payload pack-
ets, the signer sends a small path reservation packet to the destination, enabling
the verifier and all intermediate nodes to efficiently check the integrity of the sub-
sequent payload packets. ALPHA is adaptive in the sense that it can be used for
occasional signaling traffic as well as for high-volume data streams. Moreover it pro-
vides integrated support for reliable and unreliable data transmission. To this end,
ALPHA provides two modes of operation (acknowledged and unacknowledged, c.f.
Section 5.4.4) and three transport mechanisms (c.f. Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.5)
that can be combined to meet the requirements of different application scenarios
and network capabilities.
In contrast to earlier proposals of interactive schemes, ALPHA achieves efficient on-
path verification in multi-hop networks and can adapt to the capabilities of relaying
devices. Relaying nodes can verify ALPHA signatures by observing the ALPHA
packet exchange between the interacting peers. The forwarding node can verify that
i) the peers are the legitimate owners of the hash chains tied to the connection, ii)
the message was sent by the legitimate sender, iii) the data transfer is solicited by
the legitimate receiver, and iv) the content of the message is authentic.
5.4.1 ALPHA’s Interactive Hash Chain Signature Scheme
For a better understanding, we first give an overview of the basic ALPHA signature
process before discussing extensions that enable the adaptation of ALPHA. The
signature process takes place after an initial handshake in which the anchors of the
hash chains are exchanged. For the sake of clarity, we defer the handshake details to
Section 5.6 and later discuss a concrete incarnation of the handshake in Chapter 5.7.
The signer and the verifier each use a hash chain hS and hV . The superscript S
indicates that the hash chain belongs to the signer and V indicates the same for the
verifier. The elements of the hash chains are hSi and h
V
i , respectively.
The goal of the signature process is to transmit an integrity-protected message m
from a signer to a verifier in a way that enables relays to verify the properties i) to iv)
discussed in the previous section. The basic ALPHA signature scheme consists of a
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three-way packet exchange for each protected payload messagem. Figure 5.3 depicts
the communication process. The ALPHA signature scheme belongs to the class of
interactive hash chain signatures. Thus, ALPHA uses deferred secret disclosure
in combination with an interlocking scheme (see Section 3.5.4.2). The first packet
announces a MAC M of the message m keyed with a fresh hash-chain element of
the signer. In the second packet, the verifier acknowledges the receipt of the MAC
and in the third packet, the signer sends m and discloses the hash chain element
that was used as the MAC key. In the following, we discuss the three-way signature
process in detail.
5.4.1.1 Use of Hash Chains in ALPHA
Typically, an end-host acts both as a signer and a verifier on a bi-directional packet
flow. Each host uses separate hash chains for signing outgoing and acknowledging
incoming packets. Using two separate hash chains for these distinct tasks is a coun-
termeasure to the relabeling attack we identified for WIMP (see Section 3.5.4.2).
Moreover, using distinct hash chains for signing and acknowledging enables both
communicating hosts to initiate a signature process at any time without waiting
until their peer’s signature process finishes. The total computation cost of the basic
interactive scheme does not increase due to the use of two separate chains, because
the same amount of hashes is used during a signature process.
The shared security context between two hosts A and B consists of the respective
anchors {hAsn , hAan , hBsn , hBan }. The two hash chains with superscript A are owned by
host A while the other hash chains are owned by host B. The hosts use the first hash
chain for signing data (i.e., it provides temporary keys for creating MACs) while they
use the second chain for acknowledging the receipt of a message. Hence, the hash
chains are denoted signature chain and acknowledgment chain and are signified by
the second superscripts s and a. Each pair of a signer’s signature chain and a verifier’s
acknowledgment chain protects a simplex channel. In the remainder of the chapter,
we discuss the protection of such simplex channels between a signer S and a verifier
V with their respective anchors hSsn and h
V a
n without loss of generality. By using
two hash chains per host, ALPHA creates a full-duplex channel consisting of two
simplex channels. We assume that the four hash chain anchors are communicated
to the peers and relays via an end-to-middle authenticated signaling channel like
HIP-MA or ALPHA for IP.
5.4.1.2 End-to-End Delayed Secret Disclosure Protocol
After providing an overview of ALPHA and presenting its use of hash chains, we
now discuss the details of the basic ALPHA protocol. The basic ALPHA signature
process is a three-way packet exchange as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Each signature
packet exchange is initiated with an S1 packet from the signer to the verifier. This
packet fulfills three objectives: First, a fresh hash chain element of the signer’s
signature chain hSsi identifies the signer. Second, a MAC keyed with the signer’s
next undisclosed signature chain element M(hSsi−1,m) ensures the integrity of m. In
this sense, the signer commits tom in this first message. We denote this commitment
as a pre-signature, in short pre-sig, because it represents the signature of a packet
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Signer VerifierRelay1 · · · Relayn
   
S1: hSsi ,M(h
Ss
i−1|m)

A1: hVaiff
S2: hSsi−1,m

tim
e
Figure 5.3 Basic ALPHA signature scheme. Relays authenticate m before forwarding it.
that is to be sent later. The pre-signature of m, based on the undisclosed hash chain
element hSsi−1, provides the asymmetry that is required to generate a signature. At the
time the pre-signature is generated, attackers are not in possession of the undisclosed
hash chain element. Hence, the signer has a property that clearly distinguishes it
from any other host. The verifier and relays buffer the pre-signature (the MAC)
until m and its key are disclosed through a subsequent S2 packet. Third, the S1
packet triggers the verifier to send an acknowledgment packet A1.
The A1 packet indicates that the verifier buffered the pre-signature and it expresses
the willingness of the verifier to receivem. To authenticate the A1 packet, the verifier
attaches the next undisclosed hash chain element of its acknowledgment chain hV ai
to the A1 packet. Similar to S1 packets, attackers cannot forge A1 packets because
they are not in possession of hV ai before the verifier has received the S1 packet.
Again, this provides the verifier with a property that clearly distinguishes it from
any other host in the network.
On receipt of a valid A1 packet, the signer discloses hSsi−1 (the key of the MAC)
and the message m in the S2 data packet. With this key, the verifier and all relays
that buffered M(hSsi−1,m) can check the integrity of m by recomputing the MAC.
Tampering with the message m is ineffective because the verifier and all relays can
check its validity against the tamper-proof MAC from the S1 packet.
The hash chain values in the S1 and A1 packets serve as a strong evidence that
the peer has initiated the transmission of a signed packet or that the peer has
acknowledged the receipt of an S1 packet, accordingly. In S1 and A1 packets, these
hash chain elements are the only cryptographically secured information. Thus, these
values protect the transitions between the three conceptual stages of the protocol:
commitment, acknowledgment, and secret disclosure.
5.4.1.3 Efficient On-path Authentication
Besides the end-to-end protocol, the interaction between ALPHA end-hosts and
middleboxes is important. Middleboxes can follow the interaction of the ALPHA
end hosts and observe the three steps (commitment, acknowledgment, and secret
disclosure). The relays store the commitments (i.e., pre-signatures) from the S1
packets, observe if a subsequent A1 packet indicates that the verifier is ready to
receive the data packet (acknowledgment) and verify that the contents of the S2
data packet matches the stored commitment from the S1 packet (disclosure).
For efficiency, similar to the broadcast and multicast authentication schemes by Yao
et al. [YFN06] and Perrig et al. [PCST01], ALPHA only transmits the short MAC of
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Signer VerifierRelay
 
S1: hSsi ,m
∗,M(hSsi−1|m)∗ 
A1: hVa∗i , h
Ss
iff
S2: hSsi−1

tim
e
(a) IHC signature without commitment
Signer VerifierRelay
 
S1: hSsi ,M(h
Ss
i−1|m)∗

A1: hVa∗i , h
Ss
iff
S2: hSsi−1,m

tim
e
(b) IHC signature with commitment.
Figure 5.4 IHC signatures without and with commitment. Without commitment, the message
m is sent in the S1 packet. With commitment, only the MAC, M(hSsi−1|m), is sent the S1 packet.
In addition to the hash chain values, the values marked with an asterisk (*) must be buffered
by the relay until the S2 packet arrives.
a message in the first packet and sends the larger message m in the S2 packet. This
design decision allows relays to only store the small pre-signatures while the actual
message can later be verified without delay or buffering. Hence, upon receipt of the
message m in the S2 packet, relays can immediately decide whether m is authentic
or forged and forward or drop the S2 packet accordingly. When sending the pre-
signature of m as a commitment, the message m is still protected by the MAC and
the temporal separation between the creation and delivery of the signature and the
disclosure of the MAC key is still guaranteed. Figure 5.4 compares both options.
Using commitments in the form of pre-signatures instead of first sending the message
m along with the MAC drastically reduces the amount of data buffered by verifiers
and relays and enables on-the-fly verification ofm at the cost of a higher buffer space
requirement at the sender. Although the benefit regarding the buffer space reduction
is marginal for today’s typical Internet end-hosts, this reduction makes hash-chain-
based signatures feasible on memory-constrained devices, such as embedded routers,
and sensor nodes. Most importantly, for forwarding devices, pre-signatures offer
significantly better scalability with the number of flows than regularly signed mes-
sages. Additionally, the lower buffer requirements render memory exhaustion attacks
against the relays more difficult.
5.4.2 States and State Transitions
So far we described the basic steps in order to run the ALPHA end-to-end proto-
col without considering transmission errors like packet losses or duplicate packets.
However, handling of such error cases is important for ALPHA. In particular, han-
dling of packet losses and subsequent retransmission in combination with the use of
hash chain elements must be designed carefully to avoid attacks based on replayed
or intercepted packets.
In ALPHA, state transitions depend on the received packet type as well as on the
presence of hash chain elements in the packets. Depending on whether a hash value
belongs to a hash chain or not and depending on when it was disclosed, we classify
hash chain elements into three classes: fresh, old, and invalid elements.
• A hash chain element is fresh when it is the predecessor of the most recently
disclosed hash chain element of the same hash chain. When, for instance, hi is
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the last hash chain element disclosed by a host, only the value hi−1 that fulfills
the equation H(hi−1) = hi is considered to be fresh1. The verifier typically
changes its state when receiving a fresh hash chain element in a valid packet.
• A hash chain element is old when it equals the most recently disclosed hash
chain element of the corresponding hash chain. Hosts consider elements to
be old if they already have received the same element but not its successor.
Assumed hi is the last hash chain element disclosed by a host, further packets
with hi as the hash chain value are considered old. Old hash chain elements
are the results of duplicate packets, retransmissions, or replay attacks. The
verifier responds to such packets by repeating its previous response without
adjusting its state. Relays forward S1 and A1 packets with old hash chain
elements to allow the protocol to recover from packet loss.
• A hash chain element is invalid when it is neither old nor valid. Packets with
invalid hash chain elements are neither processed by the signer nor by the
verifier. They are generally dropped by relaying ALPHA nodes, regardless of
the packet type and state. Hence, we do not explicitly discuss packets with
invalid hash chain elements in the context of the state machines.
Depending on whether a hash chain element is fresh, old, or invalid, different actions
are taken even if a host receives the same packet in the same state. Figure 5.5 depicts
the signer and verifier state machines and shows the different state transitions. A
second important question is when a new element of a hash chain should be disclosed.
The state diagrams indicate the disclosure of a new hash chain element with an
asterisk (*) next to the state transition.
In the following, we discuss the state machines of both end hosts and the on-path
relay. We only discuss the state machines for the simple ALPHA mode as presented
so far. We do not provide state machines for the other ALPHA modes, discussed in
the remainder of this chapter, because their state machines and processing rules are
almost identical to the state machines presented here.
5.4.2.1 Signer State Machine
The signer state machine is depicted in Figure 5.5a. Retransmissions of lost packets
are purely driven by the signer to avoid deflection DoS attacks. After sending an S1,
the signer sets a timer and retransmits the same S1 without using a new hash chain
element if the timer fires before the A1 packet arrives. After receiving an A1 with
a valid hash chain element, the signer immediately sends the S2 packet with a fresh
hash chain element. Now the signer is ready to send a new S1 packet. Note that the
receipt of the S2 packet is not acknowledged in this case. Therefore, there are no
retransmissions for lost S2 packets. However, ALPHA offers an acknowledged mode
that allows to detect and retransmit lost S2 packets (see Section 5.4.4).
1Note that for other hash-chain-based protocols any undisclosed hash chain element Hj(hi−1) = hi
with j > 0 is considered fresh. This is the case for the tokens of the SPOTS scheme.
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(b) Verifier state machine
Figure 5.5 End-host state machines of basic ALPHA. Operations that require the use of a
new hash chain element are marked with an asterisk (*). Operations in brackets are optional
and require additional pre-signature buffer space. Packets with invalid hash chain elements are
dropped in any state and are not depicted in this figure.
5.4.2.2 Verifier State Machine
The verifier state machine is illustrated in Figure 5.5b. The verifier waits for in-
coming S1 packets and acknowledges these with A1 acknowledgments. The verifier
uses an undisclosed hash chain element for each A1 packet as a response to an S1
packet with a fresh hash chain element. It is important to note that the verifier
only buffers the pre-signature M if the S1 contains a fresh hash chain element. For
S1 packets with old hash chain elements, the verifier retransmits its previously sent
A1 packet without using an undisclosed hash chain element to keep up the protocol
flow. However, in this case it neither stores nor overwrites the previously buffered
pre-signature M . This is a precaution against buffer poisoning attacks in which an
attacker (Eve) tries to flood the verifier’s buffer with replayed S1 packets and bogus
pre-signatures M ′.
In state A1 sent, the verifier has the option to accept new S1 packets before the S2
from the previous signature process arrives. In this case, the verifier buffers a new
pre-signature M and acknowledges the S1 with an A1 that contains a fresh hash
chain element. The newly buffered M must not overwrite or invalidate the old M
from the previous signature process to allow the verification of the still outstanding
S2 packet. Implementing this optimization allows ALPHA to operate in scenarios
in which an out-of-order delivery of packets is possible or expected.
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5.4.2.3 Relay State Machine
The relay processes packets from the signer as well as from the verifier to follow the
protocol flow. Therefore, the state machine of the relay resembles a superset of the
signer and verifier state machine. The ALPHA relay state machine is depicted in
Figure 5.6. The relay does not send any packets by itself but decides whether to
forward or drop the S1, A1, and S2 packets.
The relay also distinguishes between fresh, old, and invalid hash chain elements from
the signer’s and the verifier’s signature and acknowledgment hash chains. Only for
packets with fresh hash chain elements, the relay adjusts its state in the form of
state transitions and buffering of pre-signatures. Old hash chain elements in S1 and
A1 packets are forwarded to enable ALPHA to recover from losses of S1 and A1
packets on the path between the relay and the receiver of the respective message.
Figure 5.6 shows five transitions that lead to an error condition. These transitions
occur when a relay receives two fresh hash chain elements from the signer before
receiving an acknowledgment from the verifier or two subsequent fresh acknowledg-
ments before a new S1 is received. This circumstance can either be the result of
asymmetric routing (see Section 5.4.3.2) or a result of a non-conforming signer or
verifier behavior. In both cases, the middlebox cannot make any statements about
the authenticity of the ALPHA packets any more because the delayed secret disclo-
sure scheme is broken. Hence, such events represent a severe and unrecoverable error
and must be solved by re-establishing the ALPHA context via the control protocol.
Depending on the application scenario in which ALPHA is used, the middlebox stops
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Figure 5.6 Relay state machine of basic ALPHA. Operations in brackets are optional and
require additional pre-signature buffer space. If optional buffering of a new pre-signature is
performed, the relay must wait for A1 and S2 packets concurrently as indicated by the dashed
transition and the operations marked with a cross (+).
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forwarding packets for the ALPHA end-hosts until these realize the loss of connec-
tivity or the middlebox may signal this error condition to the end-hosts explicitly.
However, it should be noted that explicit error signaling from on-path relays can be
used as a DoS attack if no appropriate precautions are taken.
5.4.3 Path Binding for ALPHA
As already discussed, ALPHA requires a stable set of forwarding relays. There are
two main reasons for this requirement. First, ALPHA establishes association-related
state on relays. This state allows relays to track the ALPHA authentication ex-
change, consisting of the S1, A1, and S2 packets. Second, the relays must constantly
monitor the disclosure of new hash chain elements because after their disclosure,
attackers could otherwise use these elements in a replay attack against the relays.
Differing sets of ALPHA relays on the path during the lifetime of an ALPHA as-
sociation will lead to relays that have insufficient state because the end-hosts are
either not known to the relays or the relays have not observed all ALPHA authen-
tication exchanges, and hence, cannot continue authentication of ALPHA packets.
In the remainder of this section, we show that such a partial view of the authentica-
tion process makes relays vulnerable to attacks against the authentication scheme.
Moreover, we show how relays can shelter against such attacks.
5.4.3.1 A Bypass Attack on ALPHA End-to-middle Authentication
In principle, changes of the set of forwarding nodes can be prevented by fixed and
static forwarding routes within the network or by placing ALPHA nodes at network
locations through which all traffic must flow (e.g., gateways). However, purely rely-
ing on network topology and routing is not sufficient for ensuring a secure operation
of ALPHA since two malicious on-path attackers (Mallory1 and Mallory2) can use
tunneling to alter the set of relays that observe ALPHA exchanges. Without ad-
ditional countermeasures, neither an honest relay nor honest end-hosts can prevent
collaborating attackers from unnoticeably subverting the protocol. In the remainder
of this section, we first describe such a bypass attack on ALPHA in detail and then
present a simple but efficient countermeasure based on hash chains.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the bypass attack in which two collaborating on-path attackers
Mallory1 and Mallory2 impersonate Alice and Bob towards Ron. The goal of Mallory
is to hide a full ALPHA signature process, consisting of S1, A1, and S2, from Ron to
use the hash chain elements from this hidden exchange for forging a valid signature
exchange with a different message m′. The attack can be carried out by two on-path
attackers. One attacker is situated on the path between Alice and Ron and the
other one is situated on the path between Ron and Bob. A single attacker or an
eavesdropper, Eve, cannot carry out the attack because it cannot prevent all packets
from reaching Ron.
After a successful initial authentication of Alice and Bob via the control protocol
and possibly some previous valid ALPHA exchanges between Alice and Bob, the
adversaries establish a tunnel to hide subsequent ALPHA packets from Ron. As
Ron cannot observe a full signature process, it will not note that hSsi and h
Ss
i−1
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Figure 5.7 Two collaborating attackers m1 and m2 perform a bypass attack against a victim
relay r.
are disclosed by Alice. Hence, when Mallory1 replays the packets, Ron accepts
both values as fresh. Moreover, when replaying the exchange, the attackers are in
possession of two subsequent hash chain elements from the signature chain of Alice
and a valid hash chain element of the acknowledgment chain of Bob. This allows
the attackers to construct a valid signature and acknowledgment for the replayed
exchange without further interaction with Alice and Bob. Therefore, the attack is
undetectable for Alice and Bob. Finally, the attack cannot be detected by Ron, who,
in turn, accepts the forged message m′ as authentic message from Alice to Bob.
The severity of the attack depends on the reasons for which ALPHA is applied. While
the end-to-end integrity protection and the on-path filtering function of unsolicited
packets are not affected by this attack (the second attacker must be located on
the path behind the victim and it must express interest in receiving the replayed
packets), the secure extraction of signed data by forwarding nodes suffers. Thus, if
secure signaling to the middlebox Ron is the goal, the attack allows the attackers
to take over the session and to impersonate Alice for the lifetime of the session.
However, if Alice stops transmitting new hash chain elements, the attackers cannot
continue to use the session because of the lacking supply of fresh hash chain elements.
5.4.3.2 Mitigating the Bypass Attack
The solution for preventing this attack is to make the fact that all middleboxes on
the path have processed the S1 packets (and therefore will not accept subsequent S1
packets with the same hash chain element as fresh) visible to the end-hosts. There
are different options for achieving this awareness for the end hosts, ranging from
public-key signatures by middleboxes to symmetric key based solutions like over-
lapping MACs between neighboring nodes. For performance reasons and simplified
integration in ALPHA, we designed a lightweight scheme based on hash chains. In
the following, we refer to the process of fixing the set of forwarding nodes as path
binding.
The verifier can enforce a static set of forwarding nodes by only acknowledging an
S1 packet after it ensured that all forwarding nodes have processed the S1 packet.
Ensuring that each relay processed the S1 can be done by letting the relays append
some discriminative information to the S1 packet. Similar to the scheme of HIP-MA,
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the relays add some authentication data to the packet that indicates that they have
processed it. This piece of authentication data must be unique and replay proof.
We use authentication tokens, similar to the tokens in SPOTS, for this purpose. For
each ALPHA association that the middlebox intends to authenticate, it generates
a hash chain and adds elements of this hash chain to S1 packets as a proof that it
has processed the packet. Figure 5.8 illustrates the process. The protocol consists
of three phases: First, the anchors of the middleboxes’ hash chains are signaled to
the end-hosts in the bootstrapping phase. Second, the middleboxes add hash chain
elements to the S1 packets for acknowledging that they have processed them. Third,
the middleboxes renew their hash chains before these run out of elements. In the
following, we describe these three phases:
1.) Bootstrapping: We assume that each relay announces the anchor of a hash
chain hri to the verifier during the ALPHA bootstrapping process. Hence, for
bidirectional communication, the middlebox signals two anchors to the pair of
end-hosts. This bootstrapping signaling must be designed so that the middle-
boxes can verify that their anchors were received by the end-hosts. The design
of the signaling is similar to the operation of HIP-MA. Relays first add their
anchors to unprotected parts of the packets in the ALPHA bootstrapping pro-
cess. Then, the end-hosts echo the anchors in the signed part of the subsequent
bootstrapping packets (step two of the bootstrapping process in Figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.8 Ron1 and Ron2 announce hash chain anchors to Bob. These hash chains are used
to acknowledge the receipt of an S1 message, thereby fixing the path between Alice and Bob.
Ron attaches fresh hash chain elements to each S1 packet from Alice. Later, Ron must refresh
its hash chains.
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Thus, relays can verify that their anchors have been noted by the authentic
end-hosts.
2.) Operation: To each fresh S1 packet that a relay forwards, it attaches a new
hash chain element of the hash chain belonging to the anchor. When receiving
a fresh S1 packet, the verifier checks that the hash chain elements of all mid-
dleboxes are fresh. Only if for each middlebox, the S1 packet contains a fresh
hash chain element, the verifier acknowledges the receipt of the S1 packet with
an A1 packet. If the hash chain elements of a relay are missing, the verifier
denies to acknowledge the S1 and waits for a retransmission of the S1 packet
that is acknowledged by all relays. If the S1 acknowledgments of the middle-
boxes fail repeatedly, the verifier can assume that the path has changed and
can initiate a path binding update process that re-authenticates the end-hosts
and makes new anchors known to the middleboxes.
3.) Renewal: The hash chains used by the middleboxes are finite. Therefore, these
hash chains need to be renewed after a certain number of S1 packets are ac-
knowledged. We discuss techniques for re-bootstrapping of hash chains in
Section 5.6.1 in detail. These re-bootstrapping mechanisms do not require the
use of public-key signatures and can be carried out by only using hash func-
tions. The re-bootstrapping is piggybacked on the S1 packets from the signer
to the verifier.
As the verifier denies the acknowledgment of incomplete S1 packets, the signer will
not disclose a new hash chain element in an S2 packet unless all of the forwarding
nodes have processed the packet. Hence, attackers cannot hide an ALPHA signature
process from middleboxes.
This extension to ALPHA allows malicious middleboxes to block the A1 acknowledg-
ments by denying to attach new hash chain elements to the S1 packets. The result
would be a permanent failure of the ALPHA association, resulting in the inability of
Alice and Bob to exchange authenticated messages. However, this behavior is a mi-
nor threat because a middlebox can achieve the same result in a simpler manner by
either manipulating the forwarded ALPHA S1 packet so that the signature verifica-
tion in the S2 packet fails or by simply dropping the S1 packet. As dropping S1, A1,
or S2 packets represents an equivalent threat with less effort for the attacker, intro-
ducing countermeasures to avoid attacks on the middlebox acknowledgment scheme
are likely to introduce additional overhead without increasing the overall security
and availability of ALPHA. Thus, we do not introduce countermeasures against this
threat. Finally, it is important to note that dropping packets is a general threat for
any communication protocol and is not a specific weakness of ALPHA.
5.4.4 Unreliable and Reliable Data Transmission
To support a wide range of applications, ALPHA defines unreliable as well as reliable
message transmission. Depending on the application of ALPHA on different layers
of the communication stack, reliable or unreliable transmission is more or less ade-
quate. The IP protocol, for example, provides an unreliable service, in which payload
packets are not guaranteed to be delivered and in which no explicit acknowledgment
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for delivered packets exist. Hence, using unreliable transmissions in ALPHA is ap-
propriate when it is wedged into the stack at or above the IP protocol. However,
if ALPHA were to be integrated with a protocol that offers reliable data trans-
mission (e.g., a transport-layer protocol, such as TCP), using ALPHA for reliable
data transmission can reduce the overhead compared to employing acknowledgment
and retransmissions above ALPHA. Since the ALPHA payload channel design aims
at being a general and adaptive mechanism, we present and discuss techniques for
unreliable and reliable data transmission in this section.
Essentially, reliable data transmission is an optimization of the unreliable data trans-
mission of ALPHA to reduce the number of message exchanges if acknowledged mes-
sage delivery is required. Using the integrated acknowledgment scheme for reliable
ALPHA packet delivery allows us to reduce the overhead for acknowledged packet
transmissions to 67% under normal operation and to ≤50% under loss conditions,
compared to acknowledgments sent by higher-layer protocols. Similar reductions are
possible for the number of required hash computations and delivery delays. In the
remainder of this section we present the unreliable and reliable modes of ALPHA.
5.4.4.1 Unreliable Data Transmission
For unreliable data transmission, ALPHA uses the basic three-way signature process
as depicted above in Figure 5.3. Due to the unreliable nature of the S2 transmission,
no explicit confirmation is provided when the verifier receives the S2 packet. Thus,
the signer may send the next S1 packet at any time after the S2 packet was sent.
Figure 5.9 illustrates the process.
As shown in Figure 5.9, two consecutive hash chain elements (hSi−1 and h
S
i−2) are
disclosed without acknowledgment from the verifier. Hence, without additional se-
curity measures, a reformatting attack (see the WIMP reformatting attack in Sec-
tion 3.5.4.2) would be possible in which the hash chain element of an intercepted
S2 packet and the following S1 packet could be used to generate a new S1 packet
with a seemingly valid pre-signature. To prevent such an attack, ALPHA binds the
elements of the signature chain to the purpose of either authenticating an S1 or
providing the MAC key and authenticating the S2.
To this end, hash chains in ALPHA are constructed in the following way: hi =
H(“S1′′|Hi−1) for odd occurrences of i and hi = H(“S2′′|Hi−1) for even occurrences
Signer VerifierRelay
 
S1 : hSi ,M(h
S
i−1|m1)

A1 : hViff
S2 : hSi−1,m1

S1 : hSi−2,M(hSi−3|m2)
···
tim
e
Figure 5.9 ALPHA for unacknowledged S2 packets. The signer sends another S1 packet
without confirmation that verifier received the S2 packet.
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of i. The values S1 and S2 are placeholders for strings that make two sequential
hash chain elements distinguishable. Thus, hash chain elements that are supposed
to be used for MAC creation can be distinguished from hash chain elements that are
used for authenticating S1 packets. This enables a signer to send a new S1 packet
immediately after receiving the A1 packet without the possibility of a reformatting
attack.
5.4.4.2 Reliable Data Transmission
Some transport-layer protocols and applications require reliable data transmissions.
Acknowledgements for received packets and retransmissions of unacknowledged pack-
ets are one mechanism to ensure such reliable delivery. Each signed message from
a signer to a verifier requires a three-way interactive signature process. Thus, us-
ing the same technique to send signed acknowledgments to allow for reliable data
transmission would result in a total of six packets. We reduce this overhead to
four packets by integrating acknowledgments into the ALPHA signature process.
This way, we can reduce the number of additional packets that are required for the
acknowledgment of the S2 from three to one. Figure 5.10 depicts an unoptimized
six-way acknowledged message delivery, essentially consisting of two independent
three-way signature processes, and an optimized four-way exchange with integrated
acknowledgments.
Similar to the message m, acknowledgments are authenticated by a delayed secret
disclosure signature. Hence, similar to the concept of pre-signatures, we introduce
pre-acknowledgments. These pre-acknowledgments are commitments to an acknowl-
edgment or negative acknowledgment that is sent in a later packet. As shown in
Figure 5.11, the verifier adds the pre-acknowledgments to the A1 packet, preparing
the actual acknowledgment in an additional A2 packet. However, when receiving the
A1 packet, the verifier cannot decide whether the S2 packet will be delivered cor-
rectly. Therefore, the verifier generates two values: a pre-acknowledgment (pre-ack)
and a pre-negative acknowledgment (pre-nack) for the case of a successful verifica-
tion of the S2 packet and for the event of a failed verification. The verifier uses one
Signer VerifierRelay
 
S1: hSsi ,M(h
Ss
i−1|m)

A1: hVai , h
Ss
iff
S2: hSsi−1,m

S1: hVsi ,M(h
Vs
i−1|ack)ff
A1: hSai ,m,M(h
Sa
i−1|m) 
S1: hVsi−1ff
tim
e
(a) Without optimization
Signer VerifierRelay
 
S1: hSsi ,M(h
Ss
i−1|m)∗

A1: hVai ,pre-(n)ackff
S2: hSsi−1,m

A2: hVai−1, ackff
tim
e
(b) Reliable ALPHA with optimization.
Figure 5.10 In the unoptimized case, acknowledgments are authenticated by a second three-
way ALPHA signature exchange. For the optimized operation, one additional packet suffices.
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Signer Verifier
 
S1: hSsi ,M(hSsi−1|m)

A1: hV
a
i ,H(h
Va
i−1|1|sack),H(h
Va
i−1|0|snack)
ff
S2: hSsi−1,m

A2: hV
a
i−1, [1, sack/0, snack
]
ff
tim
e
Figure 5.11 The optimized reliable ALPHA mode uses commitments as pre-
acknowledgements.
of the acknowledgment values later to securely report the result of the verification
to the signer.
Figure 5.11 depicts the signature process with pre-acknowledgments in detail. The
pre-(n)ack values are hashes over the concatenation of three pieces of information.
The first piece is the next undisclosed hash chain element of the verifier’s acknowl-
edgment chain hV ai−1. It is included to prevent attackers from forging the acknowledg-
ments. The second piece is a fixed string for the pre-ack and a different fixed string
for the pre-nack to make both values distinguishable (e.g., 0 and 1). The third piece
of the pre-acknowledgment consists of two distinct secret random numbers sack and
snack. These secrets prevent an attacker from computing a negative acknowledgment
from an acknowledgment or vice versa after the corresponding hash chain element
hV ai−1 is disclosed.
If the signature of the message in S2 packet is valid, the verifier discloses the contents
of the pre-ack, otherwise it discloses the contents of the pre-nack. It transmits the
disclosed data in an A2 packet to the signer. The signer can verify that the packet
was sent by the verifier by comparing the hashed result of hV ai−1 to the hash chain
element previously disclosed by the verifier. The string in the A2 packet (1 or 0 in
the example) indicates an acknowledgment or negative acknowledgment for the data
received by the verifier in the S2. The signer and relays can verify the validity of the
ack or nack by hashing the concatenation of the hash chain element, the string, and
the disclosed secret sack or snack and comparing it to the corresponding pre-(n)ack
in the A1 packet.
To detect forgery attacks, temporal separation (see Section 3.5.4) between the pre-
(n)ack creation and the disclosure of the corresponding hash chain element is achieved
by letting the signer discard pre-(n)acks in further A1 packets after it sent an S2
message. Also, using fresh random or pseudo-random secrets sack and snack for every
pre-(n)ack thwarts replay attacks.
Depending on the transmitted payload, relays may also need to verify that a message
was successfully received by the destination host. Examples for such payloads are
signaling protocols that require the relays to change their internal state (e.g., mobil-
ity management protocols for macro mobility and secure QoS signaling). To verify
(n)acks on relays, the middlebox must buffer the corresponding pre-(n)acks until the
A2 packet arrives from the verifier. After verification of the acknowledgment, relays
may safely interpret the message in the S2 packet and, e.g., change their internal
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Unreliable Reliable Transmission
Unoptimized Optimized
Number of Packets
Signer (no loss) 2 3 2
Verifier (no loss) 1 3 2
Signer (S2 lost) - 5 3
Verifier (S2 lost) - 4 2
Signer (Ack. lost) - 6 3
Verifier (Ack. lost) - 6 3
Delay (excl. processing, incl. timeouts)
Data delivery (no loss) 1.5 RTT 1.5 RTT 1.5 RTT
Ack. (no loss) - 3 RTT 2 RTT
Data delivery (S2 lost) - > 5 RTT+ > 2.5 RTT+
Ack. (S2 lost) - > 5 RTT+ > 2.5 RTT+
Data delivery (Ack. lost) - > 6 RTT+ > 3 RTT+
Ack. (Ack. lost) - > 6 RTT+ > 3 RTT+
Hash operations (incl. HC use and HMAC)
Signer (no loss) 5 10 7
Verifier (no loss) 5 10 9
Relay (no loss) 5 10 7
Signer (S2 lost) - 15 7∗
Verifier (S2 lost) - 15 9∗
Relay (S2 lost) - 15 7∗
Signer (Ack. lost) - 20 7∗
Verifier (Ack. lost) - 20 9∗
Relay (Ack. lost) - 20 7∗
Table 5.2 Reliable and unreliable data transmission for basic ALPHA. Retransmissions in the
optimized case that are marked with an asterisk (*) do not require additional hash computa-
tions. Values marked with a cross (+) include a timeout for detecting the loss of a packet.
The additional delay for the timeout is > 0.5 RTT for the optimized case and > 1.5 RTT for
the unoptimized case.
state based on it. Using pre-acks and pre-nacks offers two advantages in scenarios
that require reliable data delivery. First, they reduce the communication overhead
in terms of required transmissions. Second, they reduce the latency for receiving
the acknowledgment from three to two RTTs. Table 5.2 compares the computation
and communication cost of basic ALPHA with and without acknowledgments. In
addition, it shows the unoptimized six-way exchange for reliable message delivery
with unreliable ALPHA for comparison purposes.
Table 5.2 also shows the computation and communication cost in cases where an
S1 packet or the following S2 packet is lost due to a transmission error. In these
cases, the optimized acknowledgement scheme clearly outperforms the unoptimized
alternative. In particular, the optimized acknowledgment scheme does not require
the end hosts to compute additional hash verifications or to use additional elements
of their hash chains because the signature process is blocked until the acknowledg-
ments are delivered to the signer. In contrast, when the S2 transmission fails, the
unoptimized case requires the signer to start another three-way signature process,
resulting in a higher amount of hash computations per payload packet.
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The optimized acknowledgment scheme also shows benefits regarding the end-to-end
delay in case of packet losses. In particular, timeouts for retransmissions can be set
much lower in the optimized case (timeout > 1 RTT vs. timeout > 2 RTTs) because
a complete three-way handshake for the acknowledgement is avoided. Due to the
overlap of transmitting the S2 packet, these larger timeouts prolong the delivery of
the S2 packet and the acknowledgment by 0.5 RTTs in the optimized case and 1.5
RTTs in the unoptimized case.
Table 5.2 only depicts the computation cost of the basic ALPHA mode. It does
not contain additional hash computations for the path binding extension discussed
in Section 5.4.3.2. Hence, one additional on-line hash function calculation per S1
and per middlebox is required by the verifier if the extension is used. Moreover, one
off-line hash function calculation per S1 is performed by each relay.
5.5 Bandwidth Adaptation
In its basic form, ALPHA signatures offer only limited support for transmitting large
amounts of data because the strictly sequential packet exchange limits throughput.
If implemented as described above, a signer can only transmit a single packet during
a time window of 1.5 RTTs. Therefore, the basic mode of operation for ALPHA
is not suited for high network latencies and high traffic volumes. In this section,
we present two additional modes for ALPHA that allow for a better adaptation
to the bandwidth, memory, and computational resources of a multi-hop network.
In particular, we evaluate the use of these modes for end-to-end and hop-by-hop
authentication.
Taking relays into account, a solution for sending higher volumes of data must not
substantially increase the memory requirements for relays. Moreover, due to the
higher packet loss and the possibility of out-of-order delivery in wireless networks,
efficient verification of individual data packets must be ensured even if other data
packets are lost or arrive out of sequence.
5.5.1 ALPHA-C: Cumulative Transmissions
Sending only a small pre-signature instead of the actual message in the S1 packet
offers the possibility to send multiple pre-signatures in a single S1 packet in parallel.
For high-volume data transfers, pre-signatures of multiple messages based on the
same undisclosed hash chain element are transmitted to the verifier in a single S1
packet. Hence, the signer accumulates data packets, prepares their transmission
by sending an S1 with pre-signatures for all data packet, and sends out a burst
of S2 packets when the A1 packet arrives. The verifier acknowledges the receipt
of cumulative pre-signatures just as it would acknowledge an S1 with a single pre-
signature. Thus, the signer can send the S2 packets for all pre-signed messages in
parallel or in short succession without waiting for individual acknowledgments. We
refer to this mode as ALPHA-C, standing for ALPHA with cumulative transmissions.
Figure 5.12 depicts the ALPHA-C mode.
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Signer VerifierRelay1 · · · Relayn
   
S1: hSsi , MAC1, MAC2, MAC3

A1: hVaiff
S2: hSsi−1,m1

S2: hSsi−1,m2

S2: hSsi−1,m3

tim
e
Figure 5.12 The signer accumulates data packets and sends multiple pre signatures in one
S1 packet. The pre-signatures MACj are HMACs of the messages mj keyed with h
Ss
i−1. Note
that the same key hSsi−1 is used for all MACs and all S2 packets.
Although the sequence of S1 and A1 packets is strictly sequential, the order of
delivery of the S2 packets is not of importance. As the hash chain element hSsi−1 is
present in all S2 packets, they can be verified by the verifier and relays independently.
Packet loss of an S2 packet can either be handled by retransmitting the S2 packet
or can be ignored if retransmission is not required, e.g., for time-critical data, such
as multimedia streams.
When using ALPHA-C, the verifier and relays buffer multiple pre-signatures. This
requires additional buffer space of the size of up to the maximum packet space avail-
able for pre-signatures per secured connection. The number of S2 packets increases
linearly with the available buffer space of the relays and the verifier while the com-
putational overhead for verifying an S2 packet is constant.
Accumulating S1 packets is a natural process for ALPHA if the transport layer pro-
tocol sends more than a single message within one RTTs. In this case, messages
accumulate while the S1/A1 exchange takes place before Alice can send a new S1
packet. This duration takes approximately one RTT (plus minor delays for packet
processing). Therefore, accumulating pre-signatures for ALPHA-C packet delivery
does not generally introduce longer packet delivery delays, although intentionally
extending the accumulation period can produce larger bursts and fewer S1/A1 ex-
changes.
Using ALPHA-C slightly reduces the per-packet hash computations because the
hash computations for the S1 and A1 packet are not repeated for each S2 packet.
We discuss the computation cost and performance in more detail in the evaluation
section of this chapter.
5.5.1.1 Reliable Data Transmission with ALPHA-C
As for basic ALPHA, ALPHA-C can offer reliable data transmission by using pre-
acknowledgments. Instead of using a single pair of pre-acks and pre-nacks, the
verifier sends a pair of pre-ack and pre-nack for each pre-signature in the S1 packet.
If fragmentation needs to be avoided, the size of the pre-acks and pre-nacks must not
exceed the available space in the A1 packet. Hence, the number of pre-signatures n
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in the S1 packet must be chosen so that 2n hash function outputs can fit into the
A1 packet.
Alternatively, other data structures can be used to authenticate acknowledgments.
In the next section, we discuss tree based pre-signatures and pre-acknowledgments
that are not subject to space restrictions.
5.5.2 ALPHA-M: Pre-signed Merkle Trees
ALPHA-C enables higher throughput at the cost of increased buffer requirements
but with constant computational overhead for verification. In the following, we
discuss a complementary approach for sending n individually verifiable S2 packets
with constant buffer size and a computational cost increasing with log2(n). The
approach leverages trees of hashes, so called Merkle Trees (see Section 3.4.2.5 for
details), to generate pre-signatures and pre-acknowledgements. Thus, we denote it
as ALPHA-M, standing for ALPHA with Merkle-Tree based pre-signatures.
As depicted in Figure 5.13, ALPHA-M applies Merkle Trees to the ALPHA scheme
as follows: A signer constructs a Merkle Tree with its buffered messages mj serving
as the pre-images of the tree leaves. The root r of the Merkle Tree serves as a
pre-signature in the S1 packet. The signer includes in the S1 packet the root r =
H(hSsi−1|b0|b1) and a fresh element of its signature hash chain as a pre-signature. The
verifier authenticates S1, buffers r, and acknowledges the reception with the next
element from its acknowledgment chain. Each message mj is transmitted in an S2
packet along with the set of complementary branch nodes {Bc}, such that mj can
be authenticated independently of other messages.
With this design, the verifiability of individual messages by end hosts and on-path
entities is preserved and each S2 data packet can be verified individually. However,
compared to ALPHA-C, ALPHA-M requires significantly less pre-signature data to
be buffered by relays and the verifier, because only the root of the tree must be
root(pre−signature)︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(hSsi−1|b0|b1)
 
b0︷ ︸︸ ︷
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Figure 5.13 ALPHA-M: Merkle Tree with 8 leaves.
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stored. More importantly, the number of packets in a burst (the number of leaves in
the tree) does not influence the size of the pre-signature. This means that the burst
size is not limited by the available space in the S1 packet. For example, if 1200 bytes
of a UDP datagram are available for pre-signatures and SHA-1 with a 20-byte output
length is used, the maximum size of a burst is limited to 60 packets for ALPHA-C.
This limitation does not apply to ALPHA-M. However, the set {Bc} that needs to
be transmitted in each S2 packet increases by log2(n) with n as the number of data
chunks n = |mj|. Hence, the size of the service data unit (the payload available in
an S2 packet) diminishes with increasing tree size.
Assuming a fixed amount of pre-signature data in an S1 packet, the ALPHA-M
approach provides a trade-off between:
a) Payload per burst: The amount of verifiable payload that can be transmitted in
S2 packets en bloc per pre-signature in an S1/A1 exchange.
b) Authentication data overhead: The need for additional signature data trans-
mitted along in the S2 payload packets, determined by the number of Merkle
Tree nodes in each packet.
c) Computation overhead: The computational cost of S2 verifications by relays or
the verifier, determined by the number of Merkle Tree nodes in each packet,
resulting from the number of hashes required for verifying that a message
belongs to a Merkle Tree.
To quantify this trade-off, we calculate stotal, the amount of payload that can be
transmitted with a single pre-signature. We assume fixed-sized packets providing
spacket bytes of payload space to the ALPHA mechanism, and Merkle Tree nodes
(i.e., a hash output) of size sh bytes. With n as the total number of S2 packets, the
following holds:
stotal = n · (spacket − sh(log2(n)+ 1)) (5.1)
The total payload per burst stotal for different packet sizes and tree sizes is depicted
in Figure 5.14a. With an increasing number of data chunks (S2 packets) per pre-
signature, {Bc} grows logarithmically, and thus, the signature size increases. Hence,
when the |{Bc}| · sh approaches the maximum packet size spacket, the transferable
payload drops with every new level of the Merkle Tree, leading to the see-saw pat-
terns in Figure 5.14a. At this point ALPHA-M operates highly inefficient because
a large amount of S2 packets with little payload are sent. The lines in the graph
stop when the size of the Merkle Tree nodes in the S2 exceeds the payload of the S2
packet and no payload can be sent any more. This effect is relevant only for small
packet sizes. For typical IP or Ethernet packets, ALPHA-M stays efficient even for
millions of signed packets per burst, which equals hundreds of megabytes of payload
per burst. Considering the fact that ALPHA-M accumulates packets for the dura-
tion of one RTT, packet size restrictions for S2 packets are of minor importance for
Internet traffic.
Figure 5.14b depicts the ratio of transmitted bytes per payload byte. This ratio is
of particular interest on energy-constrained devices. It illustrates that the overhead
of signature data is lower for larger packets. Thus, the amount of total payload
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Figure 5.14 Comparison of the authentication data overhead for ALPHA-M.
data covered by an S1 pre-signature is practically limited by the ratio of payload to
signature data in each S2 packet, which depends strongly on the size of S2 packets.
In comparison with basic ALPHA and ALPHA-C, ALPHA-M introduces additional
hash computations for signing and verifying an S2 packet. In addition to the hashing
of the n messages as in the original pre-signature scheme, constructing the Merkle
Tree on the signer adds an additional overhead of 2n − 1 hash computations2 for
generating the tree nodes. Using ALPHA-M requires the verifier and relays to com-
pute log2(n) − 1 additional hash computations for reconstructing the path to the
2The number 2n− 1 results from n hashes for generating H(mi) from mi, n2 hashes for generating
the first hierarchy of the tree, n4 hashes for the second level of the tree and so on until the root of the
tree is reached.
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root node of the Merkle Tree. Note that all these additional hash computations are
performed on the fixed-length concatenation of two hash outputs. Section 5.9 gives
a detailed comparison of the computational cost of the three modes.
Covering a set {M} of n = |{M}| packets mj ∈ {M} with a single pre-signature
establishes a temporal dependency between the packets. Thus, the signer needs to
buffer a complete set of n packets before creating the pre-signed root of the Merkle
Tree. Analogous to the accumulation of pre-signatures in ALPHA-C, ALPHA-M
does not necessarily introduce an additional waiting time for collecting data pack-
ets as input for the tree. However, since the amount of accumulated packets may
vary, dynamic adjustment of the tree depth is necessary to support such delay-less
operation.
For fixed tree depths, the transmission of any given mj is delayed until all mj ∈ {M}
are available at the signer, the Merkle Tree is constructed, and the S1/A1 exchange
is complete. Consequently, the stronger the latency requirements of a transmission,
the smaller n needs to be chosen. However, the vast majority of communication in
sensor-, mesh-, and ad-hoc networks does not have such strict requirements and can
benefit from the efficiency gains of ALPHA-M. In fact, ALPHA-M and ALPHA-C
signatures are well suited for wireless multi-hop networks because varying latency,
out-of-order delivery, and high loss rates can be tolerated due to the individual ver-
ifiability of each S2 packet. ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M can be used in combination.
Delivering multiple Merkle Tree roots per S1 packet can either reduce the computa-
tional cost of verifying {Bc} or can enable the signer to send a larger number of S2
packets with constant cost. However, it requires larger buffering capabilities from
relays.
5.5.2.1 Reliable Data Transmission with ALPHA-M
Using Merkle Trees obsoletes the pre-acknowledgment optimization presented in Sec-
tion 5.4.4 because the required number of pre-(n)acks per S1 grows exponentially
with an increasing Merkle Tree depth. To still be able to selectively acknowledge
every mj, ALPHA-M uses a Merkle Tree construct for generating pre-acks. As
H(ack0|nack0|hVai )
 
ack0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(ack00|ack01)
nack1︷ ︸︸ ︷
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ack0...0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(x0|s0) · · ·
ack01...1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(xn−1|sn−1)
...
...
... ...
nack10...0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(x0|sn) · · ·
nack1...1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(xn−1|s2n−1)
   
x0 · · · xn−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Acknowledgments
x0 · · · xn−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Negative acknowledgments
Figure 5.15 Merkle Tree for acknowledgments.
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illustrated in Figure 5.15, pre-acks and pre-nacks are placed in the leaves of an Ac-
knowledgment Merkle Tree (AMT), requiring a tree with 2n leaves for acknowledging
n messages. Each leaf of the AMT contains a secret si and an index xi, which iden-
tifies the packet mj. The secret must be distinct for each leaf of the tree to avoid
forged acknowledgments or forged negative acknowledgments. Values from the left
AMT branch are interpreted as acknowledgments and those from the right branch as
negative acknowledgments. The undisclosed hash chain element hV ai−1 authenticates
the root and prevents forgery by an attacker.
A2 packets that acknowledge the receipt of an S2 packet contain the index xi, the
secret si, and the set of Merkle Tree nodes {Bc} necessary to compute the root from
the leaf. The signer and each relay can verify each acknowledgment individually.
Moreover, an AMT can enable retransmission schemes, such as selective repeat and
go-back-n. For example, transmitting a positive acknowledgment for an index xi can
be interpreted as a successful receipt of all packets with a lower index. Alternatively,
transmitting a negative acknowledgment for a given index can be interpreted as a
retransmission request.
5.6 Hash Chain Bootstrapping and Renewal
Bootstrapping in ALPHA is the process of making hash chain anchors known to
verifiers and relays on a path. Between signer and verifier, bootstrapping takes
place in the beginning of an ALPHA association while the set of relays may change
over time and may need to be bootstrapped during an ongoing association.
Due to the wide applicability of ALPHA, we do not define a specific bootstrap-
ping process here but discuss the options of static vs. dynamic bootstrapping and
unprotected vs. protected bootstrapping. A concrete incarnation of an ALPHA
bootstrapping protocol for IP networks is presented and evaluated in Section 5.7.
In the beginning of a communication association, the signer and the verifier need to
exchange their hash chain elements for the signature and acknowledgment chains.
This process can either be performed before deploying a network (e.g., WSNs) or
when the network is already operational (e.g., for MANETs and WMNs). For pre-
configured scenarios, such as static wireless sensor networks, base stations can pro-
vide nodes with pair-wise anchors. For dynamic scenarios, senders directly exchange
their anchors in a handshake procedure on demand. If required, additional secu-
rity measures against bypassing of relays (cf. Section 5.4.1.3) should also be boot-
strapped during the handshake or when sending the first S1 packet. We distinguish
two options for a handshake: a public-key protected, authenticated handshake and
an unprotected and unauthenticated handshake that only uses the hash chains as
identifiers:
Unauthenticated handshake: This variant provides each peer of a security associ-
ation with an ephemeral anonymous identity (its hash chains) that is only of
use in the context of the corresponding association. Even with such an anony-
mous identity, hosts can use ALPHA to securely signal changes concerning an
association (e.g., signaling new IP addresses, throttling the transmission rate,
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closing an association, etc.) to their peers. Relays can learn the hash chain
elements or anchors by observing a handshake.
PK authenticated handshake: This option binds hash chains to strong crypto-
graphic identities (e.g., public-key-based certificates) and vice versa, which
allows for identifying hosts (e.g., insiders and outsiders) or certain roles (e.g.,
coordinator, server, client). To protect bootstrapping, the anchor of a hash
chain is signed with signatures based on asymmetric cryptography, such as
RSA, DSA, or ECDSA. Because of the high resource requirements of asym-
metric cryptography, ALPHA explicitly limits its use to this bootstrapping
process. For strong hop-by-hop authentication towards relays, the public-key
signature of the sender needs to be verified by each relay for bootstrapping
and re-validated each time the set of relays changes. Due to the CPU re-
quirements and energy consumption caused by such cryptographic operations,
such a strong hop-by-hop authentication can be assumed to be prohibitively
resource intensive for MANETs with their frequently changing routes. How-
ever, it may be feasible for WSNs and WMNs in which routes fluctuate only
occasionally.
A particular challenge is the protection against replay attacks that target the
public key operations for each relay. Replay protection is important when
delayed secret disclosure based signatures are used because hash chain elements
are exposed over time and could be re-used for other signatures. We describe
this threat in more detail in Section 5.8.3.1.
During the bootstrapping phase, end-hosts exchange at least two pairs of hash chain
anchors for an ALPHA association. However, it is possible that two end-hosts use
a number of ALPHA associations at the same time to increase the throughput and
decrease the latency of packet exchanges between the hosts. To this end, hosts can
exchange several pairs of anchors during the handshake. This leads to the boot-
strapping of multiple parallel associations. In Chapter 5.7, we describe a static and
protected ALPHA bootstrapping protocol for IP networks: ALPHA for IP. ALPHA
for IP implements a public-key based handshake and supports multiple parallel AL-
PHA associations. Moreover, we used a variant of ALPHA as a lightweight authen-
tication solution for HIP (lightweight HIP). In this regard, HIP-MA also provides a
public-key authenticated ALPHA bootstrapping mechanism. We discuss the use of
HIP and ALPHA in Section 5.9.2.1.
5.6.1 Hash Chain Renewal
Hash chains are finite sequences. This means that a host will run out of hash chain
elements after using all hash chain elements. In this case, a new hash chain anchor
must be transmitted to the peer. This hash chain anchor must be protected to
avoid identity theft during the lifetime of an ALPHA association. We discuss three
different options for renewing the hash chain anchors of depleted hash chains: a)
updates using the ALPHA bootstrapping and control protocol, b) updates using the
authenticated channel that ALPHA defines, and c) updates that use an additional
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hash chain update channel embedded into ALPHA. Option c) also allows middle-
boxes to renew their hash chains if these devices apply path binding measures (see
Section 5.4.3.2).
5.6.1.1 Hash Chain Renewal via the Bootstrapping Protocol
If the bootstrapping protocol provides secure end-to-middle signaling, it can be used
to signal new anchors between end-hosts and middleboxes. For example, HIP-MA
could be used to send new anchors in a phase-two authenticated public-key signed
envelope. The possibility to adjust the set of forwarding nodes is an advantage of
using the bootstrapping protocol. An obvious disadvantage is the computation cost
that results from the use of expensive public-key operations. This high cost demands
the use of long hash chains to amortize the expensive re-distribution of anchors.
The required frequency of re-distribution, and with it public-key verification, de-
pends on the amount of data exchanged between the hosts. For example, for ALPHA
without amortization scheme, a constant stream of 100 Mbit/s with an S2 payload
of 1280 bytes and a hash chain length of 16384 elements, re-distribution is necessary
every 0.8 seconds. For ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M, this time is multiplied by the
packets per burst. Yet, public-key signature verification is required at a relatively
high frequency, even for long hash chains.
5.6.1.2 Hash Chain Renewal via the ALPHA Payload Channel
ALPHA provides an end-to-middle authenticated payload channel. Hence, it is
possible to communicate the new anchors via this channel. In contrast to using
the bootstrapping protocol, this option does not require public key operations or
additional protocol modifications. However, the hash chain re-distribution must be
reliable to avoid that a host’s hash chains deplete before new anchors are delivered
to middleboxes and end-hosts.
For ALPHA with reliable transmissions, the new anchors can simply be sent in a
special payload packet. This packet must be distinguishable from other application
payload packets, so that middleboxes can extract the anchors from it. As reliable
ALPHA transmissions are acknowledged by the verifier and block the disclosure of
new hash chain elements until the acknowledgment arrives at the signer, the re-
distribution packets can be sent just before a hash chain is depleted. Yet, a host
should announce new hash chain anchors before less than 2 · retrymax elements of
its signature chain remain. The value retrymax is the number of maximum allowed
restarts after negative acknowledgements during a hash chain signature process (see
Section 5.6.1.2). This ensures that there are always enough hash chain elements
available to complete the signature process, even if it fails for retrymax − 1 times.
It is worth noting that packet corruption resulting from transmission errors is ex-
pected to be detected by non-cryptographic packet checksums or other means with
high probability. Therefore, packets with detectable errors are unlikely to be handed
to ALPHA and will be treated as lost packets. Thus, corrupted ALPHA signatures
are very unlikely to appear outside of attacks. Hence, even in scenarios with lossy
links, retrymax can be chosen small because new hash chains are not used up for be-
nignly corrupted or lost packets. In attack scenarios, a high retrymax cannot prevent
5.6. Hash Chain Bootstrapping and Renewal 125
harmful interference because an attacker can continuously manipulate the respec-
tive packet contents. We provide more detailed discussion on attacks that target the
signature process and the related end-host and middlebox state in Section 5.8.3.2.
For ALPHA with unreliable transmissions, handling packet loss is more complicated.
Hosts must expect and handle failures of hash chain updates not only due to failed
signatures but also due to losses of S2 packets. Therefore, an acknowledgment
scheme on top of the unreliable ALPHA channel is required. In contrast to ALPHA
with reliable transmissions, retransmissions of lost S2 packets require a new three-
way signature process, which entails the use of additional hash chain elements. Since
packet loss is more likely than attacks, retrymax has to be chosen much higher than
for ALPHA with reliable transmissions. Motivated by these problems, we developed
an integrated hash chain renewal scheme for unacknowledged ALPHA, which we
present in the remainder of this section.
5.6.1.3 Integrated Hash Chain Renewal
From the signer’s perspective, ALPHA with unreliable data transmission may suffer
from undetectable loss of S2 packets. However, successful and timely delivery of
the new anchors is important to allow for uninterrupted communication between
the peers. Without integrated acknowledgments of S2 packets, other secured ac-
knowledgment and retransmission schemes would be needed, possibly requiring a
new S1, A1, S2 exchange. Hence, unacknowledged S2 packets are not suited to
transmit vital information like new anchors. For unreliable ALPHA, we designed
a hash chain re-distribution mechanism that is piggy-backed on reliably transmit-
ted S1 and A1 packets only, allowing us to renew anchors without using reliable
ALPHA transmissions or employing the bootstrapping protocol while maintaining
the characteristics of the unreliable S2 delivery. We first discuss how end-hosts can
renew their hash chains using the integrated scheme before discussing how relays
can utilize the scheme to send new anchors to the end-hosts.
In ALPHA, losses of S1 and A1 packets are always detected and the lost packets are
retransmitted to ensure end-to-end and end-to-middle authentication. Thus, similar
to basic ALPHA, we use the S1 packets to send pre-signatures of new anchors, which
are in turn acknowledged by the verifier. However, instead of sending the anchors
in the S2 data packet, we transmit the anchors in the next S1 packet because this
packet guarantees reliable delivery to end-hosts and middleboxes.
Figure 5.16 depicts the hash chain renewal process. The signer creates an additional
pre-signature for the new anchor hSsj . It uses an undisclosed hash chain element h
Ss
i−1
for creating this commitment3. After the receipt of the A1 packet, the signer sends
the new anchor hSj in clear in the next S1 packet.
The verifier and the relays can confirm the authenticity of the new hash chain anchors
by verifying that the anchors were signed with an undisclosed hash chain element and
that the temporal separation between the creation of the signature and the disclosure
of the key holds (c.f. Section 3.5.4). The temporal relation, tsign < tstore < tdisclose,
is satisfied by the piggy-backed approach because it discloses the secret for the new
3Depending on the implementation of the process, hSsi−2 can also be used as a secret for the MAC
as it is the hash chain element in the next S1 packet that carries the new anchor.
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Figure 5.16 Delivery of the new anchor hSj with ALPHA for unacknowledged S2 packets
piggy-backed on S1 packets. In this example, the signer refreshes its signature chain anchor.
Communicating a new acknowledgment anchor hVaj is handled analogously with A1 packets.
The hash chain elements with the superscript R are part of the hash chain renewal process of
the relay.
anchor at the same time or later as the basic interactive approach. Hence, the
relation is tsign < tstore < tdisclose ≤ tdisclose′ with tdisclose′ being the time at which
the secret hSsi−1 or h
Ss
i−2 is disclosed.
Renewals of anchors of the acknowledgment chains are piggy-backed on A1 packets.
As for S1 packets, losses of A1 packets are detected by the sender (the verifier) and
retransmissions do not require the use of fresh hash chain elements. The temporal
separation that is necessary for time-delayed secret disclosure signatures is given for
A1 packets as well.
Using the integrated scheme allows end-hosts to seamlessly renew hash chains when
these are used up because no additional hash chain elements are needed before the
update is complete. This allows end-hosts to use very short hash chains of tens
of elements without notable performance penalties for using additional signaling
exchanges or public-key based signatures.
Another advantage of piggy-backing new hash chain anchors on S1 packets is that
these do not delay the delivery of data packets neither do they affect the payload of
the S2 packet. Thus, the payload channel is fully usable by applications during the
update and is not affected by the hash chain renewal process.
Relays that apply path binding measures (c.f. Section 5.4.3.2) can also use this
integrated scheme to securely update their hash chains. Figure 5.16 shows such
update. Similar to the signer, relays add pre-signatures of their new anchor hRj to
S1 packets and disclose the key of the pre-signature in the subsequent S1 packet.
In analogy to the satisfied temporal relation tsign < tstore < tdisclose for hash chain
renewal by end hosts, the separation of the signature creation time and the signature
disclosure time is given if the signer executes the S1, A1 exchange properly. Hence,
the middlebox must observe the sequence of S1 and A1 packets before disclosing
the secret with which the pre-signature of the new anchor was created. As for end-
hosts, the integrated hash chain renewal scheme allows middleboxes to use short
hash chains without notable performance penalties. This reduces the storage and
computation requirements for middleboxes as short hash chains can be created and
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stored with little effort. Moreover, using short hash chains reduces the possibility of
DoS attacks that target hash chain creation at middleboxes.
5.6.1.4 Using the new Hash Chain Anchors
After a host has transmitted new hash chain anchors to end-hosts and relays, they
must start to use the new hash chain. For simplicity’s sake and for performance
reasons, we abstained from designing a dedicated signaling protocol for switching
from one hash chain to another. Thus, a host does not explicitly announce that
it starts to use the new hash chain. Instead, it simply uses the first undisclosed
hash chain element of the new chain for generating an A1 or S1 packet and the
corresponding MAC. Its peer then notices that the hash chain element in the packet
is invalid when it tries to verify it with the last known hash value of the peer’s old
hash chain. In this case, the peer tries to verify the hash chain element with the
newly announced anchor of the new hash chain. The receiver of the packet continues
to use the new hash chain values if this second verification succeeds.
This implicit way of hash chain activation requires no additional signaling. Perfor-
mance wise, when switching hash chains, the receiver calculates two hashes instead
of one hash. Using this implicit method allows a host to send hash chain anchors to
its peer at any time and to activate these anytime later when it becomes necessary.
In principle, hosts can also start to use a new hash chain when creating an S2 or
A2 packet. However, in this case, the pre-signatures in the S1 and A1 packet must
already use elements from the new hash chain. This intermingles the use of the new
and the old hash chain and leads to complicated state handling at the sender and
receiver. Hence, we restrict the activation of new hash chains to S1 and A1 packets.
5.7 Implementation
In this section, we describe ALPHA for IP, our implementation of the ALPHA con-
trol protocol for IP networks: ALPHA for IP. While ALPHA limits itself to the
definition of the ALPHA payload association, ALPHA for IP represents the envi-
ronment that is necessary to set up and operate such an association. In that regard,
ALPHA for IP is concerned not only with payload processing but also addresses the
following problems:
Bootstrapping protocol: ALPHA for IP sets up and controls the necessary context
to run an ALPHA association. It sets up the state needed for verifying the
delayed secret disclosure signatures at the end-hosts and the relays.
Association management: ALPHA for IP manages the lifecycle of ALPHA associ-
ations between hosts. It implements a separate ALPHA-authenticated control
channel over which ALPHA for IP sets up new associations and renews their
hash chains before they deplete. ALPHA for IP also allows the use of multiple
parallel associations between two peers.
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System integration: ALPHA for IP logically hooks into the TCP/IP stack between
the transport and network layer and secures IP packets. Therefore, it affects
TCP/IP aspects, such as packet MTU, end-to-end delay, and throughput at
the IP layer.
5.7.1 Architecture Overview
ALPHA for IP is implemented similar to a VPN tunneling solution. It creates a
virtual interface to capture outgoing IP packets before they are sent to the net-
work. ALPHA for IP adds its own end-to-middle authentication data to each packet
and sends it to the destination host. Hence, ALPHA establishes an end-to-middle
integrity-protected tunnel between two authenticated peers.
For packets that are addressed to a host with which ALPHA for IP has not estab-
lished a security association with, it performs a public-key authenticated handshake
and signals new anchors to the end-hosts and middleboxes. Similar to IKE and
IPsec, ALPHA for IP first establishes a single ALPHA-protected control associa-
tion with the destination host. This control association is then used to signal new
anchors for a number of basic ALPHA (ALPHA-N for normal mode), ALPHA-C,
and ALPHA-M associations. This lightweight-authenticated end-to-middle signaling
channel allows to dynamically open and close payload associations during run-time
without the need to employ costly public-key signatures.
ALPHA for IP allows for using several ALPHA payload channels in parallel. This is a
measure to increase performance in cases where network latency but not computation
resources are the limiting factor for the throughput of ALPHA. For this parallel use
of associations, ALPHA for IP runs the ALPHA state machine in parallel for multiple
associations. At any point in time none, one, or several ALPHA associations may
be ready to send an S1 packet. ALPHA for IP manages the distribution of payload
packets to different associations and buffers the packets if no association is ready to
handle the packets.
5.7.2 Implementation Details
We implemented ALPHA for IP as a user space component for Linux based systems.
All libraries and protocol implementations are written in C. The ALPHA for IP
implementation consists of three software components: a) the end-host protocol
daemon, b) the ALPHA for IP relay daemon, and c) common libraries that are used
by both daemons. We briefly discuss all three components in this section.
5.7.2.1 End-host Daemon
The ALPHA for IP end host daemon runs as a user space process and sets up a
virtual network device from which it captures regular IP packets. In contrast to
HIP, ALPHA for IP does not introduce new namespaces but derives the public keys
of an IP host from a configuration file. Hence, existing applications can use ALPHA
by simply using the IP addresses of the hosts. This allows any TCP/IP application,
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Figure 5.17 Overview of the ALPHA for IP communication stack components. The direction
of the data packets is from Alice to Bob via Ron.
such as web browsers, voice and video streaming, etc., to use ALPHA for IP without
application-specific changes or DNS address mangling. Applications simply use the
regular socket interface with any transport layer protocol to access the services of
ALPHA for IP.
As shown in Figure 5.17, application data from Alice is handed down to the transport
layer and network layer. At this point, a static route sends all outgoing IP traffic
to the virtual network interface alpha0. The ALPHA for IP user space daemon
reads the packet from the queue of the virtual interface, determines the destination
host and enqueues the packet in a destination-host specific queue. The payload
packets are encapsulated into a tunnel frame, similar to the IPsec tunnel mode (see
Section 3.5.2.2). Figure 5.18 shows the additional packet headers used in ALPHA
for IP. In contrast to the IPsec tunnel mode, ALPHA for IP uses an additional UDP
encapsulation between the outer IP header and the ALPHA header. This additional
UDP header provides a major advantage in multi-hop scenarios: legacy middleboxes
that do not support ALPHA for IP (e.g., a simple NATs) can use the UDP header
for regular packet processing. Without this header, the legacy middlebox would be
confronted with the ALPHA for IP header that contains no sensible information
for packet processing without ALPHA for IP support. Thus, the additional UDP
header supports incremental deployment of ALPHA for IP.
If the ALPHA for IP protocol daemon on the sender encounters a payload packet
for which no ALPHA association exists, it queues this first packet and triggers the
bootstrapping process. Like all other ALPHA packets, the bootstrapping packets
are sent via UDP.
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Figure 5.18 Encapsulation of ALPHA for IP payload and control packets.
In the course of the public-key based bootstrapping process, the peers Alice and Bob,
as well as the relay Ron establish two unidirectional (from Alice to Bob and reverse)
ALPHA control channels. The bootstrapping protocol uses DSA as the signature
scheme and its keys are compatible with OpenSSL. Hence, using the same key for
https end-to-end and ALPHA end-to-middle security is possible. The bootstrapping
protocol also implements a challenge/response mechanism to shelter against replay
attacks. The bootstrapping protocol exchanges a public-key-signed set of anchors for
the ALPHA control association between Ron and Alice. Once the ALPHA control
association is established, the CPU-intensive bootstrapping protocol is not used
anymore.
Alice and Bob use the ALPHA control channel to set up one or more parallel data
associations for delivering payload from the transport layer. A simplified packet
layout for control packets is shown in Figure 5.18. When Alice’s transport layer
sends data, the data is first enqueued in a destination-specific queue. Once an AL-
PHA association is ready to send the data (i.e., it has sent all previous S2 packets),
the data is handed to that association, which, in turn, sends an S1 for all data
packets it just received. Each association has a buffer for storing the data packets
until the A1 acknowledgment arrives. Once the A1 acknowledgement arrives, Alice
sends all data packets from the buffer, enclosed in S2 UDP packets. These packets
are sent using a second routing table to avoid circular routing because of the first
routing rule that directs all packets to the ALPHA for IP daemon.
When receiving the S2 packets, Bob’s ALPHA for IP instance distributes the S2
packets to the respective ALPHA association for Alice. After verifying the authen-
ticity of the packets, these are decapsulated and delivered to the IP layer over the
virtual interface. From here on, the packets are processed normally within the sys-
tem’s IP stack and are eventually handed over to the application.
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5.7.2.2 Relay Daemon
The ALPHA for IP relay daemon runs on the relays and observes the ALPHA for
IP bootstrapping process and the ALPHA signature processes. It integrates into
the netfilter/IPQ framework [The11a] and captures forwarded traffic. Although
netfilter implements its own queue mechanism for incoming packets, we found this
queue to produce lags and performance problems if many packets are queued (e.g.,
in congestion situations). Hence, the ALPHA relay software implements its own
queue and takes packets from the IPQ queue as quickly as possible.
Implementing our own queuing mechanism also allows the relay to selectively drop
packets in congestion situations. An important rule is to never drop S1 or A1 packets
but only S2 packets. The reason for this rule is that S1 packets may represent a
whole burst of associated S2 packets. Therefore, dropping S1 or A1 packets blocks
the delivery of all associated S2 packets until Alice discovers the loss and retransmits
the S1 packet. For the transport layer, the loss of the S1 packet is not visible because
of the internal retransmission within ALPHA. The only effect that the transport
layer experiences is an increased delay. Thus, transport-layer congestion control
mechanisms that operate on packet loss (e.g., TCP congestion avoidance [Ste97] or
DCCP CCID2 and CCID3 [KHF06, FK06, FKP06]) cannot determine packet loss
that is related to their data packets. As a consequence, these protocols may not
lower their transmission rate although this measure is required to reduce the load on
the middlebox. Thus, the ALPHA relay only drops S2 packets in cases of overload
because these drops are atomic (only the dropped packet is affected) and are visible
to transport and application layer protocols. From the global queue of the relay,
packets are dispatched to the respective sub-protocols (i.e., ALPHA-N, C, and M).
In contrast to ALPHA end-hosts, the relay software implements the reduced ALPHA
payload and bootstrapping protocols that are limited to verification of forwarded
bootstrapping and payload traffic (the relay state machine in Section 5.4.2.3)
During the ALPHA for IP bootstrapping phase, the relay learns the hash chain
anchors of the control channel between the peers. From this control channel, it
extracts information on further payload channels and sets up the association specific
state for each channel. The relay observes the ALPHA signature process of one
or several ALPHA associations between Alice and Bob and drops unauthenticated
packets. Finally, it observes hash chain renewal processes and replaces old end-host
anchors whenever needed.
5.7.2.3 Avoiding Packet Fragmentation
Packet fragmentation must be avoided by the end-hosts because the IPQ module at
the relay does not reassemble the fragments. This leads to two resulting problems:
a) unverifiable authentication data and b) missing authentication data. Figure 5.19
illustrates both fragmentation problems. The first problem is caused by the fact
that the ALPHA for IP implementation of the end-hosts compute the HMAC for the
authentication data based on the full payload of the unfragmented packet. However,
for the first fragment, only part of the payload is contained in each fragment, which
leads to a mismatch of the authentication data. The second problem results from
the fact that subsequent fragments contain no UDP or ALPHA header, and thus,
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Figure 5.19 Fragmented ALPHA packets do not contain the required authentication infor-
mation for Ron to successfully authenticate them.
can neither be captured by the UDP filter in the IPQ module, nor can these packets
be authenticated for the lack of the ALPHA header. As a result, the relays cannot
authenticate any of the fragments and are forced to either re-assemble or drop the
fragments. ALPHA for IP prevents IP fragmentation at the end-hosts by adjusting
the MTU of the virtual interfaces to aid the application in providing sufficiently
small transport-layer payload.
5.7.2.4 Common Libraries
The ALPHA for IP end-host and relay daemons use a set of common libraries to
access functions required by both. We omit a description of the general helper
libraries here but focus on the cryptographic libraries required for ALPHA.
We implemented a hash chain library in C that allows to handle all hash-chain
related functionality. It provides capabilities for pre-creating hash chains of different
lengths at times of low CPU use and allows for simple verification of hash chain
elements. The library uses the cryptographic hashes provided by the OpenSSL
software libraries [The11b].
In addition, we implemented a Merkle Tree library that allows for the efficient con-
struction of trees and fast verification of leaf nodes. The library also allows for the
inclusion of additional information in the tree leaves, tree nodes, and the tree root.
This capability is necessary to implement features as pre-signatures. The design of
the tree and the hash chain library focuses on the efficient use of CPU resources. For
example, the memory layout of the tree and the hash chains were chosen such that
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(a) Single association.
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(b) Two associations.
Figure 5.20 Comparison between ALPHA for IP with a single ALPHA association and two
associations.
a single consecutive block of memory is allocated once and then traversed linearly
to avoid repeated memory allocation for leaves and nodes.
5.7.3 Use of Parallel Associations in ALPHA for IP
As already mentioned, ALPHA for IP can operate several ALPHA associations be-
tween two peers in parallel. Using several associations provides benefits if the band-
width of a single association is too low or if the network delay is too high. During
the path reservation phase in ALPHA (S1, A1), the peers transmit the commitment
and acknowledgement. This process is operated in lock-step to ensure the temporal
separation between commitment and disclosure. This means that for the duration
of a path reservation, the signer cannot send data packets that arrive after it sent
the S1. Figure 5.20a illustrates the problem. During the time span between the
two S1 packets, further packets from Alice’s transport layer are buffered and cannot
be sent until the peers complete a new S1/A1 exchange. This behavior leads to an
additional delay of one RTT if the association is not ready when the new packet
arrives from the transport layer. If Alice already queued other data packets, the
delay may even increase by several RTTs if the capacity of the ALPHA association
(the number of S2 packets per S1) is too low to deliver all buffered packets of one
S2 burst.
Using several associations in parallel reduces the waiting time for an association to
become ready and can increase the overall throughput. Figure 5.20b illustrates the
situation for two associations. Interleaving the two distinct ALPHA associations
reduces the waiting time and doubles the number of S2 packets that Alice can send.
However, increasing the throughput by using several associations is not possible if
the throughput limitation is caused by insufficient CPU resources for packet handling
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(b) Sixteen associations.
Figure 5.21 Trace of a TCP stream over ALPHA-M using one and sixteen associations.
Parallel associations show less extreme phases of bursts and idleness.
and performing hash computations. On the contrary, for ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M,
higher numbers of associations may lead to slightly decreased throughput if these
associations still have S2 capacity left. Since the same amount of S2 packets can
be delivered with fewer associations, the higher effort for the commitment phase
(more S1 and A1 packets) reduces the throughput for more parallel associations for
CPU-constrained devices.
A second effect of using multiple parallel associations is that it reduces the extremely
bursty traffic patterns of ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M. By interleaving several asso-
ciations, the distinction between inactive phases, in which the peers wait for the
commitment phase to finish, and active phases, in which the hosts send out all S2
packets rapidly, are blurred. Figure 5.21 shows a trace of a TCP connection over
ALPHA-M between two PCs4 for an RTT of 30 ms. The trace for one association
shows phases during which no data is transmitted. During these phases, the peers
wait for the commitments and acknowledgments to be delivered by the network.
Hence, during these idle phases, the peers and middleboxes cannot fully utilize their
CPU. At the same time, middleboxes and the verifier may not be able to process
all packets during the subsequent load peaks. With 16 associations, idle phases
are not visible any more and the general packet throughput is greatly increased.
However, overlapping peaks of different associations lead to high overall peaks. We
provide a more detailed throughput evaluation of ALPHA with parallel associations
in Section 5.9.3.
5.8 Analysis of ALPHA
ALPHA provides middleboxes with the capability to authenticate forwarded traffic
and enables these devices to prevent flooding and packet forgery. However, at the
same time, ALPHA introduces a complexity to the networking stack that cannot
be neglected. Therefore, we discuss the practical implications of using ALPHA by
highlighting its benefits and limitations in this section. Moreover we discuss possible
4We used the same hardware as in the evaluation of ALPHA for IP in Section 5.9.3.
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attack scenarios and outline the feasibility and severity of the attacks to show the
practical security benefits and limitations of ALPHA.
5.8.1 ALPHA Strengths
ALPHA offers adaptive end-to-end as well as hop-by hop integrity protection. Hence,
it can replace traditional shared-secret-based end-to-end integrity protection mech-
anisms, which relays cannot verify. Furthermore, relays can filter forged data and
securely extract authentic information from the S2 packets, enabling them to react
to the content of protected control messages. Therefore, ALPHA can also be used
as a building block for secure signaling between end-hosts and relays.
ALPHA helps to mitigate flooding attacks since receivers can explicitly state whether
or not they are willing to receive data from a sender by providing or denying an A1
packet. When the first relay on the communication path enforces this decision,
unsolicited data cannot propagate far beyond its source in the network. The only
data forwarded unconditionally are S1 packets, which are typically small. Although
ALPHA cannot directly prevent flooding of S1 packets, hosts that send large amounts
of S1 packets without receiving A1 responses can easily be identified and isolated
from the network. As ALPHA-C permits signers to fill S1 packets to their maximum
size with pre-signatures, large S1 packets can also be used to waste network resources.
Hence, relays should initially limit and later increase the maximum size of S1 packets
per signer to combat floods of large unsolicited S1 packets.
For incremental deployment, end hosts using ALPHA do not require all or any relays
to use it, too. Furthermore, even isolated ALPHA-enabled relays can perform per-
packet authentication in the network. This eases the deployment in networks with
long-lived hardware because ALPHA-capable devices can be added incrementally.
The ALPHA protocol does not require relays to depend on each other (e.g., for shar-
ing symmetric keys, synchronizing clocks, etc.). Therefore, it does not introduce new
vulnerabilities from malicious relays because it does not rely on the distinction be-
tween outsiders and insiders. This makes ALPHA particularly suited for cooperative
scenarios with dynamic memberships in which no pre-shared secrets or distinct roles
can be assumed.
ALPHA can secure communication between arbitrary nodes in WSN and is not
restricted to communication towards a fixed sink or base station. Thus, it can
protect WSN applications that require end-to-end and on-path integrity-protection
for any pair of nodes.
5.8.2 ALPHA Limitations
Compared to traditional symmetric and asymmetric signatures, ALPHA signatures
exhibit a larger delay in communication due to the additional RTT for delivering the
S1 and A1 packet. Thus, their applicability depends on the end-to-end latency of the
network and the maximum acceptable delay at the application layer. For scenarios
in which the maximum acceptable latency is below 1.5 RTTs, ALPHA signatures
are not applicable.
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ALPHA depends on the stability of the routing path for a minimum of 2 RTTs
plus the time for an optional handshake protocol for bootstrapping. With this
stability, the minimum amount of packets necessary to transfer payload (S1&S2 and
A1&A2) can traverse the same path. In ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M, the necessary
period of stability extends to all packets belonging to the same burst. In particular,
the number of parallel transmissions and the size of the Merkle Tree should be
adapted to the network dynamics for best performance. Additional latency for
payload transmission can be introduced by packet loss. Especially S1 and A1 packets
require robust and fast retransmission. However, in scenarios with frequent route
changes, re-bootstrapping and the detection of a changed set of forwarding nodes
can be prohibitively expensive for using ALPHA. In some scenarios, a stable subset
of on-path nodes exists (e.g., gateways or nodes close to a sender or receiver). In
such cases, ALPHA verification can be limited to this stable subset to avoid frequent
re-bootstrapping in dynamic networks.
5.8.3 Attack Scenarios
While ALPHA aims at increasing the security in networks by providing end-to-
middle authentication, it also introduces new functionality to the network that, in
turn, can be the target of attacks. In this section we discuss possible attacks, their
severity, and how ALPHA mitigates these attacks. By their goals, we classify the
attacks into two groups: a) Identity spoofing attacks, which aim at undermining the
end-to-middle authentication function of ALPHA and b) Denial of Service attacks
that aim at preventing the forwarding of network traffic between legitimate hosts.
For the discussion of the attacks, we use the threat model introduced in Section 3.2.1.
5.8.3.1 Identity Spoofing Attacks
The goal of an identity spoofing attack is to impersonate another host in order to
lead a relay to the conclusion that a forged packet is authentic. If such attacks
were feasible they would undermine the goal of ALPHA to provide end-to-middle
authentication. In this section we highlight two possible identity spoofing attacks:
replayed bootstrapping handshakes and bypass attacks.
Replayed authentication handshakes
As already discussed in Section 5.6, end-to-middle replay protection is essential for
a bootstrapping protocol because of the eventual disclosure of all secret hash chain
elements in the course of the ALPHA authentication. To highlight the threat of
neglected end-to-middle replay protection, we present an attack that allows full im-
personation of a public-key authenticated host towards a relay if no replay protection
is provided.
Assume that an attacker Eve eavesdropped on an authentic ALPHA bootstrap-
ping handshake, performed as a public-key authenticated handshake without end-to-
middle replay protection (e.g., HIP without HIP-MA). In the bootstrapping phase,
Alice and Bob announce a set of hash chain anchors to the set of relays {R} on
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the path. After completing this insecure handshake the peers start communicating.
Further assume that during the normal ALPHA communication process, Alice and
Bob reveal at least two of the hash chain elements from Alice’s signature chain (hAsi
and hAsi−1) and the respective element of Bob’s acknowledgment chain h
Ba
i for signing
a message m.
Eve, who has recorded the whole exchange between Alice and Bob, can now replay
the bootstrapping exchange to a different set of relays {R’} with the help of an
accomplice. The attackers cannot change any information contained in the public-
key signed handshake packets. However, the relays of {R’} assume that the hash
chains of Alice and Bob are fresh and unused. The two attackers can later generate
a valid signature for any forged message m′ from the disclosed hash chain elements
(hAsi and h
As
i−1) that the relays {R’} attribute to Alice and Bob.
The use of dedicated middlebox-generated nonces as in HIP-MA or the use of the
path binding mechanism, discussed in Section 5.4.3.2, prevents this attack because
the attackers cannot replay the handshake successfully.
Bypass attack
The bypass attack described in Section 5.4.3.1 allows two collaborating man-in-the-
middle attackers to forge seemingly authentic packets. As we already discussed this
attack before and provided efficient countermeasures, we merely mention it here for
the sake of completeness.
5.8.3.2 Denial of Service Attacks
The goal of a DoS attack is to corrupt the state or to waste resources of the victim
end-host or relays to a degree that prevents the victim device from performing the
protocol, thereby denying service to legitimate hosts. To this end, an attacker can
either try to manipulate the protocol in a way that prevents continued operation or
it can try to tie up the resources of a victim by flooding resource consuming packets.
In the following, we discuss four different attacks, following these two patterns. If
DoS attacks on ALPHA were possible, it would introduce additional threats for
relays and end-hosts.
State corruption attacks
Malicious hosts may aim at corrupting the signature state (i.e., the buffered pre-
signatures or hash chain elements) of the relays and the verifier. A successful signa-
ture corruption attack results in valid S2 packets that yield an invalid signature and
are dropped by the relays or the verifier. While the attacker continues the attack,
forwarding or delivery of packets to higher layers fails. For the end-hosts, the results
of this attack are equal to a broken connection because of lost or blocked packets.
Figure 5.22 shows an example of a successful state corruption attack. Eve (e) man-
ages to replace the forwarding state that Alice established at Ron with useless data
(“junk”). For Alice’s S2 data packet (step 3 and 4), the signature verification fails
because Ron compares the authentic data to the forged state. A successful state
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corruption attack allows the off-path attacker Eve to disrupt the communication
between Alice and Bob, a capability that she typically does not have.
Relays and end-hosts cannot determine the authenticity of a pre-signature when they
buffer it. Therefore, an attacker can attempt to undermine the signature verification
by maliciously altering the pre-signatures. For the discussion of this attack, we
distinguish between Eve as an eavesdropper and Mallory as a man-in-the middle
attacker.
Eve cannot block packets in flight from being delivered. Moreover, she cannot guess
undisclosed hash chain elements. Therefore, she is never in possession of a fresh5
hash chain element. She can only replay packets with old hash chain elements. The
end hosts (the signer for storing pre-acknowledgments, and the verifier for storing
pre-signatures) do not store commitments delivered in packets with old hash chain
elements although the verifier acknowledges the receipt of S1 packets with a retrans-
mission of the already transmitted A1 packet. Hence, Eve cannot trick Ron or Bob
into buffering forged commitments.
The situation is different for Mallory. She can change the commitments in the
S1 and A1 packets. While she cannot generate a valid signature because of the
delayed secret disclosure technique, she can present broken pre-signatures and pre-
acknowledgments to Alice, Ron, and Bob. These broken commitments cause subse-
quent verification attempts to fail, which results in a loss of the packet. Simply put,
Mallory can cause packets that it forwarded to be dropped by other hosts. Although
we acknowledge that this attack is a valid attack, we argue that defense mechanisms
against it are not required because Mallory can achieve the same effect (i.e., the loss
of S2 packets) by simpler means. Finally, dropping packets is one of the elementary
capabilities of Mallory and cannot be prevented.
Besides corrupting pre-signatures, attackers can aim at provoking wrong state tran-
sitions at the relay and verifier to corrupt subsequent packet handling because of
out-of sync state machines between Alice, Ron, and Bob. ALPHA uses the disclosure
of fresh hash chain elements to protect its signature state machine. End-hosts only
change their state based on a packet with a fresh hash chain element. The receipt
of a packet with a fresh hash chain element can be interpreted as strong evidence
that the end-host has performed a state transition in the state machine. Based on
5For the definitions of fresh, old, and invalid see Section 5.4.2.
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Figure 5.22 Eve performs a successful state corruption attack against Alice by corrupting
the signature state at Ron.
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this evidence, relays and the peer can securely change their state. Thus, the design
of our state machine prevents unjustified state transitions.
State space exhaustion attacks
Attackers can attempt to tie up the memory resources of a victim relay or end-host
by invoking memory-consuming processes. In the context of ALPHA, we distinguish
two attack cases: First, an attacker can try to create a sufficiently large amount of
state by using one or multiple ALPHA associations. This means, the host aims
at using all available state memory at a middlebox with a single identity (e.g., an
identity authenticated via the bootstrapping protocol). Second, an attacker can try
to perform a sibyl attack in which it emulates a large number of identities to establish
a high number of ALPHA channels for multiple identities. Figure 5.23 illustrates
both cases.
In the first case, a single identity would try to use all middlebox state. However, even
for middleboxes with limited memory, this attacker would have to send a massive
amount of S1 packets to achieve this goal. We illustrate the attack with a simplified
example. Assume the middlebox can use 5 MB of memory for state information,
the hash function creates 20-byte digests, and the packet size available to ALPHA
payload and ALPHA pre-signatures is 1000 bytes. Hence, approximately 260000
pre-signatures, equaling 250 MB of unsent payload data, must be buffered by the
middlebox. Assuming a worst case RTT of 500 ms, the attacker would have to
reserve a bandwidth of 4 Gbit/s6. Moreover, the attacker would have to set up
more than 5200 parallel ALPHA-C associations to establish the state for 260000
pre-signatures. Such high bandwidth reservations can easily be countered by the
middlebox by limiting the pre-signature buffer size per-host.
In the second case, an attacker emulates a multitude of identities to avoid per-host
limitations. Limiting a host to fewer parallel associations (e.g., 20) forces the attacker
to create forged identities in a sybil attack in order to exhaust the memory of the
relay. Using the numbers of the previous example and a limitation to 20 parallel
65 MB/20 B = 262144 pre-signatures (i.e., packets), 262144 packets · 1000 B = 250 MB, 250MB · 8
bit/byte = 2 Gbit, storage duration: 500 ms, 4 GBit/s reserved traffic.
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(b) Sibyl attack
Figure 5.23 Two different variants of a flooding-based memory exhaustion attacks.
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associations, the attacker would have to send S1 packets for 260 distinct ALPHA-
C associations to use up the relay’s memory. Hence, an attacker would have to
set up a massive amount of forged identities to exhaust the state. If the connection
establishment for new identities is associated with a cost for the signer and the verifier
(e.g., for computing PK signatures or for solving middlebox-generated puzzles like
in HIP-MA), the attacker must possess considerable computation capabilities to set
up the required amount of associations. In addition, setting up such an amount of
connections can easily be observed and prevented by a relay.
Finally, as middleboxes can remove pending pre-signatures after a short time span
(one worst-case RTT), state exhaustion is unlikely but for extremely resource con-
strained relays. For comparison, the wireless routers used in our evaluation feature a
total amount of 256 MB random access memory of which, depending on the employed
operating system, a considerable amount is available for buffering pre-signatures.
CPU exhaustion attacks
An attacker could try to consume the CPU resources of an end-host or relay by
sending forged packets or by replaying authentic packets to provoke unnecessary
CPU-intensive computations. There are two possible targets for this attack: a)
the ALPHA bootstrapping protocol, and b) the ALPHA payload protocol. In this
discussion we focus on the ALPHA payload protocol since we already discussed
CPU-targeted state exhaustion attacks against signaling protocols in the context of
HIP-MA in Chapter 4.4.3.
The ALPHA payload channel only relies on hash functions and their iterated appli-
cation. For basic ALPHA and ALPHA-C, processing of a packet only requires one
hash function for verifying the hash chain element in the packet and one MAC com-
putation (i.e., two hash function applications for HMAC). Hence, no CPU intensive
per-packet operations are caused by these modes. For ALPHA-M, the verification
of the Merkle Tree nodes triggers several hash computations before the authenticity
of a packet, or the lack thereof, can be asserted. The maximum number of hash
computations depends on the maximum tree depth that the ALPHA implementa-
tions allow. For ALPHA for IP, even for throughputs above 200 Mbit/s, we did not
encounter bursts with more than 200 packets. Hence, in this scenario, we could limit
the tree depth to 8 without reducing end-to-end or end-to-middle performance.
The tree depth is typically communicated to Ron and Bob in the S1 packet with a
fresh hash chain element. Repeatedly forcing verification of deep trees requires fresh
hash chain elements of authenticated hosts. Therefore, S2 flooding can be detected
and prevented on a per-host basis. The considerations for preventing sybil attacks
in the discussion on state space exhaustion attacks also apply here.
5.9 Evaluation
The multi-hop networks for which ALPHA signatures are intended are MANETs,
WMNs, and WSNs, where CPU and memory resources are typically scarce. This
section first discusses general performance characteristics of ALPHA before examin-
ing the performance and applicability of our approach with a focus on each of those
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ALPHA-N ALPHA-C ALPHA-M
Signer Verifier Relay Signer Verifier Relay Signer Verifier Relay
Signature 1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗ 1∗ + 2− 1
n
1∗ + log2(n) 1∗ + log2(n)
HC create 2+ 2+ 0 2
n
+ 2
n
+
0 2
n
+ 2
n
+
0
HC verify 1 1 1 1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
Ack / Nack 1 2 1 1 2 1 2+ log2(n) 4+ − 1n 2+ log2(n)
Table 5.3 Hash computations for processing one message. Additional hash computations for
optional path binding measures are not taken into account and amount to one additional hash
function computation per on-path relay at the verifier and one hash function calculation at
each relay. (+):off-line hash computation, (∗): hash of variable size for MAC. ALPHA-C and
ALPHA-M send n messages per signature.
Signer Verifier Relay
ALPHA-N n(m+ h) n · h n · h
ALPHA-C n(m+ h) n · h n · h
ALPHA-M n ·m+ (2n− 1)h h h
Table 5.4 Memory requirements for a burst of n packets (ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M) and n
subsequent transmissions in basic ALPHA. (message size: m, hash size: h)
three application areas. Finally, we provide an evaluation of our Linux based AL-
PHA implementation, ALPHA for IP. The evaluation of this specific implementation
supports the high-level observations made in the first two parts of this evaluation.
5.9.1 Scenario-independent Evaluation
Before discussing the applicability of ALPHA for specific scenarios and use cases, we
summarize the properties of the different ALPHA modes in regard to computation
cost and memory consumption.
Table 5.3 summarizes the computational costs of the three ALPHA modes: ALPHA-
N (basic ALPHA), ALPHA-C, and ALPHA-M. Asterisks (∗) indicate MAC compu-
tations for protecting the (variable) sizes of payload packets. All other hash opera-
tions are performed on fixed-length input data of the size of one or two hash outputs.
Entries marked with a cross (+) are not directly tied to packet handling and can
be computed off-line (e.g., in phases of low CPU load) to reduce response times
and level CPU load peaks. The table shows that the per-packet computation cost
of all ALPHA modes is limited to few hash computations. As we will show later,
this allows for efficient packet processing even for devices with low computation
capabilities.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 compare the buffering-related memory requirements of ALPHA-
N, ALPHA-C, and ALPHA-M. The tables show that only little data needs to be
stored on relaying nodes, making resource exhaustion attacks on the path nodes
more difficult.
Comparing tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 shows that cumulative transmissions and signed
Merkle Trees permit a dynamically tunable tradeoff between memory and CPU
requirements, latency, and throughput. Cumulative transmissions keep the com-
putational cost of verifying the authenticity of a packet constant while increasing
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Signer Verifier Relay
ALPHA-N 2n · h 2n · h 2n · h
ALPHA-C 2n · h 2n · h 2n · h
ALPHA-M h n · s+ (4n− 1)h h
Table 5.5 Additional memory requirements for an acknowledged burst of n packets (ALPHA-C
and ALPHA-M) and n acknowledged transmissions in basic ALPHA for a hash size of h.
the buffer requirements on forwarding nodes. In contrast, ALPHA signatures in
combination with Merkle Trees keep the buffer requirements fixed while increasing
the verification cost logarithmically. The three options of using interactive hash-
chain based signatures in ALPHA (single transmission, cumulative transmission,
and Merkle Trees) enable fine-grained adaptation to bandwidth and latency require-
ments and also buffer and computation capabilities. With this flexibility, ALPHA
signatures can adapt to both infrequent low-volume signaling traffic and high-volume
data transfers, including changes of a data flow between different traffic patterns.
The evaluation of our ALPHA implementation for IP in Section 5.9.3 supports the
claim that ALPHA can process broadband flows and shows that ALPHA can achieve
end-to-middle authenticated throughput in the order of tens and hundreds of MBit/s
without special hardware acceleration. Thus, forged and modified packets can be
detected early and flooding-based DoS attacks can be mitigated effectively.
5.9.2 Scenario-specific Evaluation
In the following, we evaluate the feasibility of ALPHA and its variants for three
different application scenarios and platforms. Firstly, we evaluate the performance
for signaling traffic on lightweight mobile devices and workstations. Secondly, we
consider the use of ALPHA in less resource-constrained wireless multi-hop scenarios,
such as WMNs that require high throughput for payload traffic. Finally, we evaluate
the use of ALPHA in a sensor network scenario with tightly resource-constrained
sensor nodes with a characteristically small packet payload.
The scenario-specific evaluation aims at showing the feasibility of using ALPHA in
specific scenarios. To this end, we compare actual measurements and benchmark
results with well-known network and device properties to estimate the performance
of ALPHA under different circumstances.
5.9.2.1 Performance on Lightweight Mobile Devices
We implemented the basic ALPHA-N signature scheme as a lightweight integrity
protection scheme for securely signaling association-relevant information to end-
hosts and middleboxes. We integrated ALPHA as a lightweight security layer
for signaling traffic into the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [MNJH08] to show the
feasibility of extending existing protocols with ALPHA. We provided a detailed
description and analysis of the resulting protocol, Lightweight HIP, in previous
work [Hee06, Hee08, Hee09]. In this context, we measured the performance of AL-
PHA signatures in Lightweight HIP for a Nokia 770 Internet Tablet, a low-scale
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Nokia 770 Xeon 3.2 GHz
Send S1 0.33 ms 0.03 ms
Process S1, send A1 1.47 ms 0.05 ms
Process A1, send S2 1.52 ms 0.05 ms
Verify S2, send A2 1.60 ms 0.05 ms
Process A2 0.49 ms 0.05 ms
Sender(total) 2.34 ms 0.13 ms
Receiver (total) 3.07 ms 0.10 ms
SHA-1 hash 0.02 ms 0.01 ms
RSA 1024 sign 181.32 ms 9.09 ms
RSA 1024 verify 10.53 ms 0.15 ms
DSA 1024 sign 96.71 ms 1.34 ms
DSA 1024 verify 118.73 ms 1.61 ms
Table 5.6 ALPHA processing delay as the mean of 300 acknowledged ALPHA-N signatures
in Lightweight HIP. The RSA and DSA results are given for comparison.
mobile device with a 220 MHz ARM-926 CPU 7, and a server with an Intel Xeon
3.2 GHz CPU. Table 5.6 lists the performance of the ALPHA signature steps as the
mean results of 300 signatures.
The values include the time for packet creation and packet handling (e.g., context
switches for user-space processing, de-multiplexing, packet parsing, extraction of
packet parameters, etc.), and thus, reflect the actual performance of ALPHA-enabled
HIP on the evaluated systems. For comparison, we also provide the results for RSA
and DSA signatures, as used by HIP, although we cannot stress enough that the
security properties of ALPHA are not directly comparable to the security properties
of public-key signatures. We also provide the computation time for a single SHA-1
hash function to show the influence of the hash computation on the total processing
time.
The measurements show that the overall overhead for processing the ALPHA sig-
nature is 2.34 ms if the N770 acts as a sender and 3.07 ms if it acts as a verifier.
Compared to RSA and DSA, ALPHA signatures can significantly reduce the com-
putational cost of signaling for HIP.
AR2315 Broadcom 5365 Geode LX
20-byte digest 0.059 ms 0.046 ms 0.011 ms
1024-byte digest 0.360 ms 0.361 ms 0.062 ms
Table 5.7 SHA-1 delay on wireless routers
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5.9.2.2 Performance Estimation for WMNs
Besides the latency and computational cost on end-hosts, the computational power
of the relays is of particular importance because it limits the verifiable throughput in
multi-hop scenarios and introduces additional end-to-end latency. In this section, we
evaluate the feasibility of applying ALPHA in a WMN scenario and show the impact
of the cryptographic operations on wireless mesh routers. The performance estimates
in this section base on two pieces of commodity hardware and one custom-built mesh
router: The “La Fonera” wireless router with a 180 MHz Atheros AR2315 32-bit
MIPS CPU and the Netgear WGT634U with a 200 MHz Broadcom 5365 MIPS-32
based CPU are widely used in private and unmanaged WMNs. Additionally, we
consider a customized mesh router based on an ALIX board with a 32-bit 500 MHz
AMD Geode LX800 x86 processor as a hardware platform for managed WMNs. Note
that the following approximations assume the CPU to be available exclusively for
cryptographic operations and do not reflect complete packet processing costs because
it largely depends on the specific use-case and environment. Hence, these values
present the theoretical maximum based on the CPU performance of the devices. In
Section 5.9.3 we provide a throughput analysis that also takes into account packet
processing cost and network behavior.
The measured computational cost of creating SHA-1 digests for the three devices is
given in Table 5.7. For evaluating the performance of ALPHA-C, we chose a payload
size of 1024 bytes per packet and cumulative transmissions with 20 pre-signatures
per S1 packet, which results in an upper bound for payload throughput of about
20 Mbit/s for both commodity hardware devices. The upper bound for the AMD
Geode mesh node is approximately 120 Mbit/s. In these results, the computation of
the SHA-1 MAC is responsible for 99% of the total computational cost, dwarfing the
cost of verifying the hash chain element in the S1 packet, i.e., the effective overhead
introduced by the ALPHA signatures.
Table 5.8 provides estimates for the computational overhead of ALPHA-M. The
throughput refers to the upper bound of data verifiable by the AR2315 and the
AMDGeode CPU. The increasing number of S2 packets per S1 results in an increased
number of Merkle Tree leaves, and thus, in less payload due to the larger signature
7Current smartphone processors feature CPUs in the range of 1 GHz processor speed and are likely
to provide even higher performance.
Leaves Processing Payload Throughput Data per S1
(μs) (byte) (Mbit/s) (Mbit/s)
AR Geode AR Geode
16 599 258 924 11.8 27.3 0.1
32 660 320 904 10.4 21.5 0.2
64 718 382 884 9.4 17.7 0.4
128 778 444 864 8.5 14.8 0.8
256 837 505 844 7.7 12.7 1.6
512 897 567 824 7.0 11.1 3.2
1024 956 629 804 6.4 9.8 6.3
Table 5.8 Estimates for ALPHA-M
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Figure 5.24 Estimated verification performance of an ALIX router for different tree sizes.
Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
consisting of more Merkle Tree nodes. Processing time per packet also increases
with the number of Merkle Tree nodes in each packet. However, the exponential
growth of the number of parallel S2 transmissions per S1 helps the signer to achieve
a better adaptation to its available bandwidth, albeit at an increased computational
cost. The larger number of parallel S2 transmissions results in a larger amount of
signed data per S1, permitting to send fewer S1 packets or more data in a given time
span. Therefore, ALPHA-M in combination with ALPHA-C enables a fine-grained
adaptation to network bandwidth, buffer-space, and computational capabilities.
5.9.2.3 Performance Estimation for WSNs
Key factors influencing hop-by-hop authentication performance in WSNs are the
limited CPU and memory resources of relaying sensor nodes and the small packet
payload. We focus on ALPHA-C because ALPHA-M suffers in throughput from the
small packet sizes prevalent in WSNs (cf. Figure 5.14a). As in the previous section,
only cryptographic CPU load is taken into account.
As basis for our estimations, we used a hash function based on the Matyas-Meyer-
Oseas (MMO) construction [MMO85] and measured its performance on the Philips
AquisGrain 2.0, a sensor node with 8 KBs of RAM and a 16 MHz CC2430 system-
on-chip. For computing the MMO hash function, we utilize the built-in AES-128
hardware support of the CC2430 chip. Applying the hash function to a 16-byte in-
put string consumes 0.78 ms and 2.01 ms for a 84-byte input. These measurements
include the time necessary for transferring the data between the node’s memory
and the network chip. We base our estimations on these measurements, the values
from Table 5.3, and an assumed packet payload of 100 byte8. Additionally, we use
8For IEEE 802.15.4, the packet payload ranges from 80 to 116 B, depending on the applied security
measures.
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ALPHA-C with 5 pre-signed messages per S1. Based on these assumptions, we pro-
vide an example computation but, depending on the target scenario, smaller packets
or hashes can be used due to the resource-constraints of WSNs. The signature over-
head per packet is 16 bytes for the hash chain element of the signer, 16 bytes for
the MAC, and 16
5
byte for the pre-signature in the S1 packet. In this scenario, re-
lays are estimated to verify up to 244 Kbit/s signed payload in 460 S2 packets per
second, being close to the maximum theoretical IEEE 802.15.4 throughput of 250
Kbit/s and well above the practically achievable throughput in real IEEE 802.15.4
networks. The use of pre-acks reduces the maximum amount of verifiable payload
data to 157 Kbit/s in a total of 334 packets. By utilizing the same algorithms and
hardware acceleration features as traditional symmetric-key point-to-point integrity
protection approaches, ALPHA achieves a similar performance. However, symmetric
cryptography does not allow relays to verify the authenticity of packets, and hence,
cannot prevent forged packets from being forwarded.
In comparison, public key cryptography in WSNs, even efficient ECC implementa-
tions, perform poorly when compared to ALPHA. According to Gura [GPW+04] an
160-ECC point multiplication takes 0.81 seconds on an 8 MHz Atmega 128 CPU.
Thus, purely ECC-based mechanisms for signature and verification would cause un-
acceptably high delays for on-path verification. However, ECC signatures present a
viable solution for securely exchanging the anchors of hash chains in the beginning
of an association (cf. Section 5.6).
Using specialized hardware to accelerate signature and MAC generation can speed up
ALPHA signatures significantly. As a major fraction of the computational overhead
is generated by computing the keyed MAC, delegating this task to specialized circuits
reduces the verification cost to mere creation and verification of short hash chain
elements. Hardware for generating MACs is already available for many sensor node
models (e.g., the micaZ) and can be reused for ALPHA signatures as only the key
for generating the MAC must be adapted according to the hash chain element at
hand.
5.9.3 Evaluation of ALPHA for IP
In the remainder of this section, we evaluate the performance of ALPHA for IP and
show that our synthetic benchmarks and estimations can be met by a real system.
We focus on throughput as the main performance indicator because ALPHA and
ALPHA for IP are designed for protection of broadband payload streams.
As for HIP-MA, we use the following two devices for our experiments: two PC end
hosts that serve as Alice and Bob, and a PC as well as an ALIX router that serves
as Ron. The PCs are equipped with an AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual Core Processor
4800+, 4 GB of RAM, and a 1 Gbit/s network interface card. The ALIX router
equals the mesh router that was used for computing the cryptographic performance
in Section 5.9.2.2. It features a 32-bit 500 MHz AMD Geode LX800 x86 processor,
256 MB of RAM, and a 100 Mbit/s network card. We did not use the wireless
interface of the ALIX router to avoid non-deterministic behavior. Moreover, the
wireless 802.11b/g interface would have limited the throughput to 25 Mbit/s and
would present an additional bottleneck for our measurements. Hence, instead we
used the wired network interface of the router for our measurements.
5.9. Evaluation 147
For our evaluation we set up three scenarios to show the end-to-end and end-to-
middle performance of ALPHA for IP.
End-to-end Evaluation: This evaluation shows the end-to-end performance of AL-
PHA for IP between the PC end-hosts. This scenario provides a reference
results without a relay as a bottleneck.
End-to-middle Evaluation (PC middlebox): This evaluation shows the through-
put that can be achieved in a symmetric scenario in which the relay is as
powerful as the end-hosts.
End-to-middle Evaluation (ALIX router): This evaluation shows how a consider-
ably weaker middlebox can cope with the ALPHA-authenticated traffic gener-
ated by two more powerful hosts.
Because of its interactive signature scheme, the performance of ALPHA also depends
on the network latency. Therefore, we performed the measurements with different
network delays. We use the tool netem for emulating scenarios with larger delay.
Netem is included in the Linux kernel since kernel version 2.6.7.
5.9.3.1 TCP Throughput Without ALPHA for IP Processing
We use TCP for measuring the throughput of ALPHA for IP for two reasons. First,
TCP is widely used by bandwidth-intensive applications, such as file transfers and
semi-real-time video and audio streaming. Secondly, TCP implements flow and
congestion control mechanisms and is able to determine suitable throughput rates
without prior configuration. For these two reasons we decided to use TCP rather
than an artificial benchmarking protocol.
Despite the advantages of using TCP, its flow and congestion control mechanisms
also affect the measurements. The TCP throughput performance is delay-dependent
and quickly degrades for increasing network delays. Figure 5.25 depicts the plain
TCP throughput for the PC and ALIX middlebox for our test setting without AL-
PHA. We also implemented a NULL-processing mode for ALPHA for IP in which
no ALPHA specific processing is performed. This NULL-processing mode shows the
performance impact of the TUN device as well as the user space packet handling
that is not related to ALPHA. The NULL-processing mode represents a benchmark
for our ALPHA for IP evaluation because performance reductions compared to the
NULL-processing mode show the impact of the ALPHA specific operations. For both
cases (plain TCP and NULL-processing), the TCP performance decreases quickly
with increasing delay.
Since we measure the TCP performance of ALPHA for IP for different network
delays, the results reflect both, the end-to-end TCP throughput and the ALPHA for
IP signature and verification performance. Thus, the following results for increased
round-trip delays must be evaluated in the context of the delay-related transport-
layer effects depicted in Figure 5.25. In particular, since ALPHA increases the
network round-trip delay for the transport layer by three RTTs, the TCP throughput
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of that delay is the relevant reference value. For example, for an additional network-
layer delay of 30 ms, TCP over ALPHA for IP experiences a network round-trip
delay of 90 ms.
To counter the negative effect of increased network delays on TCP, we evaluated
the performance of ALPHA for IP for multiple parallel TCP connections. However,
we abstain from further tweaking TCP to still achieve comparable results. Finally,
the use of multiple TCP streams models better the shared use of a middlebox by
multiple hosts with their own TCP stack. Hence, we used TCP as provided by the
Ubuntu 10.4 distribution with the default “cubic” congestion control algorithm and
10 parallel TCP streams. We provide the results for a single TCP connection in
Appendix B.
5.9.3.2 End-to-End Evaluation
The end-to-end performance is an important factor for an end-to-middle security
protocol because the end-to-end performance limits the total throughput that end-
hosts can transmit, regardless of the existence of a middlebox. In this evaluation, we
use the PC and ALIX middlebox but without running any ALPHA specific applica-
tions on the middlebox. Hence, the middleboxes perform the mere functionality of
an IP router without any traffic verification.
We measured the end-to-end throughput with different numbers of ALPHA associ-
ations between Alice and Bob. Each data point in the following figures is the mean
value of ten samples of a 60 second TCP throughput test performed with iperf. We
varied the additional round-trip delay between 0 ms and 30 ms. This delay is added
to the latency inherent to the test network. As all devices were directly connected
by a switch, the round-trip delay in our test network was as low as 0.15 ms.
Figure 5.26 shows the end-to-end throughput of ALPHA for IP with increasing num-
bers of associations. For low additional latencies of 0 ms and 1 ms, the throughput
for ALPHA-M and ALPHA-C reaches values above 200 Mbit/s. With such a low
RTT, the delayed secret disclosure signatures are performed rapidly and the time
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Av
er
ag
e 
ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in
 M
bi
t/s
Delay in ms
NULL Processing, 1x TCP
NULL Processing, 10x TCP
1x TCP
10x TCP
(a) PC middlebox
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Av
er
ag
e 
ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in
 M
bi
t/s
Delay in ms
NULL Processing, 1x TCP
NULL Processing, 10x TCP
1x TCP
10x TCP
(b) ALIX middlebox
Figure 5.25 TCP throughput of our test setup with varying network round-trip delay for
plain TCP and with NULL-processing using the TUN interface and the user space component
without ALPHA processing. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
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of waiting for associations to become ready is short. Therefore, ALPHA reaches
its best performance already with few parallel associations. For such low latencies,
adding further parallel association does not increase the throughput for any of the
ALPHA modes because the time for waiting for an association to become ready is
already very low. The figure shows that ALPHA-M and ALPHA-C achieve simi-
lar throughput, while the basic ALPHA mode (ALPHA-N) cannot reach a similar
performance due to the higher processing cost (each ALPHA-N S2 data requires
one S1 and one A1 packet). The maximum throughput of ALPHA without network
delay (Figure 5.26a) is an important measure because it shows the computational
requirements of ALPHA and minimizes the effect of delay-dependent transport layer
behavior because the delay sensitive behavior of TCP has no influence.
Figure 5.26b shows that ALPHA-N benefits from additional parallel associations.
ALPHA for IP distributes the payload from the application to these associations
and achieves a linear increase in throughput. From 15 associations on, increasing
the number of associations cannot increase the throughput of ALPHA-N because
additional associations would be idle. In contrast, for 10 ms and 30 ms of additional
delay, increasing the number of associations leads to a continued linear increase of
bandwidth for ALPHA-N. This behavior results from the longer network delay, that
leads to significantly worse performance of each ALPHA-N association because of
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Figure 5.26 End-to-end throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over
a PC middlebox without ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers of
parallel associations. Solid lines are a guide to the eye. For the legend see Figure (a).
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Figure 5.27 End-to-end throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over an
ALIX middlebox without ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers of
parallel associations. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
the prolonged duration for the S1/A1 exchange. For higher delays of 10 ms and 30
ms, using more parallel associations clearly has a positive effect on ALPHA-C and
ALPHA-M. ALPHA-M reaches a TCP throughput above 165 Mbit/s and above 75
Mbit/s despite the higher delay.
In the following, we present some statistical facts regarding the measurements that
show the interplay of the different mechanisms of ALPHA. These facts merely serve
as an illustration of the function of ALPHA for IP. During the test run, short hash
chains of 1000 elements were used. For the measurement runs with the highest
throughput (ALPHA-M and ALPHA-C, 0 ms additional delay, one association), the
sender performed 34 hash chain extensions for its signature chain and 17 extensions
for its acknowledgment chain. In both modes the sender transmitted about 660000
S2 packets in bursts of up to 128 packets for ALPHA-M and 69 packets for ALPHA-
C. The limitation to 69 packets results from the limited space available for pre-
signatures in the S1 packets.
Using an ALIX mesh router as a middlebox without ALPHA for IP processing leads
to similar results. Figure 5.27 shows the TCP throughput results for this scenario.
However the limitations of the ALIX network interface card and CPU scale down the
throughput significantly, turning the ALIX router into a bottleneck even without AL-
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PHA packet processing. Yet, the basic ALPHA end-to-end behavior is still evident
from the figures.
5.9.3.3 End-to-Middle Evaluation
In this section, we include the relaying middlebox in the verification process. To
this end, we enabled the ALPHA for IP relay daemon on the middleboxes. During
the tests the middleboxes performed full end-to-middle payload verification as well
as ALPHA for IP control protocol operation, such as the bootstrapping of parallel
associations and the renewal of hash chains.
PC middlebox
In the symmetric scenario, in which the middlebox is as powerful as the end-hosts,
the results roughly equal the results without processing by the middlebox (compare
Figure 5.26 to Figure 5.28). Figure 5.28 shows the throughput results for the PC class
middlebox with full ALPHA end-to-middle payload integrity protection. From the
almost identical throughput results compared to the pure end-to-end case without
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Figure 5.28 End-to-middle throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over
a PC class middlebox with ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers of
parallel associations. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
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(b) 30 ms round-trip delay.
Figure 5.29 Average maximum burst size for five TCP measurement runs. The burst size
(S2 packets per S1 packet) were recorded during for the measurements in Figure 5.28. Solid
lines are a guide to the eye.
verification by the middlebox, we conclude that the two end-hosts cannot saturate
the capacity of the middlebox. However, the middlebox processing slightly reduces
the throughput without additional delay and for few associations (see Figure 5.28a).
Despite the higher computation and transmission overhead for sending and verifying
the Merkle Tree nodes, ALPHA-M outperforms ALPHA-C in all four end-to-middle
measurements. The reason for the better performance is that the burst size of
ALPHA-M adapts better to scenarios with large bursts. The burst size of ALPHA-
C is limited by the number of pre-signatures that an S1 packet can hold. This space
limitation restricts the burst size to a fixed maximum number of S2 packets per
burst. ALPHA-M does not suffer from this restriction. Hence, it can send bursts of
arbitrary size. Figure 5.29 shows that ALPHA-M sends considerably larger bursts
while ALPHA-C is restricted to 69 packets per burst. An increasing number of
associations reduces the burst size because the load is distributed among all associ-
ations. For smaller packet sizes, the burst size restrictions become even tighter for
ALPHA-C while the burst size of ALPHA-M is not affected.
Figure 5.30 provides a more fine-grained view on the behavior of the different AL-
PHA modes for different delays. Figure 5.30a shows the throughput for a single
bidirectional ALPHA-N, ALPHA-C, and ALPHA-M association for different addi-
tional network delays. Figure 5.30b shows the same setting for five bidirectional
ALPHA associations. The figure shows that ALPHA-N strongly suffers from in-
creasing network latency because it provides no measures to adapt its transmission
5.9. Evaluation 153
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Av
er
ag
e 
ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in
 M
bi
t/s
Delay
ALPHA-N
ALPHA-C
ALPHA-M
(a) One association (bidirectional)
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Av
er
ag
e 
ba
nd
wi
dt
h 
in
 M
bi
t/s
Delay
ALPHA-N
ALPHA-C
ALPHA-M
(b) Five associations (bidirectional)
Figure 5.30 ALPHA throughput with one and five associations for varying network round-trip
delays. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
volume. ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M cope better with higher latencies but they still
require to use several parallel associations to sustain an acceptable throughput at
higher latencies.
ALIX middlebox
Figure 5.31 shows that, in contrast to the PC middlebox, the TCP throughput over
the less powerful ALIX mesh router drops significantly when it performs full AL-
PHA packet verification. However, considering its intended function as a wireless
802.11b/g router, it can still forward a considerable amount of verified data. In
particular, with about 25 Mbit/s of verified throughput, it can saturate its 802.11g
wireless network interface for low end-to-end delays. In a different study, we ob-
served a throughput of 25 Mbit/s for TCP connections over two wireless 802.11
hops without ALPHA [WHBW11]. Hence, the performance of ALPHA will not
limit the system performance of a wireless multi-hop network. Therefore, ALPHA
shows sufficient performance to enable full end-to-middle authentication at typical
wireless line speeds in multi-hop wireless 802.11 networks.
The lower throughput values for higher latencies are caused by end-to-end effects of
ALPHA and are not of relevance for the middlebox. For evaluating the end-to-end
throughput, however, higher delays are relevant as well, since wireless multi-hop sce-
narios often show higher network delays because of layer-2 interference and retrans-
missions. For delays of 10 ms and 30 ms, the throughput reached about 14 Mbit/s
and 10 Mbit/s, which matches the throughput of current DSL connections. These
results match our theoretical verification performance estimations in Section 5.9.2.2
and show that the estimated numbers can be met in practice. Hence, we argue that
the throughput of the ALPHA for IP enabled mesh router is sufficient for payload
processing in the relevant cooperative scenarios introduced in Section 2.1.
Similar to Figure 5.30, Figure 5.32 provides an overview of the behavior of the differ-
ent ALPHA modes for different delays. Again, Figure 5.32a shows the throughput
for a single bidirectional ALPHA-N, ALPHA-C, and ALPHA-M association for dif-
ferent additional network delays while Figure 5.30b shows the same setting for five
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Figure 5.31 End-to-middle throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over
an ALIX class middlebox with ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers
of parallel associations. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
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Figure 5.32 ALPHA throughput with one and five associations for varying network round-trip
delays for the ALIX middlebox. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
bidirectional ALPHA associations. As for the PC middlebox, ALPHA-N suffers
from an increasing network latency while ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M adapt better
to higher latencies. Parallel associations can greatly improve the throughput of all
ALPHA modes in scenarios with higher latencies.
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Figure 5.33 Average maximum burst size for end-to-middle authentication with an ALPHA
for IP ALIX middlebox for an additional round-trip delay of 30 ms. Solid lines are a guide to
the eye.
As visible in Figure 5.31, the throughput results of ALPHA-N with many parallel
associations approach the results for ALPHA-C and ALPHA-N at higher delays. The
reason for this behavior is that for the low TCP throughput rates at high delay, TCP
does not generate enough traffic to reach the verification performance of ALPHA-C
and ALPHA-M. Thus, the throughput of both modes stagnates while TCP can still
generate a sufficient amount of traffic to fully utilize ALPHA-N at higher association
numbers.
In contrast to the end-to-middle PC measurements, for delays of 10 ms and 30
ms, ALPHA-M does not outperform ALPHA-C in our ALIX test run. On the
contrary, especially for higher numbers of associations, ALPHA-C performs better
than ALPHA-M. Again, the reason is the maximum size of the bursts. Figure 5.33
shows the average maximum burst size for the TCP measurement with 30 ms round-
trip delay. For almost all numbers of associations, ALPHA-C sends larger bursts
than ALPHA-M. In this case, all burst sizes are below the bound of 69 packets per
burst. Hence, ALPHA-C is not limited by the size of the S1 packet. The lower burst
size of ALPHA-M is a result of its binary tree-based amortization scheme. ALPHA-
M sends bursts of size 2i. If 2i < x < 2i+1 packets are ready to be sent in a burst,
x− 2i packets cannot be sent with the burst and remain buffered by the signer until
the next S1 packet is ready for transmission. While this limitation is evident for the
smaller maximum burst size, as depicted in Figure 5.33, it also applies to all other
bursts in the communication. Therefore, ALPHA-C adapts better to small bursts
because it can use arbitrary burst sizes for bursts smaller than 69 packets while
ALPHA-M is restricted to fewer burst sizes. One option for reducing the impact of
the logarithmic burst sizes is to allow arbitrary burst sizes for ALPHA-M by filling
up the trees with random data. For a burst size of x packets with 2i < x < 2i+1,
a host can generate a tree of depth i + 1 and fill up the remaining 2i+1 − x leaves
or nodes with random values. The signer can abstain from sending S2 packets for
these random values and only send the x packets of the burst. However, we did not
implement this optimization.
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5.9.4 Performance Comparison of ALPHA, PLA, and WPLA
As described in Section 5.3.3, the security goals and services of ALPHA and PLA
are very similar. Hence, we compare the performance of PLA to the performance
of ALPHA. We also discuss WPLA, a variant of PLA for wireless scenarios, which
adopted the amortization schemes that we proposed for ALPHA. WPLA combines
public-key based packet authentication with interactive hash chain signatures and
Merkle Trees.
Al Hasib evaluates the throughput of PLA and WPLA in a scenario similar to
our evaluation [A. 09]. Al Hasib uses a notebook with an Intel Core 2 processor,
running at 2 GHz as the signer and a desktop PC equipped with Intel Core Quad
CPU running at 2.4 GHz as the verifier. The performance of Al Hasib’s evaluation
hardware is similar to the AMD dual core CPUs that we used in our evaluation.
WPLA was only evaluated for the low network RTT of 0.8 ms of the local test
network. It does not implement the concept of parallel associations for coping with
high delays because PLA and the Merkle Tree based WPLA approach do not use
RTT dependent interactive signature schemes. A difference between out ALPHA and
the WPLA evaluation are the different ethernet speeds for which it was performed.
WPLA was evaluated for a 100 Mbit/s link while ALPHA was evaluated for a 1
GBit/s network.
PLA uses ECC signatures for end-to-middle authentication while WPLA combines
ECC signatures and hash-based commitments (pre-signatures) to achieve higher
throughput. According to Al Hasib, PLA without amortization scheme and without
hardware acceleration achieved a throughput of 355 Kbit/s. Hence, even with the less
resource-constrained notebook and PC hardware, protecting high volume streams is
out of scope for PLA. WPLA with a pre-signature based amortization scheme and its
interactive hash chain signatures achieves about 50 Mbit/s with 50 pre-signatures
per S1 packet. In comparison, ALPHA-M and ALPHA-C achieved a throughput
above 230 Mbit/s under similar conditions. Despite the different link speeds (100
Mbit/s for WPLA vs. 1 Gbit/s for ALPHA), the results are roughly comparable
because both systems are not limited by these (higher) maximum network speeds.
PLA as well as ALPHA introduce additional network delay because of their cryp-
tographic operations. The delay of PLA mainly depends on the time required for
verifying the public-key signatures in the PLA header while the delay in ALPHA
mainly depends on the additional round-trip for the S1/A1 exchange. Thus, the
delay of PLA is lower than the delay of ALPHA if the total PLA header verification
time by all relays is lower than the network round-trip delay. In the WPLA evalu-
ation, the time for verifying one PLA header resulted in 24.7 ms for a single PLA
header. Hence, when extrapolating these numbers for comparison with our ALPHA
results, we assume that for a network delay of less than 24 ms, ALPHA introduces
less delay for a single relay. Considering n relays we assume that ALPHA introduces
less additional delay for RTTs of n·24 ms.
The PLA header verification time was measured on a powerful 2.4 GHz computer.
For less powerful relays, ECDSA verification requires more processing time and pro-
longs the network delay. For example, it took the ALIX middlebox 47 ms for veri-
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fying a 160-bit ECDSA signature9. As the PLA header verification process requires
two ECDSA verifications (one signature verification and one certificate verification)
the ALIX middlebox cannot perform the PLA header processing in less than 94 ms.
Hence, for each ALIX middlebox in the network, the delay for delivering a message
increases by this value. If the middleboxes buffer the third-party certificate, the
PLA lightweight header [Lag10b] can be used. In this case, only one ECDSA verifi-
cation is necessary and the additional delay per relay is reduced to 47 ms. Brumley
[Bru08] presented an optimized implementation of the operations required for PLA
authentication. The optimized implementation required 6 ms per verification on a
1 GHz AMD Athlon processor. While this presents a significant speedup compared
to his unoptimized version (25 ms), it is still prohibitively slow for processing larger
volumes of payload.
Due to the low verification performance of PLA on commodity hardware, it heavily
builds on the concept of hardware acceleration. Ja¨rvinen et al. present an FPGA de-
sign for accelerating the verification of NIST K-163 Koblitz curves [Nat09] [JFS07].
Their implementation uses the Altera Stratix II FPGA. In their evaluation, they
show that the theoretical limit for their design is 166000 signature verifications per
second. Assuming that actual hardware products can meet this limit in practice,
for 1280-byte packet payload, a hardware-accelerated PLA system can achieve a
throughput of approximately 1.7 Gbit/s. In contrast to ALPHA, PLA with hardware
acceleration does not suffer from increased round-trip delays. However, the specific
hardware acceleration used by PLA is not available in any commercial products.
Unit prices well above 500 USD10 make the use of a FPGA-based solution impracti-
cal for cooperative networks. Moreover, to achieve high throughput in practice, not
only hardware acceleration in routers must be considered but also hardware con-
strains of potentially mobile end-systems. Therefore, hardware development and a
proliferation of ECC hardware acceleration in commodity products is needed before
public-key-based end-to-middle authentication becomes practical for high-volume
streams on low-cost hardware.
Besides performance, other properties of an end-to-middle authentication protocol
are important as well. Compared to ALPHA, PLA does not require the use of an
additional bootstrapping protocol. Relays can instantly verify a PLA packet based
on the packet contents. In contrast, ALPHA must establish state at relays before it
can use the efficient delayed disclosure signatures for authenticating packets. WPLA
presents an interesting mixture of these two concepts because it allows for a tuneable
tradeoff between public-key based authentication and delayed secret disclosure based
authentication by combining both concepts. Hence, such a combination of both
techniques may suite scenarios with moderate network dynamics.
5.10 Conclusions
Our Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for Hop-by-hop Authentication (ALPHA)
enables efficient end-to-end and hop-by-hop authentication in multi-hop networks.
9The results were obtained by using the cryptographic benchmark provided by OpenSSL. We used
the NIST K-163 Koblitz ECDSA curve, as defined by PLA.
10See http://www.buyaltera.com/ for current Stratix price lists.
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Forwarding nodes can verify ALPHA-protected data on a per-packet basis, enabling
early detection of unsolicited or forged packets. Therefore, it can mitigate flooding
attacks and can provide a basis for secure signaling to middleboxes.
ALPHA comprises three different modes of operation, namely the base protocol,
ALPHA-C with cumulative transmissions, and ALPHA-M combined with Merkle
Trees. These modes complement each other and allow for a fine-grained and dy-
namic adaptation to different communication scenarios, ranging from transmission
of infrequent control traffic to sending large amounts of data. Moreover, the three
modes can be combined to fine-tune the performance of ALPHA, and thus, meet the
networking, buffering, and computing capabilities of a wide range of device classes.
ALPHA natively supports acknowledged as well as unacknowledged packet delivery
in all of its modes, making ALPHA suitable for many applications.
Our performance analysis shows that ALPHA scales and integrates well with dif-
ferent multi-hop networks and application scenarios. Our evaluation of ALPHA for
IP shows that ALPHA can protect data streams of up to 230 Mbit/s on PC class
devices and 25 Mbit/s on wireless routers without special hardware acceleration
or parallelization. With this performance, ALPHA can serve as an end-to-middle
authentication solution in wireless cooperative networks based on 802.11 without
reducing the network performance considerably. In networks with higher delay, the
throughput rates of ALPHA are lower because of the limited TCP window sizes.
However, the verification performance of relays is not affected by this effect.
The adaptive nature and distinctive resource efficiency of ALPHA enables on-path
verification of all data traffic, and thus a much higher level of security in resource-
constrained wireless networks. With ALPHA as the foundation, wireless networks
can support efficient and secure signaling paths to all network nodes. Moreover, net-
works can become considerably more robust against flooding attacks from outsiders
as well as from insiders. Being incrementally deployable, ALPHA can improve the
security even in heterogeneous networks consisting of ALPHA-aware and unaware
relays. It provides an elegant, flexible, and efficient alternative to public-key based
and symmetric integrity protection, enriching the set of security mechanisms for
ubiquitous mobile communication. Thus, we believe that ALPHA is a valuable
authentication scheme for protocol development in wireless and wired multi-hop
networks.
6
SPOTS: A Family of Lightweight
Source-Only Authentication Tokens
In this chapter, we present Stream-based Per-packet One-time Token Schemes for
Source-only authentication (SPOTS), a family of lightweight token schemes for
source-only authentication without integrity protection of packet contents. SPOTS
tokens are a complementary approach to HIP-MA and ALPHA and provide source-
only authentication for payload streams at very a low processing cost (one hash
function application per verification). Token-based source-only authentication is a
simple and efficient solution if middleboxes are agnostic to the contents of the com-
munication but still require to attribute payload packets to end-hosts.
6.1 Introduction to Token-based Authentication
Cryptographically authenticating packets in a network is an important means to
prevent end-host and network targeted attacks. Widely deployed end-to-end security
solutions, such as TLS [MHJH11] and IPsec [Kau05] use symmetric ciphers and
message authentication codes (e.g., HMAC) based on shared secrets to determine
the source and integrity of incoming traffic on a per-packet basis. However, such
end-to-end measures fail if attacks target the network itself. For example, flooding
the network with forged packets can overload relays in multi-hop networks. Since the
damage is done on the path, the authentication and integrity-protection mechanisms
at the end hosts cannot prevent such DoS attacks. Selfish or unauthorized use of
network resources are further examples of attacks that cannot be prevented by end-
to-end mechanisms alone.
Enabling hop-by-hop authentication by on-path relays to efficiently distinguish le-
gitimate packets from attacker packets can prevent network-targeted attacks be-
cause the attack can be cut off early in the network before further relays or the
end-hosts are affected. Recently, a number of protocols have emerged that focus
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on such end-to-middle authentication. Examples for such protocols are PLA (see
Section 3.5.5) and ALPHA (see Chapter 5). However, they require to make trade-
offs in performance or flexibility for the gain in security: For example, PLA uses
a CPU-intensive public-key-based authentication mechanism that relies on special
hardware acceleration, which is not available in current networks. In contrast, AL-
PHA uses lightweight crypto primitives but introduces an additional delay of one
RTT, which makes it unsuitable for applications that require low delays. Other ap-
proaches [LYWA06, ZSJN07, YLLZ05, GLCZ07] that rely on shared keys between
relaying nodes or end-hosts show scalability problems or have tight restrictions re-
garding the target scenario. Hence, networks that require hop-by-hop authentication
must be willing to compromise in performance or system complexity.
The aforementioned end-to-middle authentication solutions provide integrity pro-
tection and source authentication. However, networks are often oblivious of the
forwarded packet contents, and thus do not need to verify the integrity of a packet.
Moreover, middleboxes often have no possibility to inspect packet contents (e.g., if
end-to-end encryption is applied). Integrity protection can therefore be left to end-
hosts, where it can be ensured efficiently (e.g., by using HMAC). Still, as networks
aim at protecting their resources, they need to shelter against flooding and mali-
cious or unauthorized use of the network. To mitigate these attacks, determining
the source of a packet is important. Source authentication should therefore be pro-
vided on an end-to-middle basis to hamper network-targeted attacks at the earliest
point within the network.
Per-packet one-time authentication tokens provide verifiable source information in
an efficient way. Previous work [TO03, DHM05, ZXSJ06] uses hash chain-based
tokens to secure packet forwarding. In these approaches, the sender attaches unique
and unforgeable tokens to each packet of a communication stream. Each network
element on the path observes the stream of tokens and can drop packets for which no
valid token is presented. The tokens enable relays to determine the origin of a packet
in a notably cheap way regarding protocol complexity, computational overhead, and
memory requirements. Most importantly, the token-based approach does not require
pair-wise shared secrets between the end-hosts and the middleboxes. This consid-
erably simplifies the bootstrapping and key distribution for the system. However,
the proposals using the basic hash chain schemes either do not consider, and thus
do not handle, adverse network effects, such as packet loss, efficiently or assume
a low packet frequency for which these effects can be neglected. In particular, if
applied to high-bandwidth streams, they introduce serious robustness problems and
vulnerabilities with regard to DoS attacks against relays.
The contribution of this chapter is the design and analysis of a family of Stream-
based Per-packet One-time Tokens Schemes, SPOTS, that addresses the shortcom-
ings of the above token schemes while preserving their advantages. The tokens in
SPOTS tightly limit the possible damage of an attack and perform efficiently un-
der packet loss conditions. Moreover, the SPOTS schemes allow for a fine-grained
adjustment of the parameters that govern the overhead for in-network verification:
a) the expected packet verification cost of normal operation, b) the maximum packet
verification cost under attack, and c) the maximum loss resiliency against burst losses
of packets. We also show that the efficiency and robustness of the proposed schemes
mitigate flooding-based DoS attacks and that the schemes themselves withstand
CPU-targeted DoS attacks.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In Section 6.2, we discuss
how verification of origin and replay protection can be performed in a computation-
ally cheap way by using hash chains. We first focus on perfect networks, neglecting
packet loss, before we consider realistic network conditions. Section 6.3 introduces
SPOTS, a family of token schemes that addresses the shortcoming of the basic hash-
chain approaches, namely burst losses and DoS attacks. Section 6.4 briefly describes
our implementation. Sections 6.5 provides a performance evaluation and shows the
efficiency of the token schemes. The evaluation consists of two parts. We first eval-
uate the performance factors of the SPOTS schemes in isolation before we show
how the proposed schemes perform when integrated into a communication protocol.
In Section 6.6 we show how token-based source authentication can be applied to
existing protocols, specifically to IPsec and TESLA. Section 6.7 summarizes advan-
tages and limitations of using SPOTS tokens. Section 6.8 discusses related work and
Section 6.9 concludes the chapter.
6.2 End-to-Middle Source-only Authentication
The mechanisms introduced in this chapter are applicable to different types of net-
works. Examples for target network scenarios are multi-hop wireless networks, which
employ wireless routers as relays, or wired networks where traffic traverses multiple
network elements en route towards the intended receiver.
For our explanations and analysis, we use the attacker model and terminology in-
troduced in Section 3.2. We consider five different entities in the network: A sender
Alice, intending to send payload to a receiver Bob across one or many relays Ron
in the presence of two different classes of adversaries Eve and Mallory. Eve’s and
Mallory’s goal is to send packets that are falsely attributed to Alice, while Ron in-
tends to provide service for packets from Alice but not for packets originating from
Eve and Mallory. We assume that Alice and Bob employ symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms (e.g., HMAC) to thwart end-host targeted attacks. However, these
mechanisms are not available to Ron. For simplicity, we refer to Ron as a single en-
tity although several Rons may be present on the path. As discussed in Section 3.2,
we distinguish between Mallory, who is located on the path between Alice and Ron,
and Eve, who is located besides the path.
6.2.1 Basic End-to-middle Source Authentication Scheme
To familiarize the reader with the basic ideas behind token-based source authenti-
cation, we first describe a fundamental token scheme to which we refer as the basic
scheme. The basic scheme presents the state of the art and was proposed as a
per-packet micro payment scheme for ad-hoc networks [TO03], as a DoS defense in
Sensor networks [DHM05], and as a per-packet source authentication mechanism for
the Lightweight Hop-by-hop Authentication Protocol (LHAP) [ZXSJ06]. We assume
the scheme to be applied at the network layer (e.g., as an extension to IP).
The basic scheme uses the well-known technique of hash chains [Lam81] (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2.3). The fundamental idea behind hash chains is the iterated application of
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Figure 6.1 Hash chain based source authentication
a cryptographic hash function H on a random seed value s. The first result H(s) =
h1 serves as the input for the next round, yielding H(H(s)) = H
2(s) = H(h1) = h2
until the hash chain reaches the desired length n. The last element of the chain hn
is called the anchor.
Before sending payload data, Alice signals her anchor to Ron in a bootstrapping
phase. This signaling step requires end-to-middle source authentication and integrity
protection to enable Ron to verify the authenticity of the anchor. We do not discuss
the specifics of a bootstrapping protocol here. However, HIP [MNJH08] with the
middlebox authentication extension [HHK+09] (see Chapter 4) and PLA [CLK05]
(see Section 3.5.5) are candidate bootstrapping protocols offering the required ser-
vices. Although these protocols use CPU-intensive public-key signatures for signal-
ing the anchors, this cost is amortized by the subsequent cheap hash-chain token
processing. To each payload packet, Alice attaches an undisclosed element of her
hash chain in reverse order of creation from hn to h0 = s. Before Alice runs out
of tokens, she signals the anchor of a new hash chain to Ron via the bootstrapping
protocol.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the payload communication between Alice and Bob. For the
ith packet in a communication stream (e.g., a sequence of IP packets), identified
by an index or sequence number in the packet, Ron validates that the hash of the
authentication token in the packet, H(hn−i), equals the token in the previous packet
hn−i+1. If the verification succeeds, Ron forwards the packet towards Bob. Oth-
erwise, Ron drops the packet. By the virtue of the cryptographic hash function,
verifying a received token is inexpensive, while forging an undisclosed token is in-
feasible because of the pre-image resistance of the hash function. We assume that
Ron stores the most recently verified hash chain element locally. Therefore, after
verifying hn−i, he stores this element and overwrites the previously stored element
hn−i+1. Keeping a local copy of the most recently verified hash chain element allows
Ron to check subsequent elements against this stored value instead of verifying the
link between the new element and the anchor. In addition, the stored hash chain
element also enables replay protection, since replayed tokens (e.g., hn−i+1) are no
longer accepted.
Using hash chains as tokens provides a notion of identity because only the host that
generated the hash chain is in possession of undisclosed hash chain elements. Hence,
the knowledge of the hash chain before disclosure distinguishes the legitimate host
from all others. Furthermore, the authenticated exchange of the anchor element by
means of the signaling protocol may allow to derive an even stronger notion of the
end-host’s identity. For example, signing the hash chain element with a private key
links the hash chain to the public key.
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6.2.1.1 Security of the Scheme
The described scheme provides source authentication (i.e., it allows statements about
the legitimacy of the sender of a hash chain element) and replay protection at a
notably low cost (one hash computation per packet). As intended, a valid token
does not allow Ron to make statements about the integrity of the payload since the
token only testifies that Alice sent a packet.
Neither Eve nor Mallory can forge valid tokens from previously disclosed ones be-
cause they cannot reverse the cryptographic hash function H. Therefore, Eve and
Mallory can only replay hash chain elements that were already disclosed by Alice
but have not been received by Ron.
Since Eve is not located on the communication path between Alice and Ron, we
first assume that the triangle inequality for the transmission times of packets holds
(see Figure 6.2). This means that a direct transmission from Alice reaches Ron
before a transmission from Alice to Ron via Eve. Hence, Eve cannot reuse any
freshly disclosed hash chain elements from Alice because the messages carrying these
elements are received by Ron prior to Eve’s forged packets. The built-in replay
protection of the scheme ensures that the forged packets are dropped by Ron. If
the triangle inequality does not hold and Eve can deliver packets from Alice to Ron
quicker than Alice herself, the following considerations for Mallory apply.
For Mallory, the case is different. Since she is located on the path between Alice
and Ron, she can modify the contents of Alice’s packets, and hence, alter Alice’s
packets unnoticeably. Since the tokens do not provide end-to-middle integrity pro-
tection, this fraud cannot be detected within the network but only when the packet
reaches Bob. However, the use of the hash chain elements in the packets consid-
erably reduces the window of opportunity for Mallory to launch network-targeted
attacks. Firstly, since Mallory can only reuse packets sent by Alice, the bandwidth
available to Mallory is bound by the bandwidth used by Alice. This thwarts flooding
attacks because Mallory cannot send more packets than the Alice sends. Secondly,
every packet that Mallory alters leads to a bandwidth reduction of Alice’s channel
and leads to an invalid packet that cannot be verified via the end-to-end integrity
protection measures. Such an attack is likely to be detected by Bob.
To conclude, the scheme successfully mitigates attacks from malicious off-path at-
tackers and makes attacks from on-path attackers considerably less effective by lim-
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Figure 6.2 If the triangle inequality holds within a network, a transmission over two hops
arrives later than the direct transmission.
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iting the possible attack volume. At the same time, the scheme is notably cheap
because it only requires computationally inexpensive hashing for payload packets.
6.2.2 Resiliency of the Basic Scheme
So far, we neither considered packet loss nor DoS attacks. Packet loss is a common
condition in wireless and wired networks that is caused by transmission errors, inter-
ference, congestion, pathologic network conditions, and also DoS attacks. Assuming
availability of the basic scheme, we now highlight the challenges for token-based
source authentication in hostile environments.
For small-scale losses of l sequential packets, hash chains offer a simple and natural
solution to dealing with lost tokens. If Ron has successfully verified the token hi
and receives hi−1−l in the next packet, Ron checks whether H(l+1)(hi−1−l) equals hi
by iteratively computing all hash chain elements between the two tokens. Ron can
determine l efficiently by observing the indices or sequence numbers in the packets.
Upon successful verification, Ron forwards the packet and stores hi−1−l for verifying
future packets.
In principle, this mechanism can handle sequential packet losses of any length. How-
ever, although computing hashes is cheap in terms of computation cost, allowing an
unbounded number of hash operations per packet renders the scheme vulnerable to
DoS attacks. Eve and Mallory can generate an arbitrary verification load by creating
attack packets with bogus tokens (any random value r suffices) and a high packet
index that indicates the loss of l tokens. Therefore, Ron has to compute H(l+1)(r) for
a large number l, before he realizes that the result does not match the last authentic
token hi and that the token is invalid.
An obvious solution to thwart this attack is to introduce a threshold w that limits
the maximum number of hash computations per token. Such threshold defines a
verification window in which the next w tokens are verifiable. If Ron receives a
packet with an index that indicates a loss l > w he refuses to verify it. Hence,
the verification window counters the aforementioned network-targeted DoS attacks
under the assumption that Ron can compute a fixed number of w hashes for each
packet without impairing the forwarding of other packets.
The threshold w also limits the maximum sequential packet loss l that the token
scheme can tolerate (i.e., l < w). If w or more packets are lost in sequence, the
verification of all following packets fails because Ron refuses to verify subsequent
tokens since each token exceeds the set threshold. If Eve is able to provoke a loss
of more than w sequential packets from Alice, she can effectively terminate the
communication between Alice and Bob. One way for Eve to provoke such loss for a
concurrent communication stream is congesting Ron through flooding.
Any choice of w (large or small) leaves the protocol vulnerable to DoS attacks. Using
a large w enables Eve to provoke a large number of computations for verifying the
forged token while small values of w reduce the loss resilience of the scheme and make
it susceptible to malicious flooding. This renders the scheme unsuitable for adverse
environments and for environments with burst losses. In the following, we propose
and analyze advanced hash structures that mitigate the highlighted problems in
adverse scenarios.
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Variable Meaning
a Size of the authentication data in a packet
b Number of jumps supported by an xChain token
d Depth of an xTree
hi Hash chain element with an index i
i Packet and token index
l Packet loss length
ls Burst loss length of the stream s
lw Maximum loss length tolerable with w hash computations
n Arbitrary natural number
p Number of parallel virtual streams
s Virtual stream index
txChain Authentication token of an xChain
txTree Authentication token of an xTree
w Maximum hash computations per packet and verification windows size
Table 6.1 List of variables used in the remainder of this chapter
6.2.2.1 Summary
The basic scheme is simple and notably cheap in terms of computation overhead
and provides the desired per-packet source authentication capabilities. However,
it is susceptible to DoS attacks against middleboxes that cannot be prevented by
the scheme itself. Moreover, it considerably reduces the resiliency of high-volume
streams against burst losses. Hence, it cannot be applied securely in adverse envi-
ronments and in environments with burst losses. Assuming a secure environment
without malicious attackers, however, defeats the purpose of the basic scheme. In
the remainder of this chapter, we introduce and analyze other options for generating
token streams based on hash chains and hash graphs to mitigate these problems.
6.3 Loss-Tolerant Source-only Authentication
In this section, we propose a family of mechanisms that tolerate losses of l subsequent
packets that exceed the threshold w (i.e., l ≥ w), thus making our schemes robust in
challenging network environments and against DoS attacks. We treat the presented
Stream-based Per-packet One-time Tokens for Source authentication, or SPOTS, as
a family of schemes because they are interchangeable and share the same design
principles and technical foundations. However, each scheme behaves differently in
case of losses and attacks.
In the basic scheme, as presented above, the loss of l ≥ w packets leads to a situation
in which Alice and Ron are out of sync because Ron refuses to verify Alice’s hash
chain tokens. This means that for l ≥ w, Alice sends packets with hash chain tokens
hi−1−l while the last element that Ron was able to verify was hi. With each new
packet, Alice advances in her hash chain and further increases l. However, Ron
cannot verify the new packets hi−1−l because they exceed the maximum window w.
Consequently, Ron refuses to verify Alices’ packets and drops the unverified packets.
Most importantly, Ron cannot update its copy of Alice’s last verifiable hash chain
element. Thus, Alice widens the gap between the last verified and the currently
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used token with each hash chain element and packet she sends. As a result, Ron
continuously drops Alice’s packets.
A simple way for Alice to recover from this condition is to use the control protocol
to resynchronize all relays with Alice by transmitting new anchors. Although this
solution is valid, it has two serious drawbacks:
Rapid detection: Alice must detect the failure situation in a timely manner. Since
the loss of the unverifiable packets occurs on the path to Bob, Alice can only
detect an out-of sync path with Ron’s or Bob’s help. We do not consider
solutions in which Ron notifies Alice directly because it would require the oth-
erwise transparent middlebox Ron to directly communicate with Alice. Alice
neither knows of the existence of Ron, nor does she trust Ron. Hence, we only
consider communication between Alice and Bob. Failure detection by Bob
requires a protocol for determining packet loss at the IP level and is limited
by the end-to-end latency between Alice and Bob. However, in order to avoid
large losses, the detection must be performed rapidly.
Resynchronization costs: Using the control protocol for resynchronization may be
computationally expensive (e.g., PLA requires CPU-intensive public-key ver-
ifications) or may create an additional delay during which all packets are
dropped. Eve may be able to provoke a sequential loss of more than w packets
by jamming the channel or by flooding the forwarding buffers of Ron. There-
fore, she can provoke frequent loss of synchronization and cause frequent use
of the CPU-intensive control protocol.
Considering these problems and considering that w should be kept small, which
increases the probability of loss of synchronization, we consider resynchronization
via the control protocol as a last resort. Instead we focus on how the token scheme
itself can tolerate burst losses of l ≥ w sequential packets with at most w hash
computations. This allows our schemes to withstand worst-case losses, while making
error detection and resynchronization unnecessary. At the same time we preserve
the characteristics and security properties of the basic scheme as presented above.
We propose three schemes for SPOTS: i) parallel hash chains, ii) cross-authentication
by hash chains (xChains), and iii) cross-authentication by hash trees (xTrees). The
three schemes provide a trade-off between improved robustness and either a) in-
creased buffer requirements at the relays or b) increased token size.
Worts case losses
When considering packet loss, we distinguish between random or individual packet
loss and worst-case packet loss. We make this distinction based on the length of the
sequential worst-case loss that a relay can tolerate without losing synchronization
with Alice. Sequential packet losses l for 1 ≤ l < w are considered to be small-scale
losses while sequential packet losses with l ≥ w are considered to be worst-case
losses. Note that this definition does not limit the total number of packet losses
per transmission but only affects sequential packet losses. The actual threshold
w depends on the scenario and the computational capabilities of the relays and is
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discussed in the following sections. We denote the maximum loss length that a
token scheme can sustain with w hash computations as lw. For the basic scheme,
the maximum loss length lw is w− 1 because one hash application is necessary even
without loss and the number of additional hash computations for handling a loss of
n packets is n.
For the design of the schemes we use the number of hash function computations as
the metric for the processing cost and ignore other token-related processing costs
(e.g., checking indices, parameter decoding, etc.). This simplification assumes that
the computation cost of generating and verifying a token is dominated by the cost of
the hash function. In our evaluation in Section 6.5.1.2, we show that this assumption
is justified and analyze the complete processing cost.
6.3.1 Parallel Hash Chains
So far, when discussing the adverse effects of losses of l ≥ w packets, we have only
considered the effect on a single payload stream. However, when a relay drops l
packets in sequence because of congestion, the effect is shared by all streams for
which packets are interleaved in the queue of the relay. Hence, with an increasing
number of p parallel streams, the loss length ls per stream s decreases proportionally.
Ideally, ls approaches
l
p
if packets of all streams are uniformly distributed in a relay’s
queue.
We use this observation to improve the resilience of the basic scheme against burst
losses by splitting each payload stream between Alice and Bob into multiple virtual
streams, each with its own hash chain. Thus, for p virtual streams, Alice uses p
different hash chains in parallel. For each of the p parallel streams, Alice creates
an anchor and transmits it to Ron in the bootstrapping phase. When sending data,
Alice uses the hash chains in a round-robin fashion. The token anchor, consisting
of the anchors of all parallel hash chains, is transmitted in the bootstrapping step.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the concept.
For a loss of l > p consecutive packets, the per-packet processing cost of computing
the missing l hash iterations is spread across p parallel streams and is lowered to
a maximum per-packet cost of  l
p
. Lower maximum per-packet processing costs
reduce the computational damage that an attacker can inflict with a single packet by
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Figure 6.3 A loss of 5 packets is distributed over the number of streams that experience the
burst loss.
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(b) Hash computations for 10 packets following
a loss of l packets
Figure 6.4 Per-packet and overall hash computation cost of parallel hash chains.
sending forged packets that falsely indicate high loss. Hence, the use of parallel hash
chains makes the scheme less vulnerable to CPU-targeted DoS attacks. Moreover,
the overall cost for processing a loss of l packets is not affected by the use of parallel
hash chains because the cost of closing the gap is merely spread among p virtual
streams. Thus, parallel hash chains cannot defend against an attacker that can
selectively drop packets of a single stream.
The overall packet processing cost of a loss of l packets is not affected by the use
of parallel streams because the cost of closing the gap is merely spread among p
streams. Figure 6.4 shows measurements from our implementation that illustrate
this effect. As evident in Figure 6.4a, using more parallel hash chains for more
virtual streams reduces the maximum per-packet hash computations for processing
a burst loss. However, when considering the required computations for all streams,
the overall cost is independent of the number of streams. Figure 6.4b shows the cost
of processing 10 packets after a loss. For up to 10 streams (p:10), the number of
hash computations is identical and only depends on the loss length.
Virtual streams and the parallel use of hash chains protects against sequential burst
losses but cannot defend against an attacker that can selectively drop packets of spe-
cific streams. Hence, an attacker can successfully break the communication between
Alice and Bob if it can either drop w · S sequential packets or w packets of a single
stream. Finally, a disadvantage of using virtual streams is the increase in required
buffer space at the relays for storing multiple anchors.
Since the security properties of parallel hash chains do not differ from the use of a
single hash chain, we skip a separate discussion of possible attack scenarios and refer
to the discussion in Section 6.2.2.
6.3.2 Residual Cost of Hash Chain Based Tokens
We have shown that virtual streams reduce the maximum per-packet cost of achiev-
ing a certain loss tolerance for bursty losses. However, the total hash computation
cost for a loss of l packets remains unchanged for Ron. This may cause problems
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(b) 500 MHz AMD Geode ALIX mesh router
Figure 6.5 Cost reduction for skipping token verifications. The cost of verifying all tokens is
used as a reference (100%). A large residual cost for closing the gap between the last verified
token and the current token remains after a loss.
if the packet loss is not caused by losses on the path to Ron but by Ron’s insuf-
ficient hardware resources, for example if he cannot keep up with verifying Alice’s
tokens because of the regular per-packet hash computation cost (i.e., the repeated
hash computations). Since Ron must still compute the hashes for the lost packets
for each stream to fill up the gap between the most recently verified and the cur-
rently received hash chain elements, it is likely that he must drop even more packets
(e.g., because of overflowing buffers). Again, this increases the per-packet compu-
tations for the next packets because for these packets even more hashing iterations
are required to verify their source. This vicious circle of insufficient computation
power and increasing per-packet cost eventually results in a burst loss larger than
w, terminating the connection between Alice and Bob.
Figure 6.5 shows the residual verification cost of skipped token verifications (e.g., as
caused by packet losses) in comparison to a verification of all tokens (100%). For
determining the verification cost, we measured the CPU cycles required for 1000
token verifications per loss length on a 2.5 GHz AMD Athlon PC and a 500 MHz
ALIX mesh router in 10 runs1. The figure shows that about 90% (92% for the ALIX
mesh router and 88% for the PC device) of the token verification cost of each dropped
token remains. This remaining cost increases the verification cost of the next token.
The figure clearly shows that Ron can only slightly reduce its verification cost by
dropping packets and that the majority of the cost of the unverified packets remains
as residual cost.
In an overload situation, the residual processing cost of lost packets cannot be re-
duced by Ron alone. Under continuous stress, Ron’s overload may even exacerbate
to the point when a single virtual stream experiences losses larger than w so that
Alice and Ron loose synchronization. In the remainder of this section, we show how
to tolerate losses of l sequential packets with less than l hash operations by using
hash graphs as token sources to reduce the residual cost. An alternative solution to
1We provide a more detailed discussion of our test environment and methodology in the performance
evaluation of this chapter in Section 6.5. The spikes in Figure 6.5b are caused by the operation system
scheduling of concurrent unrelated processes.
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the overload problem is to include an implicit or explicit feedback loop between Ron
and Alice to throttle the stream of packets to avoid computation overload (e.g., by
using Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) [RFB01]). However, in this work we
only focus on the design and use of the tokens and the token source.
6.3.3 Cross-authenticated Hash Chains and Hash Trees
In this section, we show how to tolerate losses of l sequential packets with less than
l hash operations to reduce the residual cost. We use hash graphs to construct
alternative authentication structures that allow Ron to verify tokens independent of
their direct successors. This enables Ron to drop packets to reduce his CPU load.
The basic concept of hash graphs is to use several input values (e.g., two hashes
hi and h
′
i) and to hash their concatenation. The result hi+1 = H(hi|h′i) depends
on both inputs and thereby authenticates hi as well as h
′
i. This method can be
used to generate a directed acyclic graph in which all nodes are transitively bound
to one or more anchor values. A hash graph based token may consist of several
hashes and additional information (e.g., an index or additional nodes of the graph).
When receiving a token of a hash graph, the challenge for Ron is to verify whether
it is linked to an anchor by a sequence of hash operations (i.e., that the anchor was
derived from a part of the given token).
We create hybrids of hash chains and hash graphs to create authentication struc-
tures with shortcuts (jumps), as shown in Figure 6.6. The hash chain enables an
inexpensive verification of sequentially received tokens in cases without losses. The
additional graph authenticates elements of the hash chain, thereby providing a sec-
ondary option for verification. We consider chain-like and tree-like hash graphs as
a secondary verification constructs. As the chain-like graph cross-authenticates the
hash chain, we denote it as an xChain. Consequently, we use the term xTree for
hash chains that are cross-authenticated by a tree structure. Both constructs have
properties similar to the basic scheme and can be used instead of it. However, they
allow Ron to skip a number of elements in the hash chain with low computational
overhead by using the graph structures for authentication. Hence, if Ron knows
token hi and receives token hi−1−l after a loss of l tokens, he is not required to verify
hi−1−l along the hash chain by computing H(l+1)(hi−1−l). Instead, he can verify the
relation between the two values with less than l + 1 hash computations using the
additional hash graph.
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Figure 6.6 xTrees and xChains extend a hash chain with a hash graph.
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Secondary hash chain:
Primary hash chain: h0

g0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(s|h0)
 h1 · · · hk−1  hk
g1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g0|hk)
 hk+1 · · · h2k
g2︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g1|h2k)
 · · · h3k−1 h3k
g3︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g2|h3k)
· · ·
   
Figure 6.7 The first 3k elements of an xChain for a jump distance k.
6.3.3.1 xChains: Cross-authenticated Hash Chains
An xChain consists of a hash chain and a chain-like hash graph, both identified by
distinct anchors. Figure 6.6 shows a simplified image of an xChain, while Figure 6.7
shows its construction. We design xChains such that any element in the hash chain
can be authenticated by either linking it to a previously verified element of the hash
chain or the hash graph. The hash graph authenticates each kth element in the
hash chain, thereby allowing Ron to verify the authenticity of each kth hash chain
element with few computations in the hash graph. Thus, Ron can skip multiples of
k elements in the hash chain to “jump” forward in the chain. In the course of this
section we show i) the construction of the hash graph, ii) the verification of a token,
iii) the disclosure scheme for nodes of the hash graph, and iv) the factors that affect
the choice of k.
Generation of an xChain:
Starting from a seed value s, Alice first creates the hash chain and then the hash
graph.
Figure 6.7 depicts the creation of the first 3k elements of the xChain. Each arrow
in the figure symbolizes a hash operation: hi → hi+1 means hi+1 was derived by
hashing hi. The symbol | denotes the concatenation of elements. If multiple arrows
point to the same result, the input values are concatenated before they are hashed.
For example, g1 is derived from hashing the concatenation of g0 and hk. Since both
input values are bound to g1 (and transitively to the anchor of the hash graph), the
hashed value authenticates both inputs as valid parts of the hash graph, and thus
proves that hk is a valid token. The chain and the graph are disclosed in reverse
order of their creation (i.e., in reverse direction of the arrows).
In the following, we denote the hash chain component of the xChain as the primary
chain and the hash graph component as the secondary chain because both show a
chain-like structure. Both structures are linked at each kth element of the primary
chain, hjk, which serves as additional input for the secondary chain element gj.
For a hash chain of length nk, the anchor of the primary hash chain is hnk−1 and
the anchor of the secondary hash chain is gn−1. The anchors for both chains are
transmitted via the control protocol during the bootstrapping phase. The secondary
hash chain, authenticates every kth element in the primary hash chain and enables
Ron to skip up to k−1 elements in the primary hash chain with a single calculation.
An element of the secondary hash chain gi is generated by hashing the concatenation
of the previous element of the secondary hash chain gi−1and the next kth element
of the primary hash chain hik: gi = H(gi−1|hik). Hence, every kth element of the
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primary hash chain is bound to the anchor of the secondary hash chain, and is
thereby authenticated by that anchor. As for the primary hash chain, a seed value
s instead of the predecessor element is used in the generation of the first element of
the secondary hash chain.
In Figure 6.7, the element g1 in Alice’s secondary hash chain is generated from the
concatenation of g0 and hk. Since both input values are bound to g1 (and transitively
to the anchor of gnk), the hashed value authenticates both inputs as valid parts of
the secondary hash chain, and thus, proves that it is a valid token.
Verification of an xChain token
Ron can verify an xChain token by linking it either to a previously verified element of
the primary chain or to a previously verified element of the secondary chain. There
are three possibilities for verifying the relation between a recently received xChain
token and a previously verified xChain token. Figure 6.8 illustrates the possibilities.
The options are:
a) Ron uses the hash chain structure to iteratively generate all intermediate hash
chain elements. This procedure equals the processing of the basic scheme and
the processing of a single stream in the virtual stream approach.
b) Ron uses the secondary hash chain to link the new token to a previously verified
node of the hash graph. This option allows Ron to skip k − 1 elements of the
primary hash chain with a single hash computation. A more intuitive descrip-
tion of the skipping of tokens is a “jump” forward in the chain. Therefore, we
also refer to every kth as the jump element.
c) Ron combines options a) and b) and traverses the hash chain and the hash graph.
In the following, we discuss each option separately.
Verification option a) Verification along the primary hash chain
Similar to the use of the basic hash chain-based tokens, Ron can verify the connection
between any hj to any previously verified and stored hi for j < i by verifying that
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Figure 6.8 The three options for verifying the relation between a recently received hash chain
element and a previously verified hash chain element or graph node B. See Figure 6.6 for
legend. Verifications are printed as dashed arrows. Lost tokens are marked with a cross.
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Secondary hash chain:
Primary hash chain: hk

g1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g0|hk)
h2k

g2︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g1|h2k)
h3k

g3︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g2|h3k) = g3 
Figure 6.9 Ron computes a jump of 3k− 1 elements from the recently received primary
hash chain value hk to the previously verified secondary hash chain value g3. To perform the
computation, Ron requires txChain = (g0, hk, h2k, h3k). These values are printed in bold. Only
hash operations (arrows) necessary for jumps are depicted. For a full image of the hash graph
see Figure 6.7.
H i−j(hj) equals hi. After successful verification, Ron stores the new value hj as
last verified element of the primary hash chain. With this method, Ron iteratively
generates all intermediary hash chain elements until he reaches the previously stored
value hi.
Every kth element of the hash chain hjk can be verified in two ways. Either Ron
verifies the token by linking it either to the previously verified element of the primary
hash chain hjk+1 or by linking it to the previously verified element of the secondary
hash chain gj. Both operations are equal in cost and require a single hash operation.
To maintain the ability to use the secondary hash chain as a shortcut it is important
to verify the nodes gj of the secondary hash graph. Therefore, we assume that
for each kth element of the primary hash chain, Ron verifies the relation between
hjk and the recently verified element of the secondary hash chain gj by computing
H(gj−1|hjk) = gj even if he performs no jump. Ron must know the predecessor of gj
(i.e., gj−1) in the secondary hash chain to perform this computation. A successful
verification testifies that gj−1 and hjk are transitively linked to the anchor of the
secondary hash chain. Ron stores hj and gj−1 for future reference after successful
verification.
Verification option b) Verification along the secondary hash chain:
If Ron receives a jump element hjk (a k
th element of the primary hash chain) he can
use the secondary hash chain for verifying the new token even if some elements of the
primary hash chain got lost. Figure 6.8 (option b) illustrates the process. Instead
of sequentially following the primary hash chain, Ron verifies that the received hash
chain value transitively served as the input of the anchor of the secondary hash
chain by linking it to the most recently verified element of the secondary hash chain.
Hence, instead of computing several hashes for closing the gap in the primary hash
chain, Ron only computes hashes along the secondary hash chain, thereby skipping
k computations for each jump. Ron can follow the secondary hash chain for one
or several steps (i.e., several jumps). In the following, we explain both options.
Figure 6.9 shows an example of a jump over 3k − 1 elements in the primary hash
chain from hk to g3.
First step along the secondary hash chain: Assume that Ron once verified gj
as a part of Alice’s secondary hash chain and that Ron stored this value. He can
link hjk to gj by simply calculating H(gj−1|hjk) = gj. If the result of the calculation
and the previously verified value gj match, Ron can conclude that hjk was an input
to the secondary hash chain and that it is authentic. Note that gj−1 is required to
174 6. SPOTS: A Family of Lightweight Source-Only Authentication Tokens
verify the relation between hjk and gj. Hence, Alice must supply gj−1 along with
hjk to facilitate jumps to hjk.
Further steps along the secondary hash chain: For performing n backward
jumps from hjk to gj+n, Ron must know the following tuple:
txChain = (gj−1, hjk, h(j+1)k, . . . , h(j+n)k) (6.1)
The tuple txChain is the xChain authentication token for every k
th element of the
primary hash chain.
From this tuple, Ron can perform n jumps back by verifying that the following
equation holds (see Figure 6.9).
gj+n = H(...H(H(gj−1|hjk)|h(j+1)k) . . . |h(j+n)k) (6.2)
After successful verification, Ron stores gj−1 and hjk as verified elements of the
secondary and primary hash chains.
With this construction, each token txChain consists of a node of the secondary
hash chain gj−1, the current hash chain element hjk and b previous jump elements
h(j+1)k, . . . , h(j+b)k. This number of previous jump elements determines how far Ron
can jump in the chain. Adding b previous jump elements to each xChain token
txChain enables Ron to omit bk − 1 hash computations in the primary hash chain.
At the same time, the size of the token grows linearly with b. Hence, the choice of
b represents a trade-off between loss tolerance and required packet space overhead
for the token. It is important to note that b can be chosen at run time. Alice can
increase the number of jumps if she expects higher packet loss or decrease b if only
short losses are expected.
Revealing the previous intermediate hash chain elements h(j+1)k to h(j+n)k in the
token txChain is not a security threat because these hash elements can be computed
from the current hash chain element hjk in the token. Hence, adding further hash
chain elements with a higher index to the token does not degrade the security of the
scheme.
Verification option c) Verification using hash chain and hash graph
Ron can only directly verify a hash chain element hi along the secondary hash chain
if it is a jump element hjk with i = jk. Otherwise, if hi is a predecessor of hjk with
(j − 1)k < i < jk, Ron first has to compute hjk = H(jk−i)(hi) along the primary
hash chain before it can use the secondary hash chain to verify hjk. Therefore, up to
k−1 verifications along the primary hash chain are required before the closest jump
element is reached and can be verified along the secondary hash chain. Figure 6.8
(option c) illustrates the process.
Figure 6.10 shows an example in which Ron verifies hk−2 based on
txChain = (g0, hk−2, h2k, h3k) and the previously verified and stored element of the
secondary hash chain g3. Ron can easily compute hk from hk−2 and proceed from
hk as described above.
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Secondary hash chain:
Primary hash chain: hk−2 hk−1 hk
g1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g0|hk)
h2k

g2︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g1|h2k)
h3k

g3︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g2|h3k) = g3 
Figure 6.10 Ron steps back along the primary hash chain by computing hk = H2(hk−2)
before he can compute a jump over 3k− 1 elements along the secondary hash chain. Ron has
previously verified g3. To perform the computation, Ron requires txChain = (g0, hk−2, h2k, h3k).
The elements contained in txChain are printed in bold. Only hash operations (arrows) necessary
for jumps are depicted. For a full image of the hash graph see Figure 6.7.
For tokens with a current hash of the primary hash chain hi between two jump
elements ((j − 1)k − 1 < i < jk), the xChain token is:
txChain = (gj−1, hi, h(j+1)k, ..., h(j+b)k) (6.3)
From this tuple, Ron steps back along the primary hash chain until it reaches a
jump element hjk (jk− i steps). Then he can perform up to b jumps back along the
secondary hash chain by verifying that the following equation holds (see 6.10).
gj+n = H(...H(H(gj−1|Hjk−i(hi))|h(j+1)k)...|h(j+b)k) (6.4)
The above equations do not consider corner cases for j. If j is 0, no previous
elements of the secondary hash chain exists. Hence, for j = 0, the xChain token
contains the seed of the secondary hash chain s instead of the value gj−1. Likewise
if jk approaches the length of the hash chain, no jumps farther than the end of
the hash chain are possible and no respective hash chain elements for these jumps
exist. In this case, the token txChain contains fewer or no additional hash elements
for jumps if the jumps would point past the seed value of the primary hash chain.
Note that with the exception of hi, the definitions of the xChain tokens for jump
elements in equation 6.1 and non-jump elements 6.3 match. Moreover, the verifica-
tion procedure in equation 6.4 is merely a combination of the verification along the
primary hash chain and verification along the secondary hash chain and can simply
be implemented as a two-stage process consisting of these two steps.
Properties of xChains
The creation, storage, and application of an xChain is similar to the basic scheme.
However, for end-hosts, the computation and storage requirements are slightly in-
creased by the factor 1
k
for the elements gj of the secondary chain. In terms of
processing requirements, the verification cost of an xChain is identical to the cost
of the basic scheme if no jumps are taken. If jumps are taken, the verification cost
is drastically decreased because kb elements can be skipped at the cost of b hash
computations. In comparison to the basic scheme, the token size of an xChain in-
creases by a factor of b because of the additional authentication information for b
consecutive jumps.
The application of xChains for source-only authentication is identical to the appli-
cation of hash chains and parallel hash chains as discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.1.
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Figure 6.11 Packet flow for an source-only authenticated stream using an xChain of length
100. The figure depicts the communication from the 20th to the 32nd packet. The jump
length k is 10, making every 10th element a jump element. The use of the tokens allows Ron
to perform three jumps. The payload of the packets is not depicted.
Alice attaches a new token to each packet and Ron verifies the authenticity of the
token as described above. Figure 6.11 shows an example stream of tokens between
Alice, Ron, and Bob.
Selecting the jump length k
In order to stay below the maximum per-packet processing cost of w hash compu-
tations, Ron can perform a maximum of w jumps of length k. However, up to k− 1
additional computations may be needed for verifying the relation between the cur-
rent hash chain element and the closest jump element along the primary hash chain.
Therefore, k must be chosen so that:
k − 1 + b ≤ w (6.5)
where b is the number of jumps of length k that Ron can use. The guaranteed loss
length (minimal maximal loss length) that Ron can tolerate is:
l = bk (6.6)
Finding the maximum for the combination of equations 6.5 and 6.6, l = (w−k+1)k,
reveals that, for a given w, l is maximal for k = w+1
2
+ 1 and b = w−1
2
. For even
values of w, the same resiliency l is achieved for k = w−1
2
 and k = w−1
2
. The
latter option leads to longer but fewer jumps, resulting in smaller tokens. Hence,
this option is preferable. Figure 6.12 illustrates this relation between w and k and
shows the maximum minimum loss resiliency for combinations of these values.
A second consideration for selecting the jump length k in respect to w is the space
consumption of the xChain tokens txChain. Ron can only compute a jump from gj−1
to gj if the corresponding hash chain element hjk is supplied in the token. Therefore,
the size of txChain grows linearly by the hash function output size with the number
of supported jumps. Since packet space is a scarce resource, choosing the number of
jumps as b = w+1
2
(see above) to achieve a maximum minimum loss resiliency is not
always possible if the space for the token is tightly restricted. Hence, for a given b,
k is selected as k = w− b+1. The resulting token has the size of b+1 hash function
output lengths because in addition to the hashes for the jumps, the current hash
chain element must be supplied.
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Figure 6.12 Tolerable loss length of xChains for different maximum hash computations w
and jump lengths k. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
6.3.3.2 xTrees: Hash-tree Authenticated Hash Chains
An alternative to using chains for cross-authentication is the use of tree structures.
We use Merkle Trees [Mer88] as the secondary hash structure to provide a lightweight
verification option in case of packet losses. We denote such hash chains that are
cross-authenticated by trees as xTrees. Figure 6.13 shows the combination of a hash
chain and a hash tree that forms an xTree.
For constructing an xTree, Alice first generates a regular hash chain of the desired
length by using the hash function H. The chain is depicted in the bottom part of
the figure: (h0, . . . , h3, . . . , h7). Next, she generates a Merkle Tree, using the hash
chain elements as leaf nodes. Therefore, every hash chain element is authenticated
by its successor in the hash chain as well as by the root of the tree. For a hash chain
with 2d elements, the tree has a depth of d. To verify the path from a hash chain
element to the root, d+1 hash computations are necessary. The anchor of the xTree
consists of the hash chain anchor and the tree root, for example (h7, r).
In analogy to the xChain, Ron has the choice to either verify tokens along the hash
chain or via the tree. Figure 6.14 illustrates the two options. A verification along
the tree requires d + 1 hash computations. Therefore, Ron should verify a token
directly along the hash chain for losses l ≤ d and along the hash tree for losses l > d.
For the verification along the tree, Ron requires the sibling nodes of all tree nodes
 
g0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g00|g01)

root (r)︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g0|g1)  g1︷︸︸︷· · ·
h0

g000︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(h0)

g00︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g000|g001)
 h1

g001︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(h1)

 h2

g010︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(h2)

g01︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(g010|g011)
 h3

g011︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(h3)

· · ·  h7
· · ·
Figure 6.13 Left branch of an xTree. The graph nodes are numbered in binary notation.
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Figure 6.14 Two options for verifying an xTree token A. Legend see Figure 6.8.
that connect the current hash chain element hi to the tree root. In the example
in Figure 6.13, the required tree nodes for verifying h2 are g011, g00, and g1. This
complementary set of branch nodes {Bc} is part of an xTree token. {Bc} is different
for each primary chain element hi. Therefore, an xTree token consists of the tuple:
txTree = (hi, {Bc}) (6.7)
Using xTrees combines the low computation cost of hash chain verification (one
hash computation per verification) with the fixed maximum cost of tree verification.
Hence, without losses, the tree-based approach generates no additional verification
overhead and for losses l > d the computation cost is limited to d hash computations.
Tree linking
The packet space available for the tree nodes {Bc} limits the maximum depth of the
tree, and thus restricts the length of the hash chain. A simple example calculation
highlights the problem: If the space for the authentication token is limited to 8
hashes (e.g., a total of 160 bytes for SHA-1), the maximum tree depth is limited to 7
and the hash chain length is limited to 27 = 128. Assuming a payload of 1024 bytes,
the tree merely provides source authentication for 128 KB of payload. To achieve
bandwidths of several Mbit/s, trees would have to be replaced in rapid succession,
possibly requiring a public-key signature for signaling the new root and anchor to
Ron. Therefore, the use of longer chains is desirable to better amortize the expensive
signaling of the root.
For xChains, we used a stretch factor k so that every kth hash chain value of the pri-
mary chain served as an input for the secondary chain. Such stretch factor could also
be applied to trees to multiply the total number of tokens with k without increas-
ing the token size. While this is feasible, we discuss and evaluated an alternative
approach here: A second option for extending the length of the hash chain without
increasing the tree depth is the use of several linked trees for a long hash chain of
length n. Similar to xChains, an additional hash graph with nodes γj connects the
trees (see Figure 6.15). Each tree authenticates 2d < n hash chain elements and is
linked to the next tree by an additional chain-like structure. If two subsequently
received tokens are authenticated by different trees (e.g., h2k and h2k−1 in the figure),
Ron verifies the link between the trees by checking that the root of the previous tree
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γ0︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(s|r0) 

r0

g0
...

g1
. . .
γ1︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(γ0|r1) 

r1

g0
...

g1
. . .
γ2︷ ︸︸ ︷
H(γ1|r2) 

r2

g0
...

g1
. . .
H(h0)

h0
 · · ·
H(hk−1)

hk−1 
H(hk)

hk
 · · ·
H(h2k−1)

h2k−1 
H(h2k)

h2k
 · · ·
H(h3k−1)

h3k−1 
Figure 6.15 A chain of linked xTrees.
served as an input for the hash graph. Hence, when Ron verifies the first token of a
new tree (e.g., h2k−1) he checks that the tree is linked to the hash graph by verifying
that H(γ0|r1) equals the previously verified γ1. To enable this verification, γ0 that
links the two trees must be part of the token. Thus, an xTree token in the linked
trees scheme contains: (hi, γ(i div k)−1, {Bc}). For i < k, the seed value s is included
in the token instead of γ(−1).
txTree = (hi, γ(i div k)−1, {Bc}) (6.8)
When using linked trees with k leaf elements (as depicted in Figure 6.15), losses of
tokens within one tree and losses that span two succeeding trees can be tolerated as
long as at least one token per tree is received because with this token, the root of
the next hash chain is verified. Hence, the loss tolerance ranges between k − 1 and
2k − 2 lost tokens. The maximum loss tolerance lmax in relation to the maximum
per-packet authentication information a (i.e., the size of txTree) equals the maximum
loss tolerance of a single tree because providing the root of the next tree reduces
the available space for tree nodes from a − 1 to a − 2, and with it the tree depth
from 2a−1 to 2a−2. This effectively halves the number of leaves in the tree. At the
same time, the additional link allows for the verification of another tree and doubles
the maximum tolerable loss because nodes from both trees can be verified. Hence
2 · 2a−2k = 2a−1k tokens can be reached with a pieces of authentication information
in both approaches.
Properties of linked xTrees
The main advantage of linked trees is that they allow to create arbitrarily long hash
chains with shallow trees. Therefore, they decouple the factor hash chain length
from the factors maximum per-packet processing cost (w) and per-packet authenti-
cation information size (a) at the cost of one additional hash element per token
(the element that links two trees). This decoupling allows for a better amortization
of the cost of signaling the xTree anchors to Ron via the bootstrapping protocol.
xTrees that are not linked are not useful in practice because they either result in
short hash chains or in excessively large authentication data for a high number of
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branch nodes. Therefore, we only discuss linked hash-tree authenticated hash chains
in the remainder of this chapter.
The cost of generating a linked xTree consists of the costs for generating the hash
chain and for generating the linked trees. Hence, the cost of generating a hash chain
of n elements results in n+ 2n hash operations for a) generating the primary chain,
b) generating the trees and c) linking the trees with the secondary chain. This cost
is independent of the tree depth and the authentication information in the packet.
The storage requirements for storing the complete hash chain also amount to n+2n
independently from the tree depth.
6.4 Implementation
We implemented the proposed token schemes in C and integrated them into two
layer-3 end-to-middle security protocols: HIP-MA and ALPHA for IP. The token
implementations use the OpenSSL cryptographic library as a basis for the hash
functions and extend the hash chain and hash tree library that we implemented for
ALPHA.
Integration in HIP-MA: In previous work [HHK+09], we integrated the hash-chain
based tokens into IPsec ESP to provide source-only authentication for HIP-
MA payload. The implementation consists of two parts: The first part is
a modification of the HIP end-hosts, the second part is an extension to the
HIP and IPsec firewall. The implementation is based on the HIP for Linux
software. We present this implementation and selected evaluation results in
the discussion of the SPOTS application examples in Section 6.6.
Integration in the ALPHA Framework: For our SPOTS performance evaluation,
we used the ALPHA for IP framework as a basis since it already provides
the basic mechanisms for setting up and maintaining the required security as-
sociations. We extend ALPHA for IP to create a payload channel without
ALPHA integrity protection but with token-based source-only authentication.
We modified the ALPHA for IP end-hosts as well as the middlebox to gener-
ate and verify the token stream. Hence, ALPHA for IP provides the control
protocol for SPOTS.
We use the ALPHA for IP-based implementation for evaluating the SPOTS schemes
because the HIP-MA implementation intermingles IPsec processing with SPOTS
token processing. With the ALPHA for IP-based implementation we can evaluate
the token performance without considering IPsec related processing costs. Moreover,
using the ALPHA for IP framework allows for a direct comparison between the
results of the ALPHA evaluation in Section 5.9 and the results obtained in the
SPOTS evaluation below.
Abstract token interface
Since each token scheme (i.e., parallel hash chains, xChains, and xTrees) has a
different token format and requires different processing, we created an abstract token
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interface that unifies the handling of the different token types. Hence, protocol
implementers can use a simple and consistent interface for interacting with all types
of tokens. The token interface provides token type specific functions for creating a
token source and general non-specific functions for handling all other token-related
aspects. The set of handling functions consists of functions to get a token from
the token source, embed the token in a network packet, and verify the token. As
a result, even with the differences in function and format, integrating the different
token types into a communication protocol is simple.
6.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the schemes we proposed for SPOTS.
The evaluation consists of two parts: a) the performance evaluation of the individual
performance aspects of the family of SPOTS token schemes, and b) a performance
evaluation of the token schemes applied to a communication protocol (ALPHA for
IP). The first part of the evaluation serves to quantify the improvement of the token
schemes under different loss scenarios compared to the basic hash chain approach.
The second part shows that authentication tokens provide sufficient performance
for the end-to-middle authentication of high-volume streams of up to hundreds of
Mbit/s and that the schemes withstand DoS attacks.
As for our evaluation of HIP-MA and ALPHA, we use the following two device classes
for our experiments: two PCs that serve as Alice and Bob, and a PC middlebox as
well as an ALIX wireless mesh router that serve as Ron. The PCs are equipped with
an AMD Athlon 64 X2 Dual Core Processor 4800+, 4 GB of RAM, and a 1 Gbit/s
network card. The ALIX mesh router features a 32-bit 500 MHz AMD Geode LX800
x86 processor, 256 MB of RAM, an 802.11g Wi-Fi interface and a 100 Mbit/s wired
network card. We used the wired interface to avoid throughput limitations and to
reduce environmental influences on the results. We used SHA-1 with 160-bit digests
as the hash function.
6.5.1 Token Scheme Evaluation
In this section we compare the performance and loss resiliency of the basic scheme,
parallel hash chains (virtual streams), xChains, and xTrees. The evaluation of the
four token schemes consists of five parts. First, we discuss the loss tolerance of
the schemes. Second, we evaluate the performance of the schemes under normal
conditions (i.e., without losses). Third, we evaluate the performance of the scheme
for handling burst loses. Fourth, we compare the costs for generating a token source
and finally we compare the size of the tokens to show the space overhead of the
different schemes.
In our evaluation, we consider the number of hash computations and the CPU cycles
required for the processing and creating the tokens. We measured the CPU cycles by
reading the tsc time stamp counter available on most modern CPUs since the Intel
Pentium processor. Reading the tsc register is a lightweight operation and does not
involve system calls or context switches. Therefore, it is better suited for measuring
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Device 20-byte input 40-byte input
(CPU) CPU cycles Processing time CPU cycles Processing time
AMD Athlon 2.5 GHz 949 0.38 μs 976 0.39 μs
Geode 500 MHz 3391 6.81 μs 3404 6.83 μs
Table 6.2 Processing cost of a single SHA-1 hash computation (Mean of 100 runs with
100000 hashes per run).
the very short time spans for executing a hash function than other time counters
that result in context switches (e.g., gettimeofday). However, the scheduling of the
operating system can still influence the measurements because the tsc register is a
global register and run time consumed by other concurrent processes contributes
to its increase as well. To counter this effect we ran our software with the highest
possible priority and used a high number of tests. However, for the slower single-
core ALIX router, the errors are notable in the graphs. Since the results for both
systems are equivalent, we discuss the general properties of our approach based on
the graphs generated with the PC-class system and provide the graphs for the ALIX
mesh router in Appendix C. Hence, all performance results in this section relate to
the PC middlebox if not mentioned otherwise.
For comparison, we provide the CPU cycles and time consumed for a single SHA-1
hash computation on our test hardware in Table 6.2. The time consumption was
measures with gettimeofday as aggregated time of 100000 hash operations. Hence,
the imprecision of gettimeofday for short time spans is not of relevance for these
numbers. The input size of 20 bytes is relevant for hash chain generation while the
input size of 40 bytes is relevant for hash graph computations with two input values.
However, because of the block-based processing of SHA-1, the longer input value
only resulted in minor performance losses. In contrast to the 64-bit AMD Athlon
CPU, the 32-bit AMD Geode ALIX CPU requires more CPU cycles for computing
one SHA-1 hash. The measured time consumption and the counted CPU cycles are
consistent with the CPU speed of the devices.
In this section, we compare the performance of the four different schemes with a
total of 15 varying parameter settings. We discuss the following schemes: a) the
basic hash chain approach for a single hash chain (p = 1) as well as for p parallel
hash chains (virtual streams), b) xChains with different numbers of b possible jumps
and different values for the jump length k, and c) xTrees with varying tree depths d.
6.5.1.1 Range of Efficient Loss Handling
Depending of the parameters chosen for the token scheme, Ron can skip the hash
computations for a number of lost or dropped packets efficiently without resorting
to sequential generation of all intermediate hash chain elements. This number is
important because it determines the loss tolerance of a scheme. Figure 6.17 shows
the guaranteed number of efficiently omissible hash verifications for the different
schemes and for different parameters. In the following, we explain these numbers
for each scheme.
The basic scheme and the use of parallel hash chains as virtual streams does not
allow for skipping the hash computations of lost tokens. Therefore, we regard the
number of efficiently omissible token verifications as zero.
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Figure 6.16 The maximum guaranteed number of omissible elements for xChains and xTrees.
“A”signifies the most recently verified token. “B”was verified previously. The figure illustrates
the worst case. For other A and B, larger supported can be tolerated, however, not for arbitrary
positions A and B.
For xChains, for a given jump length k and a number of supported jumps b, the
maximum guaranteed number of omissible elements is kb− 1. This is the case when
the last verified hash chain element is a jump element hj and the next received hash
chain element is hj+kb and all intermediate tokens were lost. Figure 6.16 illustrates
the situation for xChains and xTrees.
For linked trees with a depth d, the value is between 2d−1 and 2d+1−2. In the first
case, the previously received token is the last hash chain element of the previous
tree while the next received token is the last element of the next tree. For the
second case, the previously received token is the first element of the previous tree
and the last element of the next tree (see Figure 6.16). Depending on the location of
the previously received token in the tree, the maximum number of omissible token
verifications is between these values. We use the lower value 2d − 1 for comparison
because it represents the worst case for the tree scenario and corresponds to the
minimum guaranteed range of omissible token verifications for any position of the
previously received token in the tree.
With a sufficient parameter choice, almost any range of efficiently omissible token
verifications can be achieved for xChains and the xTrees. Hence, we do not directly
compare the schemes based on this metric but use it for grouping different parameter
choices that affect other performance metrics of xChains and xTrees. Figure 6.17
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Figure 6.17 Loss resiliency for different token types and selected parameters.
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shows the number of efficiently omissible tokens for the different schemes and param-
eter choices. The texture of the bars in the figure corresponds to the grouping of the
token types. We chose the parameters to achieve a guaranteed number of efficiently
omissible tokens in the order of 100, 250, and 500 skipped tokens. This grouping
allows us to better interpret and discuss other relevant properties of xChains and
xTrees, such as the token size, the effort to create a number of tokens, and the veri-
fication cost. For comparison of the other properties of xChains and xTrees, we use
the same textures in other graphs of this evaluation.
6.5.1.2 Normal Operation Cost
Under normal conditions without attacks and losses, Ron receives all packets and
their respective tokens in sequential order. Since the processing cost for the verifica-
tion by the relay limits the throughput that a relay can achieve, a goal of our design
is to maintain the low computational cost of the basic scheme. Hence, in an optimal
case, the regular processing cost of the three new schemes equals the processing cost
of the basic scheme. By design, parallel hash chains and xChains require only one
hash computation for a normal verification. For linked xTrees, the cost is slightly
increased by d+2
2d
since for each switch between two trees (every 2d tokens) the root
of the tree must be verified. The more frequent tree linking makes smaller trees
slightly more expensive than larger ones. Figure 6.18a depicts the average number
of hash computations for verifying a token without loss of the previous token.
Each scheme comes with additional management overhead for handling the more
complex authentication structures. Hence, solely focusing on the required hash
function applications can only provide an incomplete picture of the actual verification
cost. Figure 6.18b shows the average number of CPU cycles that is required for
verifying a single token. The processing time for the chain-based approaches as well
as for the tree-based approach are almost identical. The xChain approach requires
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(b) CPU cycles for token verification
Figure 6.18 Average processing cost of 1000 sequential token verifications without loss. The
results were generated on the PC host in 10 runs of 1000 verifications. The coloring of the
bars indicates the loss tolerance of the scheme (see Figure 6.17)
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slightly more computation effort because of the more complicated index checking
and the parallel handling of both chains.
A comparison of Figure 6.18b with Table 6.2 shows that 85% of the CPU cycles
for processing the basic scheme are caused by the hash computations. For the less
powerful ALIX mesh router this percentages is even higher and amounts to 91%.
These result justify the assumption, we made in Section 6.3, that the number of
hash operations is the dominant performance factor for the design of the tokens.
6.5.1.3 Verification Cost under Loss Conditions
The main goal of this work is to improve the resiliency of the basic scheme against
sequential losses and attacks. In theory, the basic scheme can tolerate any loss by
iteratively applying the hash function. However, in practice the number of hash
computations must be tightly limited to prevent DoS attacks. Therefore, the com-
putation costs for handling a burst loss should be low while the maximum tolerable
sequential loss should be high. In this section, we evaluate the average costs for
handling different lengths of burst losses. It determines how efficiently packet loss
can be handled in overload situations.
Figure 6.19 shows the average number CPU cycles that is required for verifying
a single token after a loss of l previous tokens. Figure 6.19a shows a comparison
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(d) Loss tolerance of 500 lost tokens
Figure 6.19 CPU cycles required to handle different sequential loss lengths. Graph (a)
provides a comparison of all token types while the other graphs focus on different tolerable
loss lengths without comparison with single hash chains. The plots of the xTrees are printed
in gray for better visibility.
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between the basic scheme, which equals the results for parallel hash chains, and
xChains and xTrees. The figure shows that xChains and xTrees only require a
fraction of the processing cost of the basic scheme, which shows that our alternative
token types can considerably lower the computation cost in burst loss situations.
Figures 6.19b-d show comparisons between xChains and xTrees grouped by their
number of efficiently omissible token verifications (see Section 6.5.1.1). For xChains,
the jump length k determines when Ron can use efficient jumps and how far these
jumps go. On average, k−1
2
sequential hash verifications are necessary before the first
jump element is reached. Once Ron reaches a jump element, he can efficiently jump
back along the secondary hash chain (e.g., see asterisks in Figures 6.19). Hence,
lower numbers of k allow the xChain approach to enter the efficient jump phase
earlier. However, as Figure 6.19b shows, low values for k also lead to shorter jumps
and requires more jumps, resulting in a higher cost. For example, the incline of the
curve of the xChain with k = 9 is much steeper than for k = 13 and eventually the
computation cost of the xChain with k = 9 becomes higher for high loss lengths.
For trees, the cost of omitting token verifications is constant once the loss length
surpasses the tree depth because any token in the tree can be verified with d hash
computations along the tree. The cost of the tree is notably lower for high loss
resiliencies and high losses. For small trees and small losses (e.g., d = 7 in Fig-
ures 6.19b), xChains with low jump lengths k are slightly more efficient. The slight
cost increase for trees with high losses is a result of the increasing probability that the
loss spans two trees and makes necessary a verification of the link between adjacent
trees.
The actual efficiency of the discussed structures largely depends on the loss char-
acteristics of the networks and of other middleboxes on the path before Ron. For
networks with a low expected maximum loss length even sequential hashing may be
acceptable while for high possible loss lengths (e.g., because of buffer overflows for
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(b) xTree (depth 7)
Figure 6.20 Cost reduction for skipping token verifications. The cost of verifying all tokens
is used as a reference (100%). The residual cost of the xTree verifications decreases with the
number of lost tokens.
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high-throughput streams or because of attacks), xTrees present the least expensive
alternative. In comparison to the pure hash chain based scheme, xChains and xTrees
are considerably less CPU intensive for burst losses.
One of the main motivations for our work on xTrees and xChains was the high resid-
ual cost of lost hash chain tokens. Figure 6.20 compares the residual cost of the basic
and parallel schemes with xTrees for different loss lengths. Since xChains show be-
havior similar to xTrees regarding the residual cost, we only depict the basic scheme
and xTrees. The graph for the xTree should be considered as an example because
different parameter choices result in different residual costs. Nevertheless, the figure
clearly shows that xTrees can considerably reduce the residual cost. This allows Ron
to skip token verifications as an efficient measure to reduce his computation load.
6.5.1.4 Maximum Per-Packet Damage
The maximum verification costs of a packet determines the damage (i.e., the number
of hash computations) that an attacker can inflict with a single forged packet. Since
Ron cannot distinguish between an attack and a regular loss, the maximum costs for
processing a benign loss limits the possible damage of an attack packet. In an attack,
the attacker sends forged packets with a high token index, indicating that many hash
computations are necessary to close the gap between the previously verified token
and the token in the attack packet. Small maximum verification costs reduce the
damage of CPU-targeted DoS attacks against Ron because he can identify forged
packets with fewer hash computations.
Figure 6.21 shows plots of the maximum per-packet costs after different loss lengths
for our prototype implementation. Graph 6.21a provides a comparison with se-
quential hashing for different degrees of parallelism (virtual streams), xChains, and
xTrees. The Graphs 6.21b-d show the behavior for xChains and xTrees for different
parameters, grouped by their loss tolerance. Figure 6.21 (a) shows that the use
of parallel hash chains (p:2, p:10) leads to a significant reduction of the maximum
required hash computations compared to the basic scheme (p:1). For 10 parallel
virtual streams, the hash chain-based approach performs better or similar to the
best xChain and xTree parameter choices. However, the high total processing cost
of the pure hash chain approaches (see Figure 6.19) limit the use of parallel streams
to attack prevention. The xChain approach performs differently depending on the
choice of the jump length k. The effects of the choice of k are similar to the effects
on the average per-packet cost shown in Figure 6.19. Therefore, we refer to the
discussion above instead of repeating the findings.
The xTree approach performs particularly well for high losses and limits the maxi-
mum attack damage to a relatively low constant value. Such a constant cost may be
of particular interest if Quality of Service guarantees are required to be met under
attack conditions. The fact that the xTrees show no increase for low and no losses
(see asterisk in Figure 6.21 (b)) is caused by the fact that d+ 1 hash operations are
required for verifying the link between two adjacent trees. This cost occurs whenever
a new tree is used and is independent of previously lost packets. Hence, this non
loss-related cost resulted in higher maximum number of hashes for losses smaller
than d+ 1.
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(b) Loss resiliency of 100 lost tokens
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(c) Loss resiliency of 250 lost tokens
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(d) Loss resiliency of 500 lost tokens
Figure 6.21 Maximum hashes for different sequential loss lengths. Graph (a) provides an
overview while the other graphs focus on different tolerable loss lengths for xChains and xTrees.
Selected plots are printed in gray for better visibility.
The concept of parallel streams can easily be combined with xChains and xTrees to
further lower the maximum per-packet processing cost. Such a combination allows
for a linear decrease of the maximum hash computations at a linear increase of buffer
space at the relay.
6.5.1.5 Token Generation
While the cost of the token verification is of paramount importance for middleboxes,
the cost of the token creation is important for the sender. A prohibitively high
creation cost would prevent the sender from sending high-volume streams and might
lead to disruptions whenever a new token source must be created.
When evaluating the cost of the creation of a token source (i.e., the complete hash
chain, xChain, and xTree), two aspects need to be considered. First, the cost of the
token creation is an offline cost that can be spent before the actual communication
occurs, for example in times of low CPU load. Second, the cost relates to the
traffic of a single sender while the processing cost at the middlebox is caused by
processing multiple packet flows of multiple senders. Thus, the middlebox is the
more probable bottleneck in the chain of communication. Hence, robust and cheap
token verification may justify an increased cost of token creation as long as it is not
prohibitively high.
Figure 6.22 shows the creation cost of the different token schemes in terms of hash
computations and CPU cycles. The results match our expectations: For hash chains
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(a) Hash operations for token generation
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(b) CPU cycles for token source generation
Figure 6.22 Processing cost of creating a token source with 100000 tokens (PC host, mean
of 10 runs). The coloring indicates the range of omissible tokens (see Figure 6.17).
and xChains, the cost is close to one hash operation per created token while for
xTrees, the cost amounts to three hash operations per created token, independently
of the tree depth.
For xChains, the computations for the secondary hash chain slightly increase the
cost by 1/k. In comparison to the basic scheme, this additional computation cost is
negligible even for small values of k.
For xTrees the cost includes the creation of the tree leaves and the intermediary tree
nodes as well as the tree links. This higher generation cost increases the cost by two
hash operations per token (i.e., per payload packet). However, even computationally
weak end systems, such as smartphones, can quickly generate long sequences of
hashes. For example, the Nokia N900 mobile phone, equipped with a 600 MHz
ARM processor, computes about 120000 SHA-1 hashes per second, leaving enough
leeway for timely generation of long token sources.
6.5.1.6 Token Size
The size of a token is an important factor because tokens consume packet space
that could otherwise be used for payload. We already discussed the token structure
of the different SPOTS schemes in the previous sections. Figure 6.23 depicts the
actual size of the different tokens as seen on the wire for the jump lengths under
consideration. The values in the graph are mean values of 1000 tokens of an actual
token flow. We used means because xChain tokens vary in size depending on their
position in the token stream (the first tokens contain fewer hashes because jumps
from past the end of the chain are not possible).
The basic scheme as well as parallel hash chains have a notably low packet size
requirement of one hash function output length. For SHA-1, this amounts to 20 bytes
plus an implementation-specific amount of overhead data for auxiliary information.
In comparison to the basic scheme and parallel use of hash chains, the xChains
and xTrees require considerably more packet space. We regard this higher space
consumption as the main drawback of the proposed token types.
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Figure 6.23 Token size for different token types and selected parameters.
The xChain tokens grow with the number of supported jumps because more hash
chain elements are required for each token. Similarly, the xTree tokens grow with the
depth of the tree. Comparing the space requirements and computation requirements
(see Figures 6.19 and 6.21) shows that the larger packet space requirements are the
price for the lower average and maximum per-packet computation cost. Hence, the
choice of the jump length k and the number of jumps b presents the classic trade-
off between space and computations. In comparison to xChains, xTrees achieve a
low computation cost at moderate packet space requirements. Especially for larger
maximum losses (d = 8 and d = 9), the packet space requirements for xTrees are
considerably lower than for xChains with low numbers of k (k = 21 and k = 42).
However, in contrast to xTrees, xChains allow for an adjustment of the number of
jumps (b) at run time. In situations with low losses, Alice can decrease the number
of jump elements in the token to reduce the packet space requirements. In contrast,
the tree depth d is selected at the time of creating the xTree and cannot be changed
at run time.
6.5.2 Communication Performance
So far, we have shown that the SPOTS tokens provide cheap source verification while
achieving a tunable loss performance and attack resiliency. However, the previous
evaluation is limited to showing the properties of the isolated token mechanisms but
does not take into account their integration into a communication protocol and the
practical performance penalties and security benefits that result from the use of the
SPOTS schemes.
To evaluate the performance of the token schemes in the context of a communication
protocol, we implemented a token-based per-packet source authentication protocol
for IP networks. The implementation uses the ALPHA for IP framework and AL-
PHA as the control protocol and implements a token-based payload transmission
protocol. Our prototype consists of two components: a) an end-host protocol dae-
mon that acts as the sender and receiver and b) a firewall that verifies the origin
of forwarded packets. The end-host daemon uses a TUN interface to capture IP
packets and encapsulates them, appending an additional header that includes the
SPOTS tokens. The firewall uses the IPQ interface to verify packets and to drop or
forward these accordingly.
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Chain xChain xTree
NULL p:1 p:10 k:25 b:4 k:32 b:8 k:63 b:8 d:7 d:8 d:9
PC 300 288 289 264 249 248 242 236 232
ALIX 86 48 48 44 41 41 41 40 40
Table 6.3 Token performance under normal conditions. All values in Mbit/s.
In the remainder of this section, we first evaluate the performance of the protocol
regarding its overhead without considering attacks and then analyze the performance
of the token schemes in presence of a DoS attacker. For our measurements we used
the AMD Athlon PCs as Alice and Bob and either used an Athlon PC or an ALIX
wireless router as Ron.
6.5.2.1 SPOTS Performance
The generation, transmission, and verification of the tokens creates a certain over-
head in terms of CPU, memory, or bandwidth requirements. In the previous token
evaluation we analyzed each aspect of this overhead independently. However, for a
real system, the combination of these factors and the resulting performance impact
matters. To this end, we measured the end-to-end TCP throughput of the different
token schemes between Alice and Bob via Ron. Ron verifies the authenticity of
each token and drops or forwards the packet accordingly. The evaluations takes into
account all practical aspects of the tokens, including different MTUs for different
token sizes.
For comparison, we implemented a NULL processing mode that shows the per-
formance of the TUN user space handling and the IPQ packet processing without
tokens. Hence, in the NULL mode, Alice does not generate or attach tokens to pack-
ets and Ron instantly forwards all packets without verification. As for the previous
evaluation, the graphs are grouped by the resiliency of the token schemes.
Table 6.3 shows the throughput of the different schemes for selected parameters. All
token schemes achieve a considerable throughput. Compared to the NULL process-
ing, the performance reduction of the tokens is strongly correlated to the size of the
tokens. Smaller tokens (e.g., the hash chain based tokens with p:1 and p:10) achieve
almost the same throughput as the NULL processing mode while larger tokens reduce
the end-to-end throughput because of the smaller space available to payload. All
schemes achieve a throughput above 230 MBit/s for the PC relay and 40 Mbit/s for
the ALIX relay without special hardware acceleration. The verification performance
of the wireless router is sufficient to enable full verification of the expected traffic in
a cooperative 802.11 wireless network (40 Mbit/s for a single wireless hop and up to
25 Mbit/s for multiple wireless hops [WHBW11]). Hence, all SPOTS schemes show
sufficient performance to support cooperative wireless 802.11 networks at practical
line speeds without introducing new bottlenecks.
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Figure 6.24 Attack scenarios for evaluating the SPOTS tokens. Alice (a) and Bob (b)
exchange traffic over TCP via Ron. Eve (e) performs a flooding-based DoS attack against
Ron and Bob. Eve can either try to consume all bandwidth available to Alice or can try tie up
Ron’s CPU by sending forged tokens that result in hash computations for verifying the token.
6.5.2.2 Attack Resiliency
To show the practical security benefits of SPOTS tokens, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of token-authenticated connections in comparison to the performance of un-
authenticated connections.
We distinguish two attack cases: 1) Eve targets Ron’s forwarding capabilities by
flooding the channel in a volume-based attack or 2) Eve targets Ron’s CPU capabili-
ties by flooding him with attack packets that cause the maximum possible computa-
tions for verifying the tokens in a CPU-targeted attack. The maximum computation
damage per packet depends on the employed scheme and parameters. For example,
the maximum hash computations for an xTree of depth 7 are 9 hashes. Hence, for
every attack packet, Ron must compute 9 hashes. For two parallel hash chains and
a maximum tolerable loss of l < 50, the maximum per-packet damage is 26 hash
operations. Figure 6.21 in Section 6.5.1.4 shows the maximum damage for different
schemes, parametrizations, and loss lengths. Figure 6.24 shows these two attack
scenarios.
Except for the NULL mode, Ron drops all attack packets after the token verification
fails. Ron forwards the NULL mode packets because he cannot distinguish attack
packets from legitimate traffic. Hence, unauthenticated attack traffic in the NULL
mode traverses Ron and reaches Bob while for SPOTS tokens, the attack traffic is
stopped by Ron.
Figure 6.25 shows the throughput between Alice and Bob while Eve floods packets
at different rates. In our evaluation, Eve sends packets of 1000 bytes of payload
each. Thus, at a rate of 10000 (10K) packets per second, Eve sends 76 Mbit/s of
attack payload.
Attack 1: Bandwidth-targeted Attack
Figure 6.25a shows the bandwidth-targeted attack. In this attack case, Eve floods
Ron with bogus packets. For the token modes, Ron can identify and drop the
attack packets with a single hash computation. Without tokens (NULL mode),
Ron forwards the attack packets to Bob, who drops the packets eventually. The
unprotected NULL mode clearly suffers from the attack while all token schemes
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(a) Volume-based DoS attack
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(b) CPU-targeted DoS attack (resiliency 100)
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(c) CPU-targeted DoS attack (resiliency 250)
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(d) CPU-targeted DoS attack (resiliency 500)
Figure 6.25 Different token schemes under attack. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
maintain their throughput even for high attack volumes up to 450 Mbit/s. Without
tokens, the throughput of the victim TCP stream between Alice and Bob degrades
even for low volumes of attack traffic (e.g., 10K – 20K) because the victim packets
compete for Ron’s and Bob’s resources equally. For higher volumes of attack traffic
(e.g., 90K – 100K), the attack stream completely preempts the victim stream in
the NULL mode. With tokens, the vicim stream can maintain a throughput of
approximately 150 MBit/s even for high attack volumes above 700Mbit/s.
Attack 2: CPU-targeted Attack
Figure 6.25 (b), (c), and (d) show the impact of a CPU-targeted DoS attack from Eve
against the token scheme for a maximum tolerable loss of 100, 250, and 500 tokens.
Here, Ron must perform the maximum number of hash computations of each scheme
for each attack packet. Performing this attack is difficult because Eve must generate
attack packets that indicate a high loss. Therefore, she must correctly guess the
indices of the tokens in Alice’s payload packets at a high rate. In our evaluation, we
examine a worst-case scenario by disabling the index checking by Ron, thus, forcing
him to compute the maximum number of hashes for each attack packet. As the
basic scheme (p:1) must spend 100, 250, and 500 hash computations for each attack
packet, its performance quickly degrades under attack. Even low attack volumes of
10000 (10K) attacker packets cause a complete preemption of the victim stream.
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xChains can sustain their performance longer, depending on the choice of k. The
relation between the jump distance k, the number of jumps b, and the maximum
verification cost is discussed above in Section 6.5.1.3 (Figure 6.21). High values
of k result in a high maximum per-packet damage and lead to a stronger loss in
throughput for the victim stream. xTrees and parallel hash chains (p:10) perform
particularly well because of their low maximum per-packet costs. Because of their
logarithmic increase in processing cost, xTrees are particularly well suited for shel-
tering against attacks in scenarios that require a high loss resiliency (Figure 6.25d).
Summary
Our evaluation shows that SPOTS tokens significantly increase the attack resiliency
of a communication. Even if Eve inflicts the maximum per-packet computation
damage in a CPU-targeted DoS attack (Figure 6.25 (b-d)) against the token scheme
itself, they perform better or equal to the NULL processing mode without SPOTS
tokens. Moreover, the SPOTS schemes perform significantly better under CPU-
targeted attacks than the basic scheme (p:1), which suffers from its high maximum
damage. Finally, with SPOTS, Ron can drop attack packets within the network
before they reach Bob. This is of particular importance if the path between Ron
and Bob is the bottleneck of the communication since Alice’s and Eve’s packets
compete for its bandwidth. Considering their low overhead and the significantly
increased attack resilience, tokens can efficiently prevent flooding based attacks in
multi-hop networks.
6.6 Applications of Authentication Tokens
Tokens based on the SPOTS scheme can be used in a wide range of scenarios.
However, since this work primarily focuses on communication and end-to-middle
authentication, we restrict this discussion to applications related to this scenario.
Lightweight authentication tokens can either be used as the primary end-to-middle
protection mechanism for payload (e.g., as used in our prototype implementation)
or as additional mechanism to extend existing end-to-end protocols with end-to-
middle source-only authentication features to counter DoS attacks. We discuss both
options by extending existing security protocols: First we show how lightweight au-
thentication tokens can enable per-packet end-to-middle source-only authentication
for IPsec and HIP. Second, we discuss how TESLA (see Section 3.5.4.1) can benefit
from lightweight source-only authentication and how TESLA can be turned into an
end-to-middle source authentication and integrity protection protocol by using the
flooding protection offered by the SPOTS tokens.
6.6.1 Use Case A: Source-only authentication for HIP and IPsec
In Chapter 4 we proposed the HIP middlebox authentication extension: HIP-MA.
The extension achieves source authentication and integrity protection for the HIP
control channel by using public-key signatures and nonces. However, as discussed
in Section 4.5.2.4, the IPsec payload channel does not provide any end-to-middle
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authentication features, and thus, is susceptible to malicious packet injection and
payload channel scavenging. The root of the problem is that, from the perspective
of middleboxes, the payload channel lacks cryptographic source information that
distinguishes a legitimate sender from an attacker.
The lightweight authentication tokens of SPOTS are specifically designed to provide
source-only authentication in such a problem setting. First, the middleboxes are
oblivious to the packet contents because these are encrypted with IPsec ESP and
are not accessible to the middleboxes. Therefore, end-to-middle integrity protection
is not required. Second, the middleboxes must verify the source information in
each payload packet at high transmission rates to counter the misuse of established
payload channels (see Chapter 4, Section 4.5.2.4).
HIP-MA, IPsec and SPOTS tokens
In [HHK+09], we presented a per-packet end-to-middle authentication extension for
IPsec and HIP-MA based on the sequential hash chain tokens presented above. To
provide per-packet source-only authentication, we attach an authentication token
to each IPsec ESP packet. The authentication token certifies that the legitimate
sender generated the packet. For each outbound IPsec SA, each end-host generates
a sequence of SPOTS authentication tokens (i.e., a sequential hash chain, virtual
streams, xChains or xTrees). Each peer attaches the anchor of this sequence to the
HIP handshake and signs it with its public key, thereby stating that it intends to
use the specific token sequence for its payload channel. During the HIP handshake,
Ron reads the token anchors from the signed HIP packets and stores them. For
consecutive IPsec packets, Ron checks whether each packet contains a fresh and
valid authentication token.
As effect of using this IPsec extension, attackers cannot generate valid packets by
themselves because each packet must be accompanied by an authentication token
that only the sender knows prior to its disclosure. Thus, an attacker can only modify
existing packets in flight, but cannot create new valid packets. Moreover, authen-
tication tokens significantly complicate attacks of an off-the-path attacker such as
Eve, for who the triangle inequality holds, because she needs to learn the current
hash chain element before she can attempt to send a forged packet. In effect, this
prevents attacks in which the attacker uses the same medium as the potential victim
(e.g., the same local wired or wireless subnetwork).
Hash chain based authentication tokens – by nature of their design – have a finite
length, which requires to replace a token sequence with a fresh one before it depletes.
We use the authenticated HIP control channel for securely signaling new anchors to
the middleboxes. Thus, long token sequences are preferable because the bandwidth
of the payload channel can be high and public key signatures, as used in HIP, are
CPU intensive. Hence, long hash chains avoid the high cost of generating and
verifying public key signatures. Due to the notably low processing cost of hash
functions, even mobile devices, such as mobile phones, can instantly generate long
chains. For example, a Nokia 900 smartphone, equipped with a 600 MHz ARM
CPU, can generate a chain of 120000 hashes within one second. With 1280 bytes of
payload, this allows to generate tokens for 18 MB of payload per second. Moreover,
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Protocol No token authentication Packet-level token authentication
AR2315 PC AR2315 PC
TCP 6.6 (0.03) 86.1 (0.07) 5.9 (0.02) 84.4 (0.01)
UDP 9.8 (0.03) 91.8 (0.05) 8.8 (0.04) 90.6 (0.04)
Table 6.4 Middlebox throughput (in Mbit/s) and standard deviation in brackets.
hosts can pre-calculate and store hash chains for improved responsiveness during
handshakes and token sequence updates.
To maintain backward compatibility with network infrastructure elements that in-
spect and process the IPsec headers [BO97, YST05], we abstained from modifying
the basic IP and IPsec header structures. Therefore, we append the token to the
IPsec payload field as trailing authentication data. The receiver removes the token
prior to further IPsec processing.
We implemented our IPsec extension for the end-hosts and the middleboxes based
on the HIPL user-space firewall. Note that the user-space IPsec processing suffers
from additional context switches and a higher per-packet processing cost. At the
time, we evaluated the measurements with an AR2315 consumer wireless router (180
MHz MIPS CPU) and a PC firewall (AMD Athlon CPU at 1.3 GHz) that processed
the authentication token in each forwarded packet. The employed hardware for this
evaluation represents state of the art of commodity hardware as of 2006. Hence,
the throughput differs from the more recent results with the ALIX wireless routers.
The end-hosts that were used for stress-testing the middleboxes are equipped with
3-GHz CPUs to avoid the end-systems becoming the performance bottleneck.
We compare the throughput of a SPOTS-protected IPsec communication to an un-
modified IPsec stream. Both streams are handled by the HIP user space firewall.
Table 6.4 shows that the impact of the per-packet source-only authentication is
notably low. The UDP and TCP throughputs differ only by 1% from the through-
puts without tokens for the PC middlebox. For the tightly resource-constrained
consumer-grade router, the throughput decreases by 10% for UDP and by 11% for
TCP, leaving the low-cost router with sufficient resources for most ADSL-line speeds
even when using the user-space firewall. When using the token extension, the la-
tency in our local network slightly increased by 0.03 ms from 0.62 ms to 0.65 ms for
the PC middlebox and by 0.2 ms from 2.4 ms to 2.6 ms for the consumer router.
Even for local networks, this increase is negligible. Compared to ALPHA, the tokens
impose no network dependent delay penalty.
6.6.2 Use Case B: Securing TESLA Packet Buffers
One of the disadvantages for TESLA for end-to-middle authentication is the unbound
number of messages or commitments that receivers must store during an epoch.
The inability of time-delayed secret disclosure protocols to distinguish authentic
from forged messages before the secret is disclosed makes time-based approaches
vulnerable to flooding of forged messages or commitments.
During one epoch, an attacker can send floods of forged messages. The end-hosts
must buffer these forged commitments and messages unconditionally until the secret
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is disclosed in next epoch. A combination of TESLA and the lightweight authentica-
tion tokens following the SPOTS scheme can avoid this issue. With this combination,
TESLA receivers can use the tokens to identify spoofed messages before buffering
these. This way, receivers can take fresh and valid tokens in the packet as an evi-
dence that the legitimate end-host has sent some commitment (although statements
of the authenticity of the commitment itself are out of scope). As a result, flooding of
buffers with forged commitments from unauthorized attackers becomes impossible.
6.6.2.1 End-to-Middle Integrity with TESLA and SPOTS Tokens
Based on the combination of TESLA and authentication tokens in conjunction with
the sender-side buffering proposed for TESLA [PCST01], TESLA can be turned into
a time-based end-to-middle authentication and integrity protection system similar
to ALPHA-C. We briefly sketch the basic concept and features of this combination:
Assume not only receivers but also middleboxes observe the TESLA packets. Further
assume that sender-side buffering is used with TESLA. This means that a sender
first sends a commitment to a message before sending the message in the next epoch.
Alice signals the SPOTS anchors to Ron and Bon in the initial TESLA handshake
or via the integrity-protected TESLA protocol itself. As described above, senders
use SPOTS and authentication tokens to protect the buffer space at receivers and
middleboxes. Furthermore, middleboxes only forward the commitments if a valid
authentication token is presented with the commitment. When the messages and
secrets are disclosed in the next epoch, relays forward only authenticated TESLA
packets. Alice can renew her SPOTS hash chains via the TESLA channel without
resorting to the control protocol.
Comparison to ALPHA
The properties of TESLA with authentication tokens are very similar to the prop-
erties of ALPHA-C but with a time-based approach instead of an interaction-based
approach. For both approaches, relays buffer commitments (pre-signatures in AL-
PHA) for each payload packet for the duration of one epoch (one RTT in ALPHA).
The computational overhead of ALPHA-C and TESLA with authentication tokens is
comparable as well, however, ALPHA-C requires the computation of one additional
hash for verifying the A1 packet while each TESLA packet requires one additional
hash token application for verifying the token.
Despite the similarities in overhead and use, some essential differences remain be-
tween ALPHA-C and the extended TESLA version. Most importantly, TESLA
targets point-to-multipoint scenarios while ALPHA focuses on point-to-point com-
munication. While TESLA can be used for point-to-point communication (with a
multicast group of one receiver), ALPHA cannot be used for multicast. Moreover,
even if both protocols were used for point-to-point communication, technical differ-
ences remain. First, the delays of TESLA with authentication tokens and ALPHA-C
differ. TESLA introduces a fixed delay of one epoch duration (delay > 1/2 worst case
RTT) while the delay in ALPHA equals the actual RTT. Choosing the epochs in
TESLA too optimistically, meaning too short, results in unverifiable packets at the
receiver side if a packet does not arrive within the epoch. Choosing the epochs too
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pessimistically, meaning too long, requires the middleboxes and receivers to buffer
commitments for an extended time period. Overestimating the network delay by
a factor of n leads to a n-times higher buffer requirements. ALPHA avoids these
problems by using interaction to determine when the next secret can be disclosed.
Hence, no delay estimations are necessary. Second, TESLA discloses secrets peri-
odically regardless of whether traffic is sent the traffic that is sent. Therefore, even
in times with no traffic, Alice discloses hash chain elements. This constant use of
hash chain elements suits well scenarios with permanent traffic but would create
additional overhead when traffic is sent infrequently. The interaction-based scheme
of ALPHA avoids this issue.
Summary
Concluding, the combination of TESLA and authentication tokens may open new
avenues for end-to-middle authentication because multi-cast scenarios can benefit
from in-network source authentication and integrity protection as well. It shows
how authentication tokens can serve as a building block for other end-to-middle
security services by providing DoS protection. In contrast to the previous application
of authentication tokens in combination with HIP-MA, we did not implement the
combination of TESLA and authentication tokens and consider the evaluation of
this combination as future work.
6.7 SPOTS Strengths and Limitations
The SPOTS family of source-only authentication token schemes defines parallel hash
chains, xChains, and xTrees as enhancements of the basic scheme. The schemes can
be combined to further extend their applicability. For example, the concept of paral-
lel streams can also be applied to xChains and xTrees, thereby further lowering their
cost of handling burst losses. Likewise, xTrees can be extended by the concept of
stretching the hash chains between cross-authenticated tokens. In such cases, only
every kth hash chain element would serve as a leaf of the tree. This concept is identi-
cal to xChains for which every kth element serves as an input for the secondary hash
chain. Finally, linked xTrees already incorporate the concepts of xChains by using
a secondary hash chain to link adjacent trees. Other combinations and adaptations
are possible as well. Hence, we regard the family of SPOTS authentication tokens
as a flexible and extensible toolset for end-to-middle source-only authentication.
The token schemes of the SPOTS family allow for a fine-grained adjustment of their
properties regarding loss tolerance, maximum per-packet verification cost, required
packet space, and cost of creation. This allows for providing tailor-made solutions for
cases with specific limitations (e.g., small packets, resource constrained middleboxes,
or resource-constrained senders). For example, xTrees provide a constant maximum
per-packet verification cost for all tolerable loss lengths. This constant cost allows
to create tailor-made hardware or to derive a guaranteed verification performance
even under loss and attack conditions.
The proposed schemes also share a set of disadvantages. One major disadvantage
is that they strictly enforce in-order delivery of packets because tokens in out-of-
order packets are not considered to be fresh and valid. Hence, packets that arrive
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late (i.e., after Ron processed their successor packet) are discarded by middleboxes.
For example, if Ron received a packet sequence with packets p and the indices
(p120, p123, p121, p122, p124), Ron would discard the packets p121 and p122, only for-
warding packets with a sequence of monotonically increasing indices (p120, p123, p124).
This behavior is a precaution against an eavesdropper Eve who can cause packets to
be lost (e.g., corrupting packets by jamming the channel). The strict in-order pro-
cessing prevents that Eve can use outdated hashes from lost tokens because already
disclosed tokens can easily be generated from fresh tokens. While the restriction of
sequential arrival order is desirable to limit the attack possibilities, it may limit the
performance of the SPOTS schemes in scenarios with frequent out-of-order delivery.
In particular, it transforms out-of-order delivery into packet loss, two conditions that
may be handled differently by different transport-layer protocols.
Second, the tokens require a bootstrapping protocol that occasionally signals new
anchors to Ron. Thus, the proposed schemes are best used as add-ons to protocols
that are capable of end-to-middle signaling (e.g., HIP, PLA, and ALPHA). Using
the SPOTS schemes as a stand-alone solution is not possible.
In order to verify tokens, Ron must store the related verification state (anchors,
indices, and the most recently verified token). Hence, the SPOTS schemes are not
suited for stateless end-to-middle source-only authentication.
While we used the example of flooding prevention throughout the chapter, the token
schemes are not limited to this sole use case. The tokens can also be applied in sce-
narios in which costly or vulnerable on-path operations must be protected efficiently
without shared keys. Examples of such applications are bandwidth allocation and
prioritization, per-packet accounting, and protection of other scarce resources (e.g.,
in-network processing or caching).
6.8 Related Work
Tewari and O’Mahony [TO03], Deng et al. [DHM05], as well as Zhu et al. [ZXSJ06]
use the basic one-hash-per-packet source authentication mechanism as a lightweight
authentication measure. These protocols are the state of the art for the basic scheme
discussed in this work. Tewari and O’Mahony and Zhu et al. do not take into ac-
count burst packet losses for high-volume streams and DoS attacks, two important
factors that need to be considered in realistic scenarios. As we showed in our eval-
uation, these shortcomings introduce new and effective DoS attacks. We addressed
these shortcomings in the design of the SPOTS schemes. Deng et al. and con-
sider the basic scheme for low-bandwidth transmissions in sensor networks. They
acknowledge the possibility of burst losses and handle the resulting problems by
re-bootstrapping the hash chains frequently. While this re-bootstrapping solves the
problems in sensor networks, it is impracticable for high-bandwidth transmissions
with hundreds or thousands of unacknowledged packets on the wire. In particular
their re-bootstrapping method is limited by the network latency. Hence, losses of
hundreds to thousands of packets cannot be prevented for high-bandwidth streams
in the order of hundreds of Mbit/s.
In an unfinished technical report, Briscoe [Bri00] motivated a multicast scheme that
evolved into TESLA [PTSC00] by extending a token-based scheme. However, it
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purely serves to illustrate the deficiencies of a na¨ıve TESLA-like approach. There-
fore, the token-based source authentication part of the work is neither fully fleshed
out or evaluated nor does it take into account end-to-middle authentication, DoS
attacks, or burst losses.
There is a large body of research concerning end-to-end signature amortization
schemes for multicast stream authentication [WL99, MS01, GM01, PM03, SZT02].
These schemes use lightweight cryptographic operations such as hash chains, hash
trees, and erasure codes to bind a sequence of packet contents to an asymmetric
digital signature, thus spreading the cost of expensive cryptographic operations over
several packets. The schemes require senders to delay and buffer multiple packets
for binding their contents to a signature to provide integrity protection. The delay-
intensive buffering renders these schemes not well suited for real time applications
such as voice communications. For example, a voice stream that sends between 30
and 50 packets per second [Cis09] and can tolerate a maximum additional delay of
100 ms only allows to use three to five lightweight signatures per costly asymmetric
signature. Therefore, short hash chains and shallow trees must be used, making
efficient amortization impossible. In our work, we avoid the requirement of integrity
protection because it can be handled efficiently by end-to-end mechanisms. Sacrific-
ing integrity protection allows us to use deep trees and long chains to significantly
reduce the cost of public-key signatures while still providing source authentication.
Recently, a number of protocols have emerged in the area of end-to-middle authen-
tication. Gu et al. [GLCZ07] use pair-wise keys between the sender and en route
nodes. These keys are derived from Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) route replies.
Since this approach requires explicit knowledge of the network, it is not applica-
ble to other routing schemes. In particular it is not applicable to basic IP. Zhu
et al. [ZSJN07] and Ye et al. [YLLZ05] solve the problem of packet injection and
forgery with probabilistic approaches. However, both techniques are tightly cou-
pled to a large sensor-network scenario with multiple cooperating sensors that send
their information to a fixed sink (base station). Xin et al. propose packet pass-
ports [LYWA06] based on symmetric keys and MACs to combat packet injection
and source address spoofing. Packet passports are attached to packets by relays
(i.e., special passport routers). Their approach provides protection on a per-domain
granularity. Protecting the first hop (e.g., a wireless link) or a domain-less scenario
is not possible. In Packet-Level Authentication [CLK05], every payload packet is
signed with elliptic curve cryptography that relays can verify. The relay can, there-
fore, identify injected and modified packets. However, signature verification in PLA
is CPU-intensive and requires specialized hardware to achieve throughput in the
order of hundreds of Mbit/s.
Hu et al. proposed sandwich chains as an efficient way of skipping hash chain verifi-
cations in time-synchronized systems with fixed disclosure intervals [HJP05]. Specif-
ically they discuss how their solution can be used to re-synchronize a TESLA receiver
with a sender if the receiver missed a large number of hash chain elements. Similar
to xChains, their solution introduces primary and secondary hash chains. Their so-
lution allows a receiver to efficiently catch up with a sender without computing the
complete sequence of intermediate hash chain elements. While the proposed solution
works for TESLA, it is not applicable to our scenario because it requires fixed dis-
closure intervals. With fixed disclosure intervals, Alice would have to disclose tokens
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(i.e., send packets) at a fixed rate. Since our solution uses tokens on demand and
supports variable transmission rates, this precondition is not met. Moreover, even
if Alice would disclose new tokens at a fixed rate, the rate would have to be very
high to achieve a throughput of hundreds of Mbit/s (ten thousands of packets per
second). In times of low or no network traffic, such high use of tokens wastes CPU
resources. Moreover, as the granularity of time synchronization required for sand-
wich chains is inversely proportional to the disclosure rate of the sandwich chain,
a time synchronization with a difference of few microseconds between the remote
communication peers and the middleboxes is required to operate sandwich chains at
such disclosure rates. Achieving such highly precise synchronization between end-
hosts and middleboxes in networks with roundtrip times of milliseconds or tens of
milliseconds (delays that are several orders of magnitudes higher than the maximum
tolerable synchronization error) is not trivial and is susceptible to synchronization
errors that break the security of the scheme. Therefore, sandwich chains cannot
provide the variable and high-frequency token disclosure required for SPOTS.
6.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we showed the applicability and efficiency of hash-chain- and hash-
graph-based source authentication tokens. To this end, we introduced SPOTS, a
family of token schemes. The regular verification of SPOTS tokens requires only
one hash computation, making the schemes notably cheap in terms of computation
cost. In contrast to previous work, SPOTS tokens achieve a considerably higher
resiliency against burst losses and DoS attacks, making per-packet source authenti-
cation feasible for high-volume streams in adverse scenarios. Our solution supports a
fine-grained adjustment of its properties, allowing to tailor the schemes to meet the
requirements of a wide range of target scenarios (e.g., network loss characteristics as
well as middlebox CPU and memory resources). Our evaluation shows that the to-
ken schemes can withstand volume-based and CPU-targeted DoS attacks. Hence, in
contrast to an unprotected connection, middleboxes can efficiently identify and drop
packets with forged tokens, thereby protecting legitimate traffic. Finally, we believe
that loss-resilient one-way authentication tokens are a versatile tool that can enrich
end-to-end security protocols with end-to-middle per-packet source authentication.
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7
Discussion and Conclusions
Cooperation and collaboration are powerful concepts to surpass the technical and
conceptual restrictions of a single device, application, and system. Over the last
decades, a range of cooperative network concepts have surfaced, enabling these net-
works to achieve higher coverage and availability or lower costs than non-cooperative
alternatives. However, the concept of cooperative network service provisioning also
creates new attack possibilities for malicious and selfish users. Many of these threats
arise from the lack of trust and accountability in such jointly operated networks.
Therefore, providing middleboxes with the capacity to authenticate the origin and
the integrity of forwarded network traffic is an important step in establishing this
trust. However, enabling such end-to-middle authentication in an efficient manner
is challenging because lightweight standard solutions mostly focus on protecting the
end-systems but not the middleboxes.
In this thesis, we addressed the problem of end-to-middle authentication on different
levels of granularity, ranging from infrequent signaling events to rapid verification
of high-bandwidth payload streams. The different security and performance re-
quirements of signaling and payload traffic prevent the creation of a one-size-fits-all
solution but require the use of specialized solutions. Hence, each of the presented
solutions makes unique trade offs to achieve its goals. Therefore, the three protocols
presented in this thesis show different security properties, operational requirements,
and performance.
7.1 Contributions
The main contribution of our work is the design and evaluation of three novel end-
to-middle authentication protocols for multi-hop networks. Beginning with an initial
analysis and extension of HIP as a public-key-based security protocol, we addressed
the problem of end-to-middle authentication for signaling traffic. As the performance
of public-key based schemes is limited to processing a few hundred authentication
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events per second on standard hardware, we analyzed more lightweight cryptographic
primitives to achieve rapid end-to-middle authentication for higher volumes of pay-
load traffic. Based on delayed secret disclosure schemes and hash-based authentica-
tion structures, we designed the Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for Hop-by-hop
Authentication, ALPHA. It achieves full end-to-middle source authentication and
integrity protection for high-bandwidth payload streams. Finally we introduced a
family of Stream-based Per-packet One-time Token Schemes, SPOTS, as a mech-
anism to further increase the authentication performance in scenarios that do not
require integrity protection but for which source authentication suffices.
The core challenge of our work was to create a set of mechanisms that are suit-
able for direct end-to-middle authentication. To this end, we evaluated different
cryptographic components that were previously used in an end-to-end fashion and
extended these to match the requirements of end-to-middle authentication. As a
result, we tied these techniques together into three coherent systems that provide
generic and efficient end-to-end and end-to-middle authentication.
In the process, of creating these end-to-middle protocols, we not only combined but
also adjusted and extended existing techniques. In particular, we extended the con-
cept of delayed secret disclosure to support end-to-middle authentication and high-
volume data transfers. Further, we introduced options for fast re-synchronization of
hash chains between senders and receivers in scenarios with variable transmission
rates. While these novel concepts are designed to be useful in the context of three
presented protocols, they can also serve as a building block of other protocols and
systems.
We showed that the proposed systems achieve the respective authentication goals at
high performance. This allows them to serve as an efficient security building blocks
for cooperative networks without limiting the performance of the network. Especially
the performance of ALPHA and SPOTS on our resource constrained wireless router
platform exceeded our expectations.
Besides providing the technical foundation for achieving the desired security goals,
we also focused on preventing Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the proposed
protocols and systems. To this end, we analyzed the potential for exploiting the
protocol mechanisms and designed and evaluated appropriate defenses to counter
memory-targeted and CPU-targeted DoS attacks.
For each of the presented solutions, we created working implementations and con-
ducted detailed performance analyses to quantify the impact of the additional se-
curity measures on the communication performance. Moreover, we designed and
analyzed different modes of operation for each protocol. These modes allow the
protocols to adapt to different requirements and conditions.
7.2 Challenges Revisited
All protocols presented in this work are designed and discussed in the context of
cooperative multi-hop networks. Section 2.3.1 highlighted the challenges for end-
to-middle authentication in such scenarios. This section summarizes how each of
the three protocols, HIP-MA, ALPHA, and SPOTS, addresses these challenges.
7.2. Challenges Revisited 205
Challenge HIP-MA ALPHA SPOTS
(C1) Decentralized
security bootstrap-
ping
PK based PK based,
anonymous
PK based,
anonymous
(C2) Cascaded middle-
boxes
yes
(limited by packet
size)
yes
(limited by packet
size)
yes
(C3) Heterogeneous
and resource con-
strained hardware
yes yes yes
(C4) Resilience to DoS
attacks
puzzle, return
routability check
efficient packet
processing
efficient packet
processing
(C5) No trust between
middleboxes
yes yes yes
(C6) Incremental de-
ployability
backwards
compatible with HIP
hosts
yes yes
(C7) Sufficient perfor-
mance in non-
attack situations
yes:
tens+
hundreds of hosts∗
yes:
≈ 25 Mbit/s+
≈ 200 Mbit/s∗
(depending on the
parameter choices)
yes:
≈ 45 Mbit/s+
≈ 250 Mbit/s∗
(depending on the
parameter choices)
Table 7.1 Overview of the requirements and their fulfillment by the three protocols. +: wire-
less router class device, ∗ PC class device. For a full explanation of the requirements see the
problem statement in Section 2.3.1.
Table 7.1 summarizes the results while the following descriptions briefly highlight
the properties of each solution regarding the challenges.
7.2.1 HIP Middlebox Authentication Extension
HIP-MA enables end-hosts to use self-generated public-key identities for authenticat-
ing to middleboxes. In combination with HIP certificates, this allows for decentral-
ized security bootstrapping (C1) without an on-line authentication server. Moreover,
HIP-MA can run over sets of cascaded middleboxes (C2) without increasing the load
of the end-hosts. However, the number of middleboxes on the path is limited by the
available space in the HIP control packets because each middlebox needs to attach a
piece of information to the HIP signaling packets it forwards. Hardware constraints
(C3) are most important for HIP-MA in the context of DoS attacks (C4) because
public-key operations are CPU intensive on resource constrained hardware. HIP-MA
implements a return routability check and a puzzle mechanism to slow down and
prevent DoS attacks against the middlebox. HIP-MA does not require any interac-
tion between middleboxes (C5) and even a single middlebox in a network can realize
the security benefits of HIP-MA (C6). Under normal conditions, the public-key op-
erations of HIP-MA perform sufficiently well (C7) on commodity wireless routers to
support tens to hundreds of associated HIP hosts. For more powerful PC-class mid-
dleboxes, our evaluation indicates that the authentication mechanism can support
hundreds to thousands of hosts or thousands of authentication events per second.
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7.2.2 Adaptive and Lightweight Protocol for Hop-by-hop Au-
thentication
Depending on the employed control protocol, different direct authentication options
without the need for a central authentication server are possible with ALPHA. For
example, ALPHA for IP implements a public-key based initial bootstrapping process
but other authentication options, including anonymous and unauthenticated opera-
tion, are possible as well. Similar to HIP-MA, cascaded middleboxes are supported
(C2) because each middlebox operates individually. However, relays may add addi-
tional information to ALPHA control packets. Hence, the depth of the cascade is
limited by the available packet space in these packets. ALPHA was designed to avoid
CPU intensive cryptographic operations. This allows it to achieve high throughput
on powerful PC-class hosts and sufficient performance on resource constrained wire-
less routers (C3). At the same time, the resource efficiency of ALPHA allows it to
mitigate DoS attacks. In addition it can block flooding-based DoS attacks against
end-hosts early on the communication path. ALPHA in combination with ALPHA
for IP is compatible with normal IP networks. A single middlebox can already per-
form all required functions (C6). However, end-host support for ALPHA for IP is
mandatory. Our evaluation systems achieved throughputs of above 200 Mbit/s on
PC hardware and 25 Mbit/s on a resource constrained wireless router. This al-
lows for full end-to-middle authentication and integrity protection of higher volumes
of payload traffic in cooperative wireless multi-hop scenarios without performance
reductions (C7).
7.2.3 Stream-based Per-packet One-time Token Schemes
Since we implemented SPOTS as an extension of ALPHA for IP, the same boot-
strapping options are supported by both protocols (C1). SPOTS efficiently supports
cascaded middleboxes. Besides from the bootstrapping phase, no limitations regard-
ing the depth of the cascade exist (C2). The flexibility of the SPOTS schemes and
the use of efficient hash functions allow to use SPOTS on a wide range of devices
from powerful PCs to resource constrained wireless routers (C3). In our evaluation
of the SPOTS schemes, we show that they can withstand different DoS attacks and
can prevent flooding based attacks against end-hosts. In SPOTS, all middleboxes
operate in an independent manner (C5), which aids incremental deployment (C6).
Our evaluation also shows that the performance is high for both high-performance
and resource-constrained devices. When using SPOTS, the PC middlebox can verify
125% of the throughput that ALPHA achieved and the resource constrained router
achieves up to 178% of the ALPHA throughput. Hence, compared to ALPHA, the
reduced set of security services offered by a SPOTS middleboxes allows it to fur-
ther increase the source-authentication performance. With up to 40 - 48 Mbit/s of
source-only authenticated throughput on a wireless router class device, the token
schemes show sufficient performance to support typical wireless throughput rates
in single-hop and multi-hop cooperative networks without creating new bottlenecks
(C7).
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Figure 7.1 Security features and interplay between HIP-MA, ALPHA and SPOTS. HIP-MA
can serve as a bootstrapping protocol to set up an ALPHA or SPOTS token protected payload
channel. ALPHA can serve as a mechanism to re-bootstrap the hash chains of the SPOTS
token schemes.
7.3 Interplay Between the Protocols
HIP-MA, ALPHA, and SPOTS explore different areas of the problem and design
space for end-to-middle authentication. Their different properties regarding the
offered security services and the resulting performance characteristics make each
protocol suited for different tasks in communication. However, the presented mech-
anisms and protocols are not isolated but can complement each other as well as
other protocols. Figure 7.1 gives an overview of the relation between the protocols
and their tasks.
HIP-MA, as a signaling protocol, is suited for setting up the necessary state between
the end-hosts and the middleboxes to enable subsequent payload processing by other
protocols (e.g., IPsec, ALPHA, or SPOTS). It is suited for this task because it pro-
vides the security services of peer-entity authentication, source authentication, and
integrity protection. Hence, it can be used to prove the identities of two communicat-
ing end-hosts to middleboxes and to bootstrap an integrity-protected end-to-middle
signaling channel. Although it provides all necessary security services for protecting
payload (e.g., piggy backed on HIP control packets), the insufficient performance
of the employed security measures prevents its use as an end-to-middle payload
protection protocol.
In contrast, ALPHA and SPOTS tokens require an existing end-to-middle signaling
channel (e.g., HIP-MA or ALPHA for IP) for bootstrapping an association. Af-
ter this bootstrapping phase, they can protect payload traffic at high throughput
rates. Both protocols can be seen as alternatives that serve different security needs.
ALPHA can support scenarios that require source authentication and integrity pro-
tection. This combination allows it to serve as a payload protection mechanism and
signaling protocol. In contrast, SPOTS sacrifices integrity protection for a higher
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performance. Both protocols are highly resource efficient because they restrict them-
selves to the use of cryptographic hash functions and derived cryptographic primi-
tives. This resource efficiency also allows ALPHA to serve as an efficient management
protocol for SPOTS.
Summarizing the roles of the protocols, HIP-MA serves as a signaling and bootstrap-
ping protocol while ALPHA and SPOTS serve as a payload protection protocol. In
combination, all three protocols can support all important stages of a communica-
tion, including setup, management, and payload delivery.
7.4 Impact of our Work
The results of the parts of this work were published at a number of scientific con-
ferences. Moreover, results of our work provided the basis for other research efforts.
We briefly highlight the impact of our work here.
We proposed and presented HIP-MA and related documents in the context of the
Internet Engineering Task Force. Ziegeldorf [Zie11] and Namal [NGB11] use the
extension as a part of their own communication systems. Our certificate extension
to HIP [HV11] was adopted as an IETF working group document and was published
as an experimental RFC standard (RFC 6253) in May 2011.
HIP-MA is an integral part of the Peer-to-peer Internet Sharing Architecture, PiSA
[HGWW08, HJH+10, HWV+11b], which serves as the technical foundation for the
network security layer of the Mobile ACcess project [Mob11]. The Mobile ACcess
project is a joint research and development project between nine organizations from
industry and academia with a total project budget of 3.5 Million EUR, funded by
the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia. The goal of the project is to establish
the technical foundations for a cooperative Wi-Fi sharing community for municipal
wireless networks.
Two independent and interoperable implementations of HIP-MA exist. One imple-
mentation is jointly maintained between RWTH Aachen University and Aalto Uni-
versity as a part of the HIP for Linux (HIPL) project [HIP07]. LANCOM Systems
GmbH, a vendor of wireless networking systems, maintains the second implementa-
tion for their LCOS router platform.
Since the first publication of our hash chain-based authentication mechanism in AL-
PHA [HGGMW08], our results and mechanisms have been adopted for the Packet
Level Authentication (PLA) protocol. This adoption resulted in the definition of
lightweight PLA variant for wireless scenarios (WPLA) [A. 09], allowing PLA to
achieve considerably higher throughput in the absence of hardware acceleration.
7.5 Future Work
During the research on the topics covered by this thesis, we encountered a number
of related research challenges that are not directly in the scope of this thesis but are
important in the context of end-to-middle authentication.
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7.5.1 End-to-middle Fragmentation Support
Fragmentation of an end-to-middle protected packets along the path can decrease the
efficiency of the presented protocols because the individual fragments may lack the
authentication information necessary for verification (see Section 5.7.2.3). There are
three possible options for addressing this problem: (a) reassembling the fragments
at middleboxes, (b) mitigating fragmentation by sending sufficiently small packets,
and (c) developing new message protection schemes that sustain fragmentation. In
this work, we resorted to the first two options. However, for cases that require
fragmentation, further research on fragmentable authentication schemes is required.
7.5.2 State Management at Middleboxes
The protocols presented in this work establish state at middleboxes to implement
efficient end-to-middle authentication. Hence, each middlebox along the commu-
nication path requires a certain set of information to operate properly. However,
relying on existing state at middleboxes poses a number of challenges. A loss of
state or the lack of state (e.g., because of topological changes and new middleboxes
on the communication path) may terminate the connection between the communi-
cating end-hosts. To circumvent this problem, ALPHA and SPOTS require a stable
path to avoid such failure conditions. However, integrated support for coping with
state loss and topological changes can open new areas of application for these pro-
tocols. One example for a promising use case without stable paths is lightweight
mobility signaling for resource constrained mobile devices that change their location
within a multi-hop network.
7.5.3 Interaction with other Protocol Layers
SPOTS and ALPHA protect a stream of authenticated packets. Thereby the pro-
tocols create a range of interdependencies between the packets of the stream. Ex-
amples for these interdependencies are the strict ordering of packets in SPOTS and
the burst-based packet transmission in ALPHA. Since these interdependencies do
not exist for normal IP packets, the two protocols change the behavior of IP from
the perspective of the transport layer. This changed behavior creates challenges for
protocols and protocol mechanisms in layers above and below the end-to-middle au-
thentication solutions. For example, middleboxes may drop out-of-sequence packets
in SPOTS or TCP may operate less efficient for highly bursty traffic in ALPHA.
Hence, a careful analysis of the interaction between the adjacent layers and an ap-
propriate design can further increase the performance of the complete system when
using ALPHA and SPOTS.
7.5.4 Other Traffic and Communication Patterns
ALPHA and SPOTS are designed for supporting arbitrary and dynamic traffic pat-
terns ranging from the delivery of few infrequent packets to the transmission of
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high volumes of bulk data. While this flexibility supports a wide range of applica-
tions, specialized protection mechanisms could further improve the performance of
the two protocols for specific traffic patterns. For example, the internal structure
of the SPOTS tokens could be adapted to require lower bandwidth when used with
constant streams of data without congestion or flow control. Similarly, the burst size
of ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M could be adapted to meet the bandwidth and latency
requirements of delay-sensitive applications. Finally, as discussed in Section 6.6.2,
apart from unicast, other communication patterns, such as multicast and broadcast
may be of interest for end-to-middle authentication.
7.5.5 Applications of End-to-Middle Authentication
This work presents different building blocks for enabling end-to-middle authentica-
tion. However, authentication is not the ultimate goal but presents a step towards
enabling more specific security-related tasks in a system. The next step for realizing
the potential of end-to-middle authentication is the design of systems that use the
proposed techniques to achieve their goal. In part, we have already taken this step
by designing and implementing example use cases, such as the Peer-to-peer Internet
Sharing Architecture [HGWW08, HJH+10]. Moreover, other researchers have al-
ready used some of our concepts for creating smart firewalls [Zie11] and for securing
network access in femto cell networks [NGB11]. However, further applications in
the areas of DoS prevention, access control, and accounting are possible. Finally,
a comprehensive study on existing and potential applications of our systems may
provide further directions for improving and extending the presented work.
7.6 Final Remarks
While analyzing the problems and considering candidate solutions for the mecha-
nisms and systems presented in this work, we encountered a wide range of exist-
ing generic end-to-end authentication concepts and methods. Selecting the cryp-
tographic mechanisms that are most suited for end-to-middle authentication and
combining them into coherent systems that provide the necessary security features
and performance characteristics was the main challenge of this work. We hope that
the presented selection of mechanisms and their adaptation to end-to-middle au-
thentication will prove both useful and inspiring to other researchers. We further
hope that future network security protocols will explicitly include middleboxes in
their design to leverage the possibilities and advantages that these devices can offer.
A
Additional HIP-MA Evaluation
Graphs
This appendix provides additional graphs for the evaluation of HIP-MA. These
graphs are equivalent to Figure 4.7 in Chapter 4. Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 show
the processing time required to process the different steps in the HIP base exchange
from the perspective of an Initiator and a Responder. However, in contrast to Fig-
ure 4.7 in Chapter 4, the following figures show the results that were obtained with
an ALIX middlebox instead of a PC middlebox. Since the performance of the mid-
dlebox does not affect the performance of the end-systems, the graphs in this chapter
and the graphs in Chapter 4 are almost identical. Therefore, we merely list the fol-
lowing figures for completeness. A detailed description of the evaluation setup and
an interpretation of the results can be found in Section 4.9.
212 A. Additional HIP-MA Evaluation Graphs
! #!!! $!!! %!!! &!!! "!!!! "#!!! "$!!! "%!!!




"	'"
#	$"
$	$'
$	$
(		
%		
%

"#$$(%
"$(%
(a) Processing time for a PC Initiator with 1024-bit RSA end-host keys and an ALIX middlebox
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(b) Processing time for a PC Initiator with 1024-bit DSA end-host keys and an ALIX middlebox
Figure A.1 Processing times for the steps of the HIP base exchange messages of the end-hosts
from the perspective of the Initiator. Connected message processing is represented by a dash
(/). For example, R1/I2 means that the bar represents the time for processing the incoming R1
message and for preparing the outgoing I2 message. This graph is equivalent to graph 4.7a-b
in Chapter 4. However, an ALIX middlebox was used instead of the PC middlebox.
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(b) Processing time for a PC Responder with 1024-bit DSA end-host keys and an ALIX middlebox
Figure A.2 Processing times for the steps of the HIP base exchange messages of the End-
hosts from the perspective of the Responder. Connected message processing is represented
by a dash (/). For example, I1/R1 means that the bar represents the time for processing the
incoming R1 message and for preparing the outgoing I2 message. This graph is equivalent to
graph 4.7c-d in Chapter 4. However, an ALIX middlebox was used instead of the PC middlebox.
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B
Additional ALPHA Evaluation Graphs
In the following, we provide additional plots of our ALPHA evaluation. These plots
use a single TCP connection instead of ten TCP connections as used in Section 5.9.3.
The graphs show less clear results because the effects of the TCP congestion and
flow control have a stronger influence on the throughput. Each sample point is the
mean value of five TCP throughput measurements for a 30 second test run. A more
detailed description of the evaluation setup can be found in Section 5.9.3.
The spikes in the curves of Figure B.1 for ALPHA-C and ALPHA-M at higher de-
lays and higher numbers of associations are caused by the interplay between the
TCP congestion and flow control mechanisms and the ALPHA for IP queue man-
agement. Instead of directly sending packets to the destination, ALPHA queues the
packet until an association reaches ready state and performs the S1/A1 exchange
before it sends a large number of queued packets at the same time. This queu-
ing behavior affects the delay and jitter that transport-layer protocols experience
and results in a different channel behavior compared to TCP. As a result, the TCP
flow control and congestion control mechanism does not always achieve a consistent
throughput performance. This results in subsequent TCP measurements with the
same ALPHA mode under the same network conditions that still differ by 10%. It is
noteworthy, that for these measurements, TCP achieves a steady throughput within
a connection. However, this steady throughout varies from TCP connection to TCP
connection. Using several TCP streams over ALPHA reduces these effects, as visible
in Figure 5.26 in Section 5.9.3. ALPHA-N does not deliver packets in bursts and
does not lead to a strong change in channel behavior. For ALPHA-N we did not
observe the TCP effects described above.
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(b) 1 ms round-trip delay
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(c) 10 ms round-trip delay
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(d) 30 ms round-trip delay
Figure B.1 End-to-end throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over a PC
middlebox without ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers of parallel
ALPHA associations and one single TCP connection. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
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Figure B.2 End-to-end throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over an
ALIX middlebox without ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers of
parallel ALPHA associations and one single TCP connection. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
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Figure B.3 End-to-middle throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over
a PC class middlebox with ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers of
parallel ALPHA associations and one single TCP connection. Solid lines are a guide to the eye.
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Figure B.4 End-to-middle throughput of ALPHA for IP for different round-trip delays over
an ALIX class middlebox with ALPHA for IP processing by the middlebox for varying numbers
of parallel ALPHA associations and a single TCP connection. Solid lines are a guide to the
eye.
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C
Additional SPOTS Evaluation Graphs
In this section we depict the SPOTS performance graphs for the ALIX mesh router.
The general properties of these results equal the results discussed in Section 6.5.
Therefore, we refer to the discussion in Chapter 6 for interpretations and explana-
tions. Due to the lack of multicore support and the weaker CPU of the ALIX device,
the measurement errors by concurrent operating system scheduling are higher than
for the PC middlebox. This is visible in the spikes in the CPU cycle graphs. These
spikes are not a result of token processing but are caused by concurrent processes.
In this appendix, we only provide graphs that are related to the CPU processing
cost because the token size as well as the required hash operations are independent
from the hardware that they are evaluated on.
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Figure C.1 Average CPU cycles for 1000 sequential token verifications without loss. The
results were generated on the ALIX middlebox in 10 runs of 1000 verifications. The coloring
of the bars indicates the loss resiliency of the scheme (see Figure 6.17)
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(b) Loss resiliency of 100 lost tokens
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(c) Loss resiliency of 250 lost tokens
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(d) Loss resiliency of 500 lost tokens
Figure C.2 CPU cycles required to handle different sequential loss lengths at the ALIX
middlebox. Graph (a) provides a comparison all token types while the other graphs focus on
different tolerable loss lengths without comparison with single hash chains. The plots of the
xTrees are printed in gray for better visibility.
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Figure C.3 Cost reduction for skipping token verifications. The cost of verifying all tokens is
used as reference (100%). The residual cost of xChains and xTrees decreases with the number
of lost tokens. The results show the residual cost as experienced by the ALIX middlebox.
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Figure C.4 CPU cycles for creating a token source with 100000 tokens (ALIX middlebox,
mean of 10 runs). The coloring indicates the range of omissible tokens (see Figure 6.17).
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